HomeToGo Stock

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and a warm welcome to HomeToGo's earnings call following the publication of the H1 figures of 2026. I'm delighted to welcome Co-Founder, Mr. Andre and CFO, Sebastian Bielski, who will speak in a moment. After the presentation, we will move on to a Q&A session in which you will be able to ask your questions directly to the management.

Let's dive straight in, Sebastian, the stage is yours.

Actually, I will hand over back to Patrick because Patrick will start today.

All right.

Good morning, everyone, and thank you for joining HomeToGo's Half Year 1 2026 Earnings Call. As you have seen in our report published this morning, we delivered a strong first half of 2026, characterized by the disciplined and successful execution of our strategic road map.

Following a transformative 2025, our half year 1 results clearly demonstrate that our strategic evolution and scale transformation are in full swing and delivering tangible results across the group. But let's now look at how we structure today's call. We want to give you a clear and comprehensive picture of our performance and momentum. We will begin with a brief summary of our half year 1 highlights, followed by a detailed update on the progress we've made against our strategic goals for 2026. And then we will walk you through our financial results for the first half of this year in depth before reviewing our financial guidance for the full year of 2026.

To wrap up, we will summarize our key takeaways before opening the floor for your questions. So let's dive in. To kick things off, let's look at the overarching highlights that defined our performance in the first half of 2026 on a statutory basis. First and foremost, we achieved a significant improvement in overall group year-over-year profitability. Our adjusted EBITDA grew substantially by 26.6% year-over-year in half year 1 and has even accelerated in quarter 2 with a year-over-year increase of 58.6%.

This development reflects our continuous advancement in expanding the group's profitability. Plus, we massively improved our free cash flow by an exceptional EUR 53.2 million year-over-year, reaching EUR 48.2 million in free cash flow in the first half of 2026 alone. Second, a key element behind this is HomeToGo PRO.

Our B2B segment more than tripled its IFRS revenues to EUR 105.2 million, representing an impressive growth of 250.5% year-over-year, primarily driven by the consolidation of Interhome. Third, our disciplined strategy in the Marketplace segment continues to boost profitability. Marketplace adjusted EBITDA improved by 16% year-over-year, while still delivering a new booking revenues backlog record for the end of half year 1, validating our strategic shift towards high-margin conversion and marketing efficiency.

Fourth, on the strategic front, the launch of HomeToGo Originals strengthens our position as Europe's leading vacation rental group. This new umbrella brand for our group's property management companies highlights HomeToGo as one of the Europe's largest direct suppliers of vacation rentals, backed by a strong and growing portfolio.

Fifth, our AI leadership is driving measurable operational and marketing efficiency gains. Deep group-wide AI adoption is delivering tangible ROI and significantly faster time to market for new product innovations.

And finally, backed by the solid first half performance, we reaffirm our financial guidance for the full year 2026. With that high-level summary in mind, let's move to the next section of our call and take a closer look at the concrete progress we've made against our strategic goals for 2026.

We introduced our 2026 strategic road map earlier this year to provide a clear and transparent framework to track and discuss our progress throughout the year. Now I'm pleased to share that we are executing successfully across all 5 pillars. But let me walk you through the overview of our year-to-date progress.

First, on finalizing the Interhome integration. Our TSA exit and cost synergy road map remains fully on track to achieve our initial EUR 10 million in annualized cost savings until the end of 2026. We are currently executing several large restructuring projects to capture the remaining cost synergies.

Second, in HomeToGo PRO, we continue to build out our strategic M&A engine. The bolt-on acquisitions closed in the first quarter of 2026 have now been successfully integrated. We are actively scaling our capabilities, expanding our dedicated M&A and post-merger integration resources as we sought additional asset deals for the second half of the year.

Third, regarding group-wide brand harmonization, we officially launched HomeToGo Originals, our new umbrella brand uniting our core property management businesses. This unified market presence builds deeper ecosystem trust, enables seamless cross-company switching and serves as a powerful catalyst to reduce customer acquisition costs.

Fourth, on driving operational excellence in the marketplace. Our strategic decision to prioritize profitability over top line growth is paying off. Despite cutting advertising spend by 16% year-over-year, we achieved a record end of quarter 2 booking revenues backlog of EUR 71.9 million, which is up 1% year-over-year, while still delivering a strong 16% increase in marketplace adjusted EBITDA for the first half of the year compared to half year '25.

And finally, on maintaining our AI leadership. AI adoption across the group is driving tangible measurable efficiency gains. In marketing, latest AI-generated ad tests achieved an impressive 44% lift in ROS alongside 60% lower video ad production costs. At the same time, we significantly accelerated operations and are well on track to drastically reduce time to market for product development.

So overall, our disciplined execution across all 5 strategic priorities continues to strengthen our foundation and drive sustainable profitability across the entire group. Let's now dive deeper into our first strategic pillar. The integration of Interhome and the substantial value creation it unlocks across the group. As a reminder, when we closed the transaction, we set an initial target of EUR 10 million in annual cost synergies to be realized within 12 to 18 months.

I'm pleased to report that our execution remains ahead of schedule. Year-to-date, we have already captured approximately EUR 6 million of these cost synergies on an annualized basis. The strong momentum is backed by an accelerated TSA exit, and we have successfully exited 8 transitional service agreements to date with 2 TSAs in the second quarter and at least 3 additional exits on track for quarter 3.

Crucially, we remain fully on schedule to exit all remaining TSAs, including our largest and most critical milestone, the migration of the Interhomes SAP. To capture the remaining cost synergies until year-end, we are now executing several large restructuring projects that were prepared during quarter 2. Beyond these initial cost savings, we continue to drive our midterm value creation road map, which adds an additional EUR 20 million in upside and brings our total midterm synergy and value creation potential to approximately EUR 30 million.

Also there, we made excellent headway on 2 key drivers. First, tech-driven efficiency and sales growth. We successfully deployed HomeToGo's core CRM platform across Interhome's shared service center, optimizing operational efficiency while significantly enhancing sales capabilities to unlock commercial upside. And second, distribution margin internalization. We expanded our own direct booking channel share by more than 5%, allowing us to retain a higher share of the distribution margin directly within the group.

So all in all, this progress clearly demonstrates that Interhome is not only delivering on its cost reduction commitments ahead of plan, but is rapidly turning into a major high-margin profit driver for HomeToGo.

Now moving up to our second strategic pillar, expanding our M&A engine within HomeToGo PRO to lead the consolidation of a highly fragmented European market. To put the scale of this opportunity again into perspective, if you look at the left side of the chart, you see that Europe's core vacation rental destinations comprise roughly 70 million properties in total. When we narrow this down to rural and marketed vacation homes, we arrive at a serviceable addressable market of roughly 2.5 million homes.

Our primary focus within HomeToGo PRO lies in this targeted market, especially for externally managed homes, representing around 900,000 properties operated by more than 100,000 local vacation rental management companies across Europe. As you can imagine, this landscape is characterized by extreme fragmentation. Most of these hyperlocal agencies manage fewer than 100 properties suffered from low tech adoption and face clear operational inefficiencies.

On top, the top 3 players, including us with HomeToGo Originals combined hold only about 10% of the total market share, presenting us with a tremendous long-tail roll-up opportunity. Following the proven success of our Interhome acquisition, we are actively scaling our vacation rental property management business with our buy-and-build strategy. I'm pleased to share that the first 3 gold acquisitions we closed in quarter 1, adding roughly 200 new units across Switzerland, Italy and Spain to our property management portfolio have already been successfully integrated and are fully bookable via the Interhome and HomeToGo platform.

To build on this transaction, we are expanding our dedicated internal M&A team and ramping up our post-merger integration resources. This infrastructure allows us to even more systematically process deal flow and swiftly onboard new inventory. Looking ahead to the second half of 2026, we are actively sourcing and expect to close additional value-accretive asset deals to continuously broaden our property management footprint.

Now on to our third strategic pillar that we already touched on before, harmonizing our group-wide brands through the launch of HomeToGo Originals. As we continue to expand our property management footprint, establishing a unified and recognizable identity is essential. HomeToGo Originals now serves as our new umbrella brand for our property management companies, Interhome and [indiscernible] Through this, what we call long brand initiative, we are connecting key physical and digital customer touch points across the entire travel journey.

Whether a guest recovers a home on our digital marketplace or visits one of our local service offices in destination, as illustrated in the storefront markup on the right on this slide, HomeToGo Originals clearly signals vacation rentals that are mostly managed directly within our group with our trusted end-to-end service.

From a strategic perspective, this cohesive presence significantly strengthens brand recognition and build deeper trust across our entire ecosystem by seamlessly bridging the gap from initial online search and booking to professional property management and all the way to actually the physical stay. Importantly, this unified identity also unlocks substantial B2B synergies for HomeToGo PRO. By aligning our market presence under one strong roof, we make it easier for homeowners and property managers to transition across our portfolio. This cohesive structure acts as a powerful catalyst to strengthen our overall PRO offering and will ultimately drive down customer acquisition costs across the group and/or increase lifetime value, however you want to see it.

Now let's dive into our fourth strategic pillar. The HomeToGo B2C marketplace. Here, our objective remains clear for clear. We strictly prioritize growing profits over pursuing top line volume. And looking at the left side of the slide, you can see the deliberate strategy is directly reflected in our half year 1 numbers. While the Marketplace IFRS revenues intentionally dipped by 10.2% to EUR 58.8 million, driven by our conscious reduction in ad spend, our booking revenues backlog actually increased 1% year-over-year.

At the same time, segment profitability improved substantially with adjusted EBITDA increasing by 16% year-over-year to a negative EUR 16.8 million, up from negative EUR 20 million in H1 '25. This earnings progress is powered by a structural transformation in our marketing efficiency shown on the right. Over the past year, we have fundamentally optimized our cost structure.

Group marketing and sales expenses as a percentage of IFRS revenues decreased to a new record low of just 54% in half year 1 '26, representing a massive 31 percentage point reduction compared to the 85% in half year 1 of last year that you can see on the slide. By maintaining strict discipline in our B2C marketing spend, we continue to proactively reallocate capital into HomeToGo PRO, where we see superior growth potential and higher risk-adjusted returns.

So for the remainder of this year, we will stick firmly to this playbook, lowering marketing investments, maximizing marketing efficiency and enhancing profitability. While this means an intentional resetting of the marketplace revenue base, it ensures the segment operates as a highly efficient, high-margin cash generator for the entire group this and especially in the coming years. But let's take a closer look at one of the clearest proof points of our operational excellence and marketing efficiency in the Marketplace segment.

On this slide, on the left side, you can see the significant deliberate reduction in advertising spend. We intentionally scaled back our marketplace ad spend by 16% year-over-year, bringing it down from EUR 16.5 million in half year 1, '25 to EUR 51 million in half year '26. This nearly EUR 10 million cost saving is a direct result of our disciplined strategy to prioritize high-margin conversion and bottom line profitability over sheer transaction volume.

Remarkably, as shown on the right side, despite this EUR 9.5 million reduction in marketing investment, we successfully expanded our marketplace booking revenues backlog to a new end of quarter 2 record of EUR 71.9 million, up 1% year-over-year, showcasing what we can do also with lower marketing spend.

Now on to a closer look at the underlying health of our marketplace, specifically our regional booking mix and the evolution of our average basket sizes. Starting on the left with our regional booking revenue share for quarter 2. The DACH region continues to represent our core foundation, accounting for 52% of total marketplace booking revenues, up 3 percentage points year-over-year. The rest of Europe contributed 26%, up 1 percentage point year-over-year, reflecting healthy and sustained demand across European destinations. North America contributed 22% to our mix, down 2 percentage points year-over-year. This is a market where we continue to operate selectively under our advertising model. And the rest of the world remained stable at under 1%.

Moving to the right side of the chart and our basket size evolution. We saw resilient customer demand across all geographies. Our basket size in quarter 2 grew by 5% year-over-year to reach EUR 1,056. Looking for that into the individual regions. In the DACH region, average basket size increased by 10% year-over-year to EUR 891 and when excluding the short trip business, it climbed by 8% to EUR 1,263. The rest of Europe followed a similar positive trend with basket sizes rising 4% year-over-year to EUR 1,183.

Finally, North America continues to generate our highest absolute order values with average basket sizes reaching EUR 1,603, up 2% year-over-year. Overall, and this is important, this broad-based expansion in basket sizes underscores our success in targeting high-value, longer-stay travelers, further supporting our high-margin strategy across all key markets.

Turning to our fifth pillar. And the final one, maintaining AI leadership. Given the broader market debate around how generative AI might impact digital search and discovery, we want to clearly address where AI represents a structural net positive for HomeToGo. Generally, vacation rentals are unique and no commodities like hotels. So on one hand, it's harder for people to let AI choose the right one.

On the other hand, it's about vacation. And thus, the selection process is for many the first part of the actual vacation. So you can imagine the total opposite of a stay in a hotel for a business trip. But even in a scenario that AI takes fully over the selection process, we are likely the best prepared in the industry.

First, the HomeToGo Group generates more than 80% of its adjusted EBITDA with HomeToGo PRO, effectively insulating the vast majority of our group profits from potential B2C search traffic shifts. Looking at HomeToGo PRO on the left, our core profitability is protected by physical mode and unreplicable on-ground services. So the property management business relies fundamentally on local physical services that are simply not easily -- not easy to replicate. This protects our business model overall in particular from big tech players that deliberately avoid capital-intensive local operations, especially when you need to build them up from scratch. Even more, a potential B2C shift traffic -- search traffic will likely increase the direct traffic to our properties. So outside of OTAs and would actually help us further internalize margin.

Second, turning to the HomeToGo marketplace side on the right. We've always solved problems of aggregating the largest selection of vacation rentals with the lightest machine learning before AI was talked about by everyone. So we were also among the first leveraging the new capabilities of AI that arrived at the end of 2021 at 2.

Our early AI adoption brought us integrated personalized AI-powered travel planning on our platform since '23, launching nice tools and features like AI summaries of reviews and descriptions even before the biggest tech players and so much more we dI'd in the first -- we did first in the vacation rental space.

Today, we have also deployed our own native HomeToGo model contracts protocol MCP to allow autonomous AI agents and third-party LLMs directly access -- direct access to our inventory, turning AI platforms into highly efficient low-cost acquisition channels. Beyond these known customer-facing innovations, internal AI adoption is radically accelerating our daily operational efficiency and delivering measurable margin expansion across the group. So that's something we haven't spoken so much about yet. Let's take a look.

Today, 100% of our workforce has access to AI tooling with 15 active tools leveraging all leading frontier models across every department. This is supported by a successful training proof of concept with over 100 employees, enabling nontechnical teams to use AI frontier models natively. So via common line interface or CLI, if that's something that you are familiar with, and securely in a secure sandbox environment.

Let me highlight 3 areas of the many parts where internal use is already delivering tangible ROI. First, in marketing. AI-generated response search ads are now outperforming copy at near zero generation cost, driving a 44% lift in return on advertisement spends in many of our tests. In video production, AI tools have enabled us to cut costs by more than 60%.

Second, we take a look into product development. Time to market has been drastically shortened. The standard example is our new partner center featuring natural language interface, which our engineering teams built and deployed in just 4 weeks, a process that previously would have taken us 6 months.

And third, in operations, process automations have enabled 3x faster customer e-mail response times, reduced unit chat escalations by 85%, as we discussed prior, and cut turnaround times for standard vehicle contract drafts by up to 95% for specific parts of the business.

In summary, AI is not just a future vision for HomeToGo. It's an operational reality, actively widening our competitive moat, driving marketing efficiency and accelerating our profitability already today. So this concludes the first part of our presentation on the strategic and operational highlights for the first half of this year. As you have seen, our strategic evolution into a B2B-led powerhouse, complemented by a strict marketplace efficiency and AI leadership is actively delivering tangible high-margin results across the group.

To now give you a more granular look at how this strategic process and progress translates into our detailed half year 1 financial performance and the actual segment dynamics, I will now hand over to our CFO, Sebastian. Thank you very much. Sebastian, the floor is yours.

Thank you, Patrick, and a warm welcome to everyone from my side as well. I am pleased to walk you through our financial results for the first half of 2026. It was characterized by strong top line expansion, accelerating profitability momentum driven by a very strong second quarter and a remarkable surge in our free cash flow performance. Let's dive straight into the financial highlights for the first half of this year.

Let's take a closer look at our statutory P&L comparison for the first half of the year. To be clear, this comparison looks at our H1 2026 performance against the figures as reported in the first half of 2025, which at that time did not yet include Interho. Let's start with the IFRS revenues. We delivered significant statutory revenue growth of 71.8% year-over-year, reaching EUR 160.1 million. This strong jump is driven by the full consolidation of Interhome, which was not part of the group's reported figures for the first half of last year.

Next, we look at the cost of revenues. Cost of revenues increased to EUR 41.4 million, reflecting a structural shift in our business model due to the inclusion of Interhome's managed service operations, which incurred substantial direct expenses such as cleaning and laundry services.

Next, we'll look at product development and operations. Here, expenses increased to EUR 25.7 million. This was driven by a larger workforce following the Interhome consolidation alongside increased software license fees.

Next, we look at G&A expenses. These expenses reached EUR 21.8 million. This increase mainly reflects the full consolidation of Interhome, bringing its personnel-related software license and third-party service expenses directly into the group's expanded cost base. Last, we look at the adjusted EBITDA and the margin expansion.

So adjusted EBITDA improved by 26.6% year-over-year to negative EUR 15.1 million. This was driven -- this drove a large margin expansion of plus 12.6 percentage points, improving our adjusted EBITDA margin from negative 22.1% in H1 of last year to negative 9.4% in this year. This clearly demonstrates how we are delivering on our 2026 targets by driving group profitability through strong marketing efficiency and a significantly widened revenue base.

Now let's take a closer look at the composition of our IFRS revenues and adjusted EBITDA by segment for the first half of the year, again, on a statutory basis, comparing our current scale to the prior year period when Interhome was not yet part of our reported figures. I will start with discussing IFRS revenues. At the group level, we realized a big step change with 72% year-over-year growth to EUR 160.1 million of IFRS revenue.

For HomeToGo PRO, the standard driver is our volume-based revenue, which grew by 412% to EUR 91.1 million, reflecting the full impact of the Interhome consolidation. In addition, subscription revenue expanded by a strong 16% to EUR 14.1 million, mainly driven by very good performance at Smoobu. For the marketplace, overall IFRS revenue declined by circa 10%. This decline was expected and reflects the strategic shift away from a focus on top line growth to a focus of growing earnings and came on the back of a 16% reduction in marketing spending.

Within IFRS revenue for the marketplace, the shift between advertising revenue and on-site revenue continues with advertising revenue declining by 26%, while on-site revenue actually grew by 4%. For HomeToGo, on-site revenue carries a much higher strategic value as it provides a superior customer experience throughout the entire booking journey.

Furthermore, it enables us to achieve customer ownership, fostering long-term relationships and driving repeat business. Consequently, we continue to work actively with our partners to transition them from the advertising model to the on-site booking model. I will now discuss adjusted EBITDA. At the group level, we improved our statutory adjusted EBITDA by 27% to negative EUR 15.1 million, demonstrating significantly enhanced operating leverage. HomeToGo Pro turned profitable, delivering a positive adjusted EBITDA of EUR 1.7 million.

For the Marketplace, further proving our operational discipline, segment adjusted EBITDA improved by 16% year-over-year to negative EUR 16.8 million. Overall, I would like to remind you of the seasonal pattern of our business. In Q1, we invest into customer acquisition to capture the bookings. In Q2, we start to see revenue coming in and profitability increases. But our by far strongest quarter in every year is Q3, where we generate the majority of revenue and earnings. We are seeing the exact same pattern also in this year.

So our strongest quarter for revenue and earnings is yet to come in Q3 of this year. I would now like to provide more transparency and clarity on the more significant items below adjusted EBITDA in our statutory P&L for the first half of this year. First, share-based payments stood at EUR 7.9 million compared to EUR 7.1 million last year. These remain noncash expenses related to our long-term incentive program. We have discussed the setup of our long-term incentive program and the accounting treatment of share-based payments in much detail in our last full year call, and I would like to point you there in case you have any questions on this matter.

The appendix of this presentation also contains a slide with some additional detail. Second, one-off costs totaled EUR 3.4 million for the first half of this year, essentially flat year-over-year. These were primarily driven by integration costs of EUR 1.7 million as we continue to execute on synergy realization from the Interhome acquisition. We also have a slide with some more detail on one-off items in the appendix of this presentation. Third, amortization and depreciation.

Amortization of fair value step-ups from M&A increased to EUR 10.4 million, which was up from EUR 5.3 million in the first half of last year. This reflects noncash charges recognized as part of the purchase price allocation for Interhome. Regular amortization of intangible assets stood at EUR 3.6 million. I would again point you to the appendix of this presentation in case you're looking for more detail. Fourth, net financial income came in at a negative EUR 14.6 million, comprising EUR 400,000 in interest income at EUR 14.1 million in interest expenses. There were a lot of items driving this post, so I will go into more detail.

So within the EUR 14.1 million of interest expenses, there were EUR 3.2 million for the full amortization of transaction costs related to the old loan, which we repaid in March 2026. There was EUR 3.1 million in actual interest on the new Nordic bonds. There was EUR 2.6 million relating to the deferred consideration for Interhome and EUR 1.4 million in interest on the old loan, which we repaid in March of this year. Further noncash items included a EUR 1.9 million revaluation of the call option that we have for the remaining 49% of Getaway Group, along with smaller accounting adjustments for the Nordic bond prepayment option, interest hedges and lease interest.

In summary, while our statutory net income is impacted by these noncash accounting effects and integration-related items, our underlying operational momentum and profit expansion are clearly visible in our significantly improved adjusted EBITDA and also our really positive free cash flow trajectory.

Let's now take a closer look at our like-for-like P&L comparison for the first half of this year. As a reminder, the like-for-like basis compares our statutory financial results for the first half of this year against pro forma financial results for the first half of last year, which includes Interhome and eliminate any distortions created by the timing of the acquisition of Interhome, which only closed on the 28th August of 2025.

Again, we'll start with IFRS revenues. IFRS revenues came in virtually flat at EUR 160.1 million, down slightly by 0.2% year-over-year. This reflects a stable overall top line development despite our deliberate strategic decision to deprioritize revenue growth in the Marketplace segment and the decline -- the managed decline in the Marketplace segment was offset by very good revenue growth in our B2B business.

Next, we look at cost of revenues. Cost of revenues increased by 6.3% to EUR 41.4 million. This includes a EUR 1 million increase in payment costs due to the higher adoption of HomeToGo payments by our partners, which also led to a material improvement in our net working capital as well as EUR 600,000 increase for additional cleaning staff and EUR 400,000 in higher costs for domains and hosting. Next, we look at marketing and sales. We achieved a significant cost reduction of 11.1% with expenses decreasing to EUR 86.2 million. This positive shift was driven by EUR 9.5 million lower performance marketing expenditures year-over-year as we rigorously focus on operational efficiency and margin protection, particularly within the Marketplace segment.

Next, we look at G&A. G&A expenses decreased by 5.2% to EUR 21.8 million. This reduction was primarily driven by the materialization of operational synergies and the successful exit of traditional services agreements for Interhome. Next, other income. Other income decreased to EUR 1.4 million, which was driven by lower other income at Interhome, which actually had an unusually high value for the baseline of last year.

Lastly, overall, our adjusted EBITDA improved significantly by EUR 7.3 million on a like-for-like basis or 32.6% year-over-year to negative EUR 15.1 million, expanding our adjusted EBITDA margin by 4.7 percentage points to negative 9.4% -- this strong like-for-like progress, especially on EBITDA, clearly confirms the power of our group strategy, which is to combine the scaling of our high-growth B2B segment with strict marketing and cost discipline in our B2C business.

Now let's dive into our IFRS revenues and adjusted EBITDA by segment for the first half of 2026, again, comparing these on a like-for-like basis, that means including Interhome for the comparison period for last year. Let's start again with IFRS revenues. On a group level, as I already said, overall revenues remained stable at EUR 160.1 million. For HomeToGo PRO, we saw solid progress across both revenue streams. Volume-based revenues expanded by 5% year-over-year to EUR 91.1 million, while subscription revenues grew even stronger by 16% year-over-year to EUR 40.1 million, which again was driven by very good performance at -- for the marketplace, overall IFRS revenues declined by circa 10%. This decline was expected and reflects a strategic shift away from a focus on top line growth to a focus of growing earnings and came on the back of a 16% reduction in marketing spending. Within the IFRS revenues for the marketplace, the shift between advertising revenue and on-site revenue continues with advertising revenue declining by 26%, while on-site revenue grew by 4%.

For HomeToGo PRO, on-site revenue carries -- for HomeToGo on-site revenues carries a much higher strategic value as it provides a superior customer experience throughout the entire booking journey. Furthermore, it enables us to achieve customer ownership, fostering long-term relationships and driving repeat business. Consequently, we continue to work actively with our partners to transition them from the advertising model to the on-site booking model.

Now looking at the adjusted EBITDA. At the group level, we significantly improved adjusted EBITDA by EUR 7.3 million or 33% year-over-year to negative EUR 15.1 million. HomeToGo PRO was a standout performer, delivering a swing in profitability to reach positive EUR 1.7 million, up from negative EUR 2.4 million in the same period of last year. This clearly demonstrates the strong underlying earnings power and synergy potential of our B2B operations, especially in Tahoe.

In the Marketplace segment, the segment adjusted EBITDA improved by 16% year-over-year to negative EUR 16.8 million, a direct result of our profitability first strategy and disciplined marketing and cost execution.

Let's now move to our liquidity development and cash generation profile. On the left-hand side of this chart, you can see our cash bridge for the period, starting with the 31st December of last year until the 30th of June of this year. In the first half of 2026, HomeToGo generated a remarkable EUR 55.3 million in positive net operating cash flow, powered by a surging EUR 52.7 million in Q2 alone. Driven by the strong operational cash performance, our cash and cash equivalents advanced from EUR 91.6 million at year-end to EUR 134.7 million as of June 30 of this year.

Moving to the right side. In order to provide more transparency, let's walk through the bridge from our operational earnings to our underlying unlevered free cash flow for the first half. We start with adjusted EBITDA, which improved by EUR 5.5 million year-over-year to negative EUR 15.1 million. From there, we deduct CapEx payments for intangible assets of EUR 5.8 million, which mainly relate to capitalized internal software development expenses and CapEx for PP&E of EUR 1.2 million. We then account for interest and principal payments for leasing of EUR 3.3 million and income tax paid of EUR 3.5 million.

Finally, we factor in the primary engine of our cash performance in the first half of this year, a very strong EUR 77.2 million cash inflow from the change in net working capital, a significant EUR 48.6 million improvement over the first half of last year. The key contributors were a EUR 56.4 million increase in other liabilities, mainly driven by seasonal advanced payments from travelers as well as a EUR 23.2 million increase in trade and other payables. The result, our underlying unlevered free cash flow surged to positive EUR 48.2 million in the first half of this year, a massive EUR 50.7 million swing compared to negative EUR 2.5 million in the first half of last year. Achieving this impressive cash generation clearly underscores our enhanced cash conversion power, which, to be honest, is very much driven by the further implementation and ongoing very good take-up by partners of the HomeToGo payment product and also the successful optimization of our operational cash cycles. Let's now turn to our balance sheet strength, especially looking at our net debt position and covenant headroom as of June 30 of this year.

Our total gross debt stands at EUR 209 million. This comprises EUR 101 million face value of our Nordic bond, EUR 81.3 million in deferred payments related to the Interhome acquisition that we still need to pay over the next 3 years and EUR 26.6 million in lease liabilities. Offsetting this gross debt, we hold EUR 134.7 million in cash on our balance sheet and also EUR 9.8 million in cash held in escrow. This brings our total net debt to EUR 64.5 million.

Moving to the right. Under the documentation of the Nordic bond, HomeToGo has to adhere to 2 maintenance covenants. The first covenant is the leverage ratio defined as net debt to last 12 months adjusted EBITDA. This covenant requires us to remain below 4.5x as of June 30 of this year. Based on our net debt of EUR 64.5 million and an LTM adjusted EBITDA of EUR 49.8 million, our leverage ratio stood at a very healthy 1.3x, well below the required threshold. The other covenant is the minimum cash position. The requirement is a minimum of EUR 20 million. As of June 30, our total cash position, including cash held in escrow stood at EUR 144.4 million, providing a substantial liquidity buffer.

In summary, all maintenance covenants for the Nordic bond are met with very comfortable headroom, fully underpinning the group's financial stability and strong balance sheet. With our strong first half financial performance and operational execution laying a solid foundation, let's now turn to our outlook and financial guidance for the full year 2026. Based on our solid performance in the first half of this year, we are confirming our financial guidance for the full year 2026. We reiterate our target of IFRS revenues of between EUR 400 million and EUR 410 million and adjusted EBITDA between EUR 45 million and EUR -- looking closer at how we expect to deliver within these target ranges. First, regarding IFRS revenues. We currently expect full year results to come in towards the lower end of our guidance range. The driver for the softer revenue outlook are lower-than-expected demand in our ancillary short trips business, which is being impacted by softer consumer sentiment and also forest fires throughout holiday destinations in Southern Europe.

But crucially, overall demand in our core vacation rental business remains as expected. Second, looking at adjusted EBITDA, we expect bottom line performance to come in towards the upper end of our guidance range. Our strong focus on profitability in the HomeToGo marketplace, combined with very good progress on synergy realization is providing us with increased confidence in our bottom line execution. To wrap up our presentation, let's summarize the 4 key takeaways from our performance in the first half of this year.

First, exceptional top line growth and significant profitability improvement. Group IFRS revenues increased by 72% year-over-year to EUR 160 million. Group adjusted EBITDA improved substantially by almost 27% year-on-year to negative EUR 15.1 million, driven by accelerating growth in the second quarter of plus 59% year-over-year. Second, HomeToGo PRO scales rapidly as the group's main revenue and profit driver.

Our B2B segment delivered extraordinary growth with IFRS revenues more than doubling by 250% year-over-year to EUR 105.2 million, now accounting for approximately 66% of total group revenues, while segment adjusted EBITDA turned distinctively positive. Third, we saw a surge in free cash flow, driven by the successful Interhome integration, seasonal cash conversion and optimized working capital, also driven by the further adoption of the HomeToGo payment product. Free cash flow surged to EUR 48.2 million in the first half, up from negative EUR 5 million in the first half of last year, advancing our cash position to EUR 134.7 million.

Lastly, we are reaffirming our guidance for this year, backed by a strong H1. We reiterate our full year guidance of EUR 400 million to EUR 400 million for IFRS revenues and EUR 45 million to EUR 47 million in adjusted EBITDA, now tracking towards the lower end of the range for IFRS revenues and towards the upper end of the range for adjusted EBITDA.

With that, we thank you very much for your attention today. We will now open the floor for your questions.

Yes. Thank you so much for your presentation. We will now move on to the Q&A session. [Operator Instructions] With that said, we have received some written hands and I send an invite to Mr. [indiscernible]

Solid set of numbers. First question for Patrick. encouraging to see your average basket size actually going up. I think that's on the industry, probably at best a stable development. Maybe you can share some comments on overall sort of booking behaviors and how you see that -- yes, you're faring against the competition on that respect.

Yes, happy to. Yes. So like part of it is obviously like our marketing efficiency topics that we like said we strategically put on our radar for this year, where we said like we will try to cover higher conversion and higher basket sizes. So like people that may have an interest in book also like a bigger vacation or like spend more. And this is basically also reflected if you compare it in regards to the overall market that we have been able to not only lower our ad spend and nonetheless get a higher booking revenues backlog, but also like some part of it is targeting specific consumer segments that are actually letting us profit from that in the basket size development.

Okay. And then Sebastian, a few questions for you. Thanks for providing the pro forma P&L. That's very helpful the transparency there. But if I look at the Q2 isolated, the EBITDA -- adjusted EBITDA improvement is only marginal. Can you remind us like how we should look at those cost synergies? It seems like they all came sort of in Q1 -- anything we should have in mind there? And on that, also, could you remind us the -- for the pro forma EBITDA for Q3 last year, I think I had EUR 69 million in mind. Could you confirm that?

On the EBITDA for Q2 in isolation, like 2 effects that I want to point out that are important to know, and that's why I think actually looking at half year is probably the much better metric. It is timing of Easter. So Easter was in Q2 last year, and it was actually in Q1 of this year. So because of the way we recognize revenue, that means that a lot of revenue has actually shifted between quarters. So Q2 this year is kind of like negatively impacted by that because some of the revenue and then also EBITDA actually shifted towards the first quarter.

So again, I would invite you to look at H2 because that is a much better comparison. Then for Q3, I would point you to our Q3 presentation that we gave last year. In the appendix, you will find the full pro forma P&L, including Interhome on a quarterly basis. So you can actually look it up there, too.

Okay. And then finally, on the free cash flow, yes, great performance there. I know you don't give guidance on that number, but maybe sort of more on a qualitative level, how we should expect that figure to pan out in the next quarters, that will be very helpful.

Yes. So the seasonality pattern that we see in revenue and EBITDA, we obviously also see in cash, right? So we get cash prepayments from our travelers, especially in the first half. When then the traveler is actually taking the holiday, we also have to pay out money to the host, especially at Interhome. So we have a very seasonal pattern. For those of you who were part of the Nordic bond fundraising last year, there were a couple of slides in the presentation materials back then where we showed the seasonal cash pattern, especially for Interhome, Tim, I'm happy if you don't have those materials to shoot them over after this call. The cash pattern will follow the same patterns as last year, also this year, right?

Another raise hand we do have from Mr. Nagarhash.

I just had a couple of questions. Could you share how much traffic you're currently getting from third-party LLMs and AI agents? That's the first question.

And the second question, with regards to your PRO business, the 3% growth on a pro forma basis, is that in line with your expectations for this year? And what kind of growth are you looking to get to in the medium term for this business and the steps you're taking to get there, please?

So on the LLM, look, I think the answer to that is, I think the most importantly is like we don't get many bookings through them, right? So LLM is -- that is all very, very early. I think probably the bookings I do personally with HomeToGo every year probably outpace the combined volume of all bookings we ever received through an LLM. So this is really early adoption of technology. We do believe that much more bookings will migrate to this panel in the future.

So we want to be positioned very early on in there. We want to learn. But economically, it doesn't have any material impact at all for us at the moment. Then on your second question for B2B. So yes, it is in line with our expectations. So we're actually quite happy with the B2B performance that we're seeing and our midterm expectations remain the same. So as we have also discussed in prior calls with you.

Okay. All right. May I just ask one more question then. With regards to Smoobu subscriptions, any color on the seasonality with regards to new subscriber adds? And the growth in Smoobu, is that being currently driven by the new subscriber adds or price increases or anything else to talk about?

Yes. So the growth in Smoobu is driven by new subscribers, actually. So it's not driven by price increases mainly this year. And there is not much seasonality profile necessarily when it comes to subscriber growth. It's more driven by campaigns that we run at Smoobu where we try to push for subscriber growth. So there's not that much seasonality profile in there.

Another rise in hand by Mr. [indiscernible]

I have 3 questions, if I may. On the wildfires we are currently seeing, I guess that makes Southern Europe in summer increasingly more or less attractive destination, maybe also some DACH regions. Can you say something how do you see the impact of that on your business model? I mean, probably summer months are very important for HomeToGo. Maybe you can share your thoughts on that one, if that's possible.

Secondly, it seems -- I would like to understand that short-term trips seems to be much more important in the DACH region than elsewhere. Is it because most of your customers are in the DACH region and they are more -- tend to be more attracted by short-term trips? Or what's the reason behind that? And lastly, on HomeToGo Payments, you said that the you incurred additional cost of EUR 1 million. for HomeToGo payments. But overall, my understanding was always that this is a very positive feature for HomeToGo because you are able to manage more effectively your net working capital when it comes to payments, customer prepayments, et cetera. Can you confirm that? That would be my 3 questions.

Yes. So on the first one, on the wildfires, I think the wildfires per se, they -- like we do see cancellations in the areas which are specifically impacted by the wildfires, right? So we do see cancellations. Overall, they're not exceptionally meaningful for us right now, right? But it is a rapidly developing situation, and it's very, very hard to forecast wildfires.

So we just need to see and hopefully, it's all going well and there is rain coming. I think the broader question, to be honest, is more what the impact of climate change in Europe will do to holidays because when you live in Germany and you are already suffering from heat, you probably are not really looking to take a holiday in Southern Europe where it's even hotter. So what we do see is an increasing interest in holidays in northern destinations. So for example, the Baltic Sea, where we are also very strong, has had a very, very good year this year. So people are looking towards taking holidays there.

From industry, we also know that Scandinavia had a very, very good year this year, which is an area where we are currently underrepresented. So it's definitely an area we're looking at to grow in the future. And we do see that some southern destinations, for example, Croatia are actually suffering this year, right? So climate change and the expectation that the heat patterns will continue in Europe and that's like hot summers like we had this year will probably be the norm in the next couple of years will definitely have an impact on where people want to take holidays. And we, as a travel provider, need to adjust to that, and we need to make sure that our destination portfolio is also well equipped to cater for that. Then the second one on DACH.

So yes, our short-term business is really a very German business, right? So it's Kodolfureen that is a business that is catering towards German customers, taking short trips in Germany. So think about taking a short trip with your wife to, I don't know, go to Munich and see the Opera or something like that. And this is definitely a part of our business where we do see negative consumer sentiment coming through. So there is less interest in this kind of booking. It's seen as a more -- as an item of spending that people can do without in contrast to the big summer holiday, which is the driver for our core vacation rental business.

So this is definitely one part of our business where we see negative sentiment unfortunately playing against us. And then on HomeToGo Payments, yes, you're absolutely right. So we obviously have higher payment fees as more and more of our partners are using the payment product, but the benefit far outweighs the cost. It's, number one, a much better customer experience. So overall conversions are positively impacted by that. Number two, the cash flow is also positively impacted because we get the money in earlier if people use our payment infrastructure. So it's a very, very good thing if more and more people use that.

We have in hand by Mr. can you hear us?

All the details already provided. A couple of questions from my side. First of all, in the future, I mean, it's about AI. And in the future, if I got it right, HomeToGo could be more an inventory provider than for the AI models. You said that is, of course, not immediate impact. But looking ahead, what does it mean on your business model? And what -- how could that impact take rates, for example, first question.

Second question is on M&A. I mean perhaps a word on that. You touched on that in the past. It was always a topic. I mean, are you working on a short list here? And how is your priority in regards to M&A versus debt reduction, for example? How do you look at that? And last one, perhaps some words on the negative EPS trend in H1 versus H1 last year. How do you think about the quality of your net income given that the higher PPA, higher financing costs and higher SBC effects?

Thank you, Volker. I take the first question and Sebastian will take the second and the third. So in regards to AI, so like as mentioned by us, we see the LLMs as a potential addition or like somehow replacing direct traffic channel. So because people might turn not only that they go directly to OpenAI ChatGPT or usethropic, but also like within the integrated AI mode of Google when they search, you obviously have like this kind of LLM interaction there, right? And so what HomeToGo has always been doing is not only like going after our own like website, but we had from some time ago like the HomeToGo DopperGanger product, which is allowing third parties to access HomeToGo inventory. And this is something we further went after with building this MCP so that LLMs can theoretically directly access our inventory via the MCP protocol.

So like really trying to build like a standard if people want to connect to the largest selection of vacation rentals. And you can imagine, as we have like good relations with Google, but also OpenAI and others are eager to connect to our large amount of inventory, we believe that this is an interesting kind of traffic channel in general. In regards to take rates, that shouldn't change something. We actually expect that customer acquisition costs like in terms of ad spend would rather be lower on that side and especially for our HomeToGo PRO part of the business, as you said, right?

So there, what we take as take rates for like managing the house, like maintaining it, cleaning it and so on, that is not affected by AI. Furthermore, we also believe there that the acquisition costs will get lower as more people might get directly to, for instance, the Interhome inventory instead of needing to pay another OTA margin in between. So like take rates stay the same, but like margin likely goes up because we don't have to share part of our take rate with third parties.

So just for clarification, in the end, it would be that the customer could book via an LLM at HomeToGo property without having seen the website of HomeToGo in this booking process, right?

No, at the moment, this is not how these things are happening, right? Like because also...

Music. I mean not in the moment, that is right. In the future, you're thinking about the way I described it.

So like as I said, right, like so all of these things take longer usually than you expect, but we prepare for such a future because like Google, for instance, is currently testing. You might have seen that in the U.S. that you can directly within their AI mode basically book hotels. So not only search them, but book them. And so it could also be that this is something that will come usually a little bit later due to European regulations to the EU. But like at some point, it might definitely come. And as we have also on the inventory side with Google Vacation Member Finder and Google Hotel Finder, a good kind of relation to Google. We expect also this at some point being part of this because as I said, right, like for us, it's about that our properties get the bookings and not necessarily that they always have to have happened via the HomeToGo marketplace.

Sorry, I will take over for the second and third question now. The second question was on M&A, if we have a short list and whether we prioritize debt reduction or M&A. So yes, we absolutely have a short list that we are working on. As Patrick has also explained in his presentation, we are also increasing overall our M&A deal capacity. So we're both increasing the number of people on the sourcing and execution of M&A deals as well as on the integration side. So we want to be able to do many more deals, especially the smaller deals. And we are very focused on deals in the property management sector, which is in line with what we had said before.

So we generally want to do M&A deals only on the B2B side and especially on the property management side. We -- as I explained, we are thinking about our portfolio as well strategically, right? So which regions we are buying at. So at the moment, we're probably not that interested in doing deals in Croatia, but we would be really interested to do deals in Scandinavia, for example. And with debt reduction, we can only repay all at once for the loan.

So we cannot repay it partially under the terms of the loan. So yes, so we probably wouldn't do that anyway at the moment. We have a good M&A pipeline. We're pretty excited about that. We can do deals at very good multiples. So we see a much better return on deploying capital there rather than repaying the debt. Then lastly, your question on net income. What I want to reiterate is -- when you look at where the deterioration comes from, it is coming from the net financial result, right, which is at negative EUR 4.8 million and then also the much higher depreciation and amortization. So within the almost EUR 50 million of net financial result, the actual interest cost in there is about EUR 5 million. So there is EUR 10 million of noncash accounting stuff in there. So is this really a good indicator towards underlying earnings power? In my personal opinion, no, but everybody has to from their own opinion. And then the higher amortization charge comes from the M&A-related amortization for Interhome. All of that is noncash. Again, it is also accounting driven.

So in my personal view, the reported loss says very little about underlying performance or underlying earnings power. And the story really is about EBITDA and free cash flow generation. So that's my personal opinion on that.

Thank you so much. We actually have some more questions in our chat box, 5 to be exact. I would say we will start with a couple of questions by Mr. Johannesen. His first question is pro forma adjusted EBITDA is higher on LTM than your full year guidance. Do you essentially expect a decline in H2?

There are obviously 2 different metrics, right? So LTM adjusted EBITDA is 100% certain. So that relates to history. So I know it with certainty. And then guidance relates to the future. And as much as I still are wishing for a crystal ball to be given to me for Christmas, my wish hasn't come true yet. So by definition, we're always a little bit more cautious about the future. So the guidance we have actually increased in this call, right? So to the upper end of the guidance. And I think that stands on itself.

All right. The second question would be to understand working capital movements in H2, where do you see leverage ending '26?

So we do not give a guidance for end of '26 leverage. But as I explained before when I was talking to Tim, the seasonal cash patterns will be the same ones as -- or very similar as last year. So I know that you know the presentation materials because you were involved in the fundraising, so I would just point you to there.

Thank you very much. His third question is, can you provide a time line on the expected realization of the remainder EUR 4 million synergies up to the EUR 10 million target?

Yes. So as Patrick has said, we are working on it. I mean there's also been some news reporting about that in the B title, for example. So they will be realized in the second half.

All right. His last question, what is the latest update around further M&A bolt-ons?

Yes. As I just said when talking to Mr. Volker, we have an M&A pipeline. We're working on that. We are picking the deals that we're doing. So there is no deal that we must do. So we're looking for a deal which -- deals generally speaking, which fit our strategic criteria, which is it needs to be on the B2B side, especially in property management, it needs to fit the geographic search focus that we have, and it needs to be priced well. We're in multiple discussions at the moment, and we expect to do deals in the coming weeks and months.

Thank you. There are 2 more questions by Mr. Braun. I will read them out one by one. The first one is, you are evidently planning a restructuring. What does this entail? And what impact will it have on the financial figures?

Yes. So as Patrick has also explained during his presentation, the restructuring is part of the synergy realization. So it's getting those last EUR 4 million until the end of the year. There is a couple of larger projects that we're working on, and that is the restructuring that is mentioned. So one of them entails discussion with the workers' council, which we have started recently. As those discussions are ongoing, we cannot give specific guidance on the restructuring costs involved.

All right. The second question would be the quarterly report mentions a compensation claim against the former owners of Interhome. What is this about? And what risks does it pose for HomeToGo?

Yes. So I would point you to Note 6 in the half year report. There's actually a lot of detail on your question in there already. So this relates to a tax matter at Interhome. It all relates to the period well before our ownership. There's about EUR 26 million in risk there, tax risk, of which EUR 18 million relates to back taxes and EUR 8 million to interest and penalties. We have taken a liability as part of the purchase price allocation for that. But most importantly, we've also created an asset, which is exactly the same amount. And why have we created that asset? Because we have an iron flat indemnification from the seller towards that. So the net risk for us is zero because any back tax and interest and penalties are to the account of the seller, and we are working through that at the moment also together with the seller.

Perfect. Thank you so much. We have 2 more remaining questions in our chat box. One is, can you expand on your free cash flow expectations for the full year? This would be very helpful since the lack of a free cash flow guidance has been a concern for investors. Also, can you reconfirm your midterm aspiration for approximately 20% EBITDA margins in the midterm and share your current thoughts on a sustainable FCF EBITDA conversion level for your business model?

Yes. I mean we do not give free cash flow guidance. So we also do not want to start with that right now, especially with bond investors, I've gone through the -- how the cash flow works and what kind of like the constituent parts of cash flow are in detail many, many times. So I would point to that. I think there is a lot of knowledge within investors about that. And yes, I can reconfirm our midterm aspiration for the EBITDA margins.

All right. Last question for today. What is the needed cash buffer to be able to sustain seasonal swings in working capital?

Look, I would probably point you to the number that is the second maintenance covenant test, which is the EUR 20 million, right? And so we had about EUR 144 million. I think the EUR 20 million, which is the maintenance level is a good proxy for that.

All right. Thank you so much. As we have not received any more questions in our chat or risen hands, I would say we now come to the end of today's earnings call. You will find the presentation on HomeToGo's website and also at the airtime platform by clicking into today's event. Dear participants, thank you for joining and your interest in HomeToGo. If you should have any further questions at a later time, please feel free to contact Investor Relations. Thanks once again. Have a nice day, and goodbye.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and a warm welcome to HomeToGo's investor and analyst call following the publication of the Q1 figures of 2026. I'm delighted to welcome CFO, Sebastian Bielski, who will speak in a moment. After the presentation, we will move on to Q&A session, in which you will be able to ask your questions directly to the management. Let's dive straight into the presentation. Sebastian, the stage is yours.

Thank you very much, and good morning, everyone, and thank you for joining HomeToGo's Q1 2026 Earnings Call. As you have seen in our report published this morning, we had a strong start to 2026 characterized by the disciplined and successful execution of our previously outlined strategic road map. Following a transformative 2025, Q1 results demonstrate that our scale transformation is in full swing.

Let's look at how we structure today's session to give you a clear picture of our continued momentum. Our call is divided into 3 main chapters. I will start by highlighting the key takeaways from our strong start to the year and our overall performance in Q1, both for our statutory financials and on a like-for-like basis. To wrap up, I will walk you through the latest progress against our 2026 strategic road map and our reaffirmed financial guidance for the full year before we open the floor for your questions.

Let's dive straight into the first chapter. We will start with the key highlights for the first quarter of 2026. First, we achieved strong group profitability. Adjusted EBITDA for the group improved by EUR 7.2 million, representing a 21% year-on-year increase on a like-for-like basis. This performance was driven by a substantially improved marketing efficiency and tight cost control. Additionally, we are seeing the first materialization of synergies from the Interhome integration yielding its first tangible benefits. Secondly, HomeToGo_PRO has become our successful new center of gravity. Our B2B segment has officially established itself as the new core for the group, now accounting for 66% of total group IFRS revenues. The segment showed excellent momentum with a 40% year-on-year increase in adjusted EBITDA on a like-for-like basis. IFRS revenues for PRO grew by EUR 4.3 million or 13% year-on-year.

Thirdly, we had disciplined execution of our strategy for the Marketplace segment. We continue to prioritize profitability over top line growth in our Marketplace segment. This strategic shift, including the continued transition from advertising to on-site or booking revenue, resulted in a 12% year-on-year increase in adjusted EBITDA. Notably, our booking revenues backlog reached an all-time high for a first quarter despite a 20% lower advertising spend. This record backlog sets a strong foundation for the coming months and provides us with very good visibility for our revenue generation in Q2 and Q3.

Next, we saw a significant turnaround in operating cash flow. We achieved a positive operating cash flow of EUR 2.6 million in the first quarter of this year. This marks a very substantial EUR 13.4 million year-on-year improvement compared to the negative EUR 10.8 million we saw in the first quarter of last year. This swing into positive territory was primarily driven by our strong and disciplined working capital management. Lastly, we are also reconfirming our guidance for 2026. Based on the good start into the year and the successful execution of our strategic road map, we confidently confirm our targets for the full year. We expect IFRS revenues in the range of EUR 400 million to EUR 410 million, and we reiterate our adjusted EBITDA guidance of EUR 45 million to EUR 47 million.

Moving ahead, we will dive straight into the financial details for the first 3 months of this year. Let's take a closer look at our like-for-like P&L comparison. Please note that the like-for-like basis refers to a comparison of the statutory financial results for the first quarter of this year against the pro forma financial results for the first quarter of last year. That means including Interhome in order to eliminate any distortions created by the timing of the first-time consolidation of this very significant acquisition. First, we look at the IFRS revenues. On a like-for-like basis, IFRS revenues remained flat at EUR 59 million. This reflects a stable top line development despite our deliberate strategic decision to deprioritize revenue growth in the Marketplace segment in favor of profitability. The intentional negative growth in our Marketplace segment was offset by a very good positive growth in our B2B segment.

Secondly, the cost of revenue. It increased slightly by 4.2% to EUR 16.9 million. This was driven by a EUR 0.5 million increase in payment costs due to the higher adoption of the HomeToGo payment offering by our partners. While this negatively impacts this P&L item, it was also a very important driver which led to the very material improvement of our net working capital position, which we will discuss later in more detail. Next, we look at the marketing and sales line item. We saw a significant improvement of 15.2% with costs decreasing to EUR 45 million. This is the result of an EUR 8.1 million lower advertising spend, mainly in the Marketplace segment. We are clearly focusing on operational efficiency and margin improvement, especially again within the Marketplace segment.

Next, a look at the G&A cost item. This cost item decreased (sic) [ increased ] by 12.4% to EUR 10.9 million. The primary driver was a EUR 2.3 million in savings from the termination of transitional service agreements related to the Interhome integration. These savings were partially offset by a EUR 0.8 million increase in personnel expenses as we transferred some employees from Hotelplan, the former owner of Interhome, to be employed directly by Interhome. Lastly, and most importantly, adjusted EBITDA improved by EUR 7.2 million or 21% year-on-year to a negative EUR 26.8 million. This strong like-for-like progress confirms our group strategy, combining the scaling of our high-growth and high-profitability B2B segment with strict marketing discipline in our B2C business.

Now let's dive into our IFRS revenues and adjusted EBITDA by each segment for the first quarter of 2026. Again, we will be comparing these on a like-for-like basis. Let's start with IFRS revenues. On a group level, overall revenues remain stable at EUR 59 million. For the Marketplace segment, IFRS revenues in Q1 declined by circa 20%. The main driver here were the deliberate reduction in advertising spending of 20% as well as the ongoing shift from advertising to on-site booking revenues. While on-site booking revenues declined by just 4%, advertising revenues declined by 33%. For HomeToGo, on-site booking revenue carries a much higher strategic value as it provides a superior customer experience throughout the entire booking journey.

Furthermore, it enables us to achieve customer ownership, fostering long-term relationships and driving repeat business. Consequently, we continue to work actively with our partners to transition them from the old advertising model to the on-site booking model. It is, however, important to note the differing accounting treatments for these 2 revenue streams. Advertising revenue is recognized at the point in which a click or booking is made, whereas on-site revenue is only recognized once the stay has taken place. The strategic shift from advertising to on-site booking revenues, therefore, results in a planned timing effect, moving revenue from Q1, which is the primary booking quarter, into Q2 and Q3, which are the primary travel quarters. HomeToGo_PRO showed strong revenue growth across both revenue streams. Volume-based revenues grew by 10% year-on-year to EUR 32 million, reflecting especially a strong start into the year for Interhome. Subscription revenue from our SaaS software offering, especially from Smoobu, increased significantly by 24% to EUR 6.9 million.

Let's now move over to adjusted EBITDA. At a group level, we significantly improved adjusted EBITDA by EUR 7.2 million or 21% to a negative EUR 26.8 million. Hereby, it is important to note that Q1 and Q4 are always our weak quarters for profitability due to the typical seasonal patterns of our business. HomeToGo_PRO is a standout performer this quarter with a substantial 40% year-on-year improvement reaching negative EUR 6.7 million. This clearly demonstrates the underlying profitability and synergy potential for our B2B operations. In the Marketplace segment, adjusted EBITDA improved by 12% year-on-year to negative EUR 20.1 million. This progress is the direct result of our profitability first strategy, driven by higher marketing efficiency and disciplined cost management across our B2C business.

Moving from the like-for-like view to a comparison of our statutory results. To be clear, this comparison looks at our current performance against the figures as they were reported in Q1 2025, which at that time did not yet include Interhome. For IFRS revenue, we saw a significant statutory growth of 71.5%, again reaching EUR 59 million in the quarter -- first quarter of this year. This jump is driven by the full consolidation of Interhome, which was not part of the group's reported figures in Q1 of last year. Cost of revenues increased to EUR 16.9 million, reflecting a structural shift in our business model following the acquisition of Interhome. This is due to the inclusion of managed service operations from Interhome, which incurred substantial direct costs such as cleaning and laundry services.

Next, we'll look at product development and operations. These expenses increased to EUR 12.9 million. This is simply a reflection of a larger workforce following the consolidation of Interhome into the group. Marketing and sales remained stable on an absolute basis at EUR 45 million despite a significantly larger revenue base. This efficiency was primarily driven by reduced advertising spend, particularly within the Marketplace segment.

G&A expenses reached EUR 10.9 million, remaining relatively flat despite the group's increased size. This stability highlights the first realization of integration synergies, particularly the termination of transitional services agreements and disciplined overhead management. Overall, the adjusted EBITDA margin expanded, and this all led to a massive margin expansion of 35.8 percentage points, improving from a negative 81.3% in the prior year to 45.5% in the first quarter of this year. This, again, clearly demonstrates how we're delivering on our 2026 targets by driving group profitability through marketing efficiency and a significantly widened revenue base.

Now let's also take a closer look at the composition of our IFRS revenues and adjusted EBITDA by segment for the first quarter, again, on a statutory basis comparing our current scale to the prior year period when Interhome was not yet part of our reported figures. For IFRS revenues on the group level, we realized a massive scale transformation with almost 72% year-on-year growth to EUR 59 million. For HomeToGo_PRO, the standout driver is our volume-based revenue, which jumped by 690% to EUR 32 million. This, again, is the result of the consolidation of Interhome. Additionally, as I said before, subscriptions grew by a strong 24% to EUR 6.9 million. For the Marketplace, we see the continued strategic shift. Again, advertising revenues declined to EUR 9 million as we also prioritized profitability, while booking and on-site revenues remained relatively stable at around EUR 11.6 million.

For the adjusted EBITDA on the group level, we improved our statutory adjusted EBITDA by around 4% to negative EUR 26.8 million despite the significantly larger operational base. HomeToGo_PRO reported an adjusted EBITDA of negative EUR 6.7 million. The year-on-year change of minus 30% in this view is a direct result of the statutory comparison, as the Q1 2025 figures did not yet include the full operational cost structure and seasonal Q1 profile of Interhome. For the Marketplace, again, we see further proof of our operational discipline, and adjusted EBITDA for this segment improved by 12% to negative EUR 20.1 million.

Let's turn to one of the most significant proof points of our operational excellence this quarter, our marketing efficiency in the Marketplace segment. On the left-hand side, you can see the significant reduction in advertising spending. We intentionally reduced our advertising spend by 20% year-on-year, bringing it down to EUR 29.2 million from EUR 36.5 million in the first quarter of last year. This is a clear result of our disciplined strategy to prioritize high-quality profitable growth over pure volume. Despite this massive EUR 7.3 million reduction in marketing investment, we successfully grew our booking revenue backlog to a new Q1 all-time record of EUR 75.4 million, as shown on the right-hand side of this slide.

The ability to lift the backlog to new record levels while simultaneously cutting spend by 1/5 is an exceptional achievement for our teams. It demonstrates the increasing efficiency of our marketing engine and the strong underlying demand for our on-site booking offering. This record backlog provides us with high visibility and a strong tailwind for our revenue recognition in the coming quarters.

Let's now take a closer look at the health of our marketplace, specifically our regional booking mix and the evolution of our average basket size. We start with the regional booking revenues share, which you can see on the left. The DACH region remains our most important market, accounting for 53% of total booking revenues on the marketplace, which is a slight 1% increase year-on-year. The rest of Europe's share remains relatively stable year-over-year at 24%, and North America now accounts for 23% of our regional mix. This is a market in which we mainly operate under our advertising revenue model and in which we operate very opportunistically.

Now I'll comment on our basket size evolution, which you can see on the right. Overall, our marketplace basket size grew by about 3% year-on-year to an average of EUR 1,178. This growth is mostly driven by our European core markets. In the DACH region, the average basket size increased by about 9% year-on-year to EUR 1,412 when excluding our short-term trip business. The rest of Europe followed a similar positive trajectory with basket sizes climbing about 4% year-on-year to EUR 1,413. North America continues to represent our highest absolute value with an average basket size of about EUR 1,738 despite a year-on-year reduction in the basket size value.

I would now like to provide more transparency and clarity on the more significant items below adjusted EBITDA in our statutory P&L. I'll start with share-based payments, which remained relatively stable year-over-year at about EUR 4.7 million. These are noncash expenses, and they relate to our long-term incentive programs. One-off items below adjusted EBITDA totaled EUR 1.5 million for the first quarter. These were primarily driven by integration costs of about EUR 1.3 million as we continue to generate synergies from the Interhome acquisition. Now looking at amortization and depreciation, we saw amortization of fair value step-ups from M&A increased to EUR 5.4 million, which is up from EUR 2.6 million in the first quarter of 2025. This reflects the increase in noncash charges following the purchase price allocation for the Interhome acquisition. Regular amortization of intangible assets stood at about EUR 1.8 million.

Now also a look at the net financial income. This net financial income decreased to EUR 8 million, primarily due to several specific effects. It includes the full amortization of remaining transaction costs related to our old bank loan, which account for about EUR 3.2 million, and the unwinding of the discount on the deferred consideration for Interhome of about EUR 1.3 million. It is important to highlight that both of these are noncash effects. Actual interest on external debt during the first quarter of this year amounted to about EUR 1.8 million. In summary, while our net income is impacted by these noncash and integration-related items, the underlying operational progress is clearly visible in our significantly improved adjusted EBITDA and cash flow trajectory.

Moving into 2 special topics I would like to spend time on as we continue to receive questions from our investors, starting with the development of depreciation and amortization. For Q1 of this year, total D&A charges amounted to about EUR 9 million, relatively unchanged compared to Q4 of last year. But it also represents a significant step-up compared to the EUR 4.4 million in the first quarter of 2025 and is driven by the acquisition of Interhome. The largest part of D&A, about EUR 5.4 million, relates specifically to M&A-related intangibles such as brand, customer relationships and software. These were recognized as part of the purchase price allocation from past M&A transactions, of which Interhome was the largest.

The Interhome acquisition is also the driver of the increase in M&A-related amortization from EUR 2.6 million per quarter in Q1 to Q3 of last year to the EUR 5.4 million seen in Q1 of this year. It is very crucial to remember that these M&A-related charges are entirely noncash and do not impact our operational liquidity. Other G&A components include depreciation of PP&E, which stood at about EUR 1.8 million. This reflects our current office and infrastructure footprint and the amortization of internally generated software stood at about EUR 1.7 million. We were asked for an outlook on these items for 2026 by a number of investors for your financial modeling. We expect overall expenses for depreciation and amortization for the full year 2026 to be approximately EUR 36 million.

Moving to our second deep dive, an overview of the P&L effects of share-based compensation. Total share-based compensation charges for the first quarter stood at EUR 4.7 million, remaining consistent with the Q1 2025 level. The main drivers continue to be our virtual stock options, VSOs, of about EUR 3.0 million. Those are the dark blue buckets. And restricted stock units, or RSUs, at EUR 1.7 million, those are the purple buckets. LTI expenditure was elevated in Q2 and Q3 of last year. This is a direct result of certain contractual commitments, specifically the 4-year contract extension for our CEO, Patrick, and a new 3-year contract for me as incoming and new CFO.

Quick reminder on the accounting. These costs appear higher during the renewal periods, which are usually in the first quarter every year because they are front-loaded in the P&L according to IFRS standards rather than being spread evenly over the vesting period. Again, we've asked -- been asked by investors for a full year outlook for share-based compensation. We currently expect the total P&L impact from share-based compensation for the full year of 2026 to remain stable or even slightly lower compared to 2025. It is also important to note that these are noncash charges and under current IFRS rules are not mark-to-market, meaning they don't fluctuate with the current share price once granted. There is also no catch-up or restatement of these costs if the share price changes.

Let's now move to our liquidity development and cash generation profile. On the left-hand side, you can see the significant improvement of our operating cash flow. As highlighted earlier, we achieved a significant milestone with a positive operating cash flow of EUR 2.6 million in the first quarter of this year. This represents a big swing of plus EUR 13.4 million compared to the prior year quarter, where it stood at a negative EUR 10.8 million. It is a clear testament to our improved operational health and cash generative power early in the year. On the right-hand side, you can see a bridge from adjusted EBITDA to unlevered free cash flow. This is a metric which we have especially discussed during the Nordic bond roadshow and which we decided to include now because we know that we don't just have shareholders anymore, but also bondholders who are also very interested in this.

So to provide full transparency, we walk through the bridge from our operational earnings to our unlevered free cash flow now. We start with our adjusted EBITDA, which improved by EUR 1.2 million year-on-year to negative EUR 26.8 million. From there, we deduct our CapEx, specifically EUR 2.7 million for capitalized software and about EUR 0.5 million for CapEx for PP&E. We then account for interest and principal payments for leasing of about EUR 1.4 million and income taxes, which we paid in the first quarter, of about EUR 2.3 million.

Finally, we factor in the most significant driver for this quarter, the change in net working capital. We generated a substantial cash inflow of EUR 33.2 million from net working capital in Q1. This is a significant EUR 11.6 million improvement over the previous year. Key contributors were the efficient management of trade receivables with an EUR 8.2 million higher inflow than in the first quarter of last year and an increase of other liabilities of about EUR 8.2 million, which were mainly driven by advance payments from travelers. The result of this is a near breakeven unlevered free cash flow in the first quarter. Driven by this disciplined cash management, our unlevered free cash flow improved by EUR 12.1 million to reach negative EUR 0.5 million. Achieving this improvement in a seasonally low first quarter is a result we are particularly proud of.

Let's move to the next chapter of our presentation, the progress on our strategic goals for this year. As you may recall, we introduced our 2026 strategic road map in March of this year to provide a clear and transparent framework. We are successfully executing our strategic road map. Let's look at our year-to-date progress across our 5 key pillars. First, we are looking at the finalization of the Interhome integration. We are moving at a high pace, successfully exiting 2 more transitional services agreements in Q1. And most importantly, we have now captured EUR 6 million of our EUR 10 million annualized cost saving target.

Second, we look at the strategic M&A in the HomeToGo_PRO segment. We continue to pursue our buy-and-build roll-up strategy for vacation rental property managers. Year-to-date, we have already closed 3 bolt-on acquisitions in the property management space in Switzerland, in Italy and in Spain. These were highly value-accretive deals, adding about 200 units under management at an exceptionally attractive multiple of less than 1x EBITDA. Third, we're looking at the harmonization of group-wide brands. Following the successful presentation of our HomeToGo Originals umbrella brand at the ITB in March, we are moving into the next phase. We are on track to launch our co-branding initiative for Interhome and Kraushaar properties in the second quarter of this year, significantly enhancing our global brand's presence and trust.

Fourth, we continue to drive operational excellence in the marketplace. This is our most significant operational proof point this quarter. As discussed previously, we achieved a new Q1 record in booking revenues backlog. We delivered this result while simultaneously reducing our advertising spend significantly by 20% year-on-year, demonstrating a massive leap in marketing efficiency and ROI. Finally, we're also working to maintain our leadership position in AI. We remain at the forefront of the AI revolution in travel. Our HomeToGo MCP is now launched and our HomeToGo ChatGPT app is live, allowing generative AI users and autonomous agents direct access to our vacation rental inventory. Looking ahead, we are already working on our next integration with Anthropic's Claude, ensuring HomeToGo remains the essential partner for the next generation of AI-driven commerce. This comprehensive road map directly fuels our financial ambitions for 2026.

Based on our performance in the first quarter, we are confirming our previous guidance for the full year 2026. We reiterate our target for IFRS revenues of between EUR 400 million and EUR 410 million, and we are aiming for an adjusted EBITDA of between EUR 45 million and EUR 47 million. As we look towards the remainder of the year, we remain mindful of the 3 external key factors built into our guidance. First, the macroeconomic uncertainty. We continue to monitor global developments, particularly the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. Second, FX volatility, especially in relation to the Swiss franc-euro exchange rate, which remains our primary currency pair following the Interhome acquisition. Third, the strategic reallocation of capital. Our deliberate shift from B2C marketplace to B2B segments remains the core driver of our margin expansion, but this also leads to a negative revenue reset in the Marketplace segment, but it also significantly strengthens the group overall profitability.

To wrap up our presentation, let's summarize the 4 key takeaways from our performance in the first quarter of this year. First, our strategic road map remains firmly on track. We achieved a significant EUR 7.2 million like-for-like improvement in group adjusted EBITDA, representing a 21% year-on-year increase. This progress was driven by our high marketing efficiency and the first tangible materialization of Interhome synergies. Secondly, HomeToGo_PRO is our new center of gravity. The B2B segment is now clearly established as a key driver for profit and revenue growth and contributes 66% of total group IFRS revenues. Performance in the B2B segment was outstanding, delivering a strong 40% year-on-year like-for-like increase in adjusted EBITDA.

Third, our strong operational cash flow trajectory. We successfully turned our operating cash flow positive in the first quarter. This represents a nearly EUR 13 million improvement compared to the prior year, underscores our enhanced cash generative power and confirms the successful optimization of our operational cash cycles. Fourth, we confirm our full year guidance for this year. Based on our successful start to the year, we are reconfirming our full year targets for IFRS revenues of EUR 400 million to EUR 410 million and adjusted EBITDA of EUR 45 million to EUR 47 million. Our confidence is supported by continued gains in marketplace marketing efficiency and the ongoing scaling of our HomeToGo_PRO segment. With that, I thank you very much for your attention today, and we will now open the floor for your questions.

[Operator Instructions] We're going to start with Mr. Kruse today.

Just 2 follow-up questions. Firstly, congrats on the working capital management. Can you give us a bit more insight in what actually the factors were? So were you able to change payment terms on supplier or the customer side? Is this a structural topic due to the Interhome acquisition? A bit more insight there would be very, very helpful. And then the second question would be on -- thanks for providing the guidance on the stock-based compensation. Could you maybe also give a rough outlook for the other expenses you adjust for, the one-off costs? That would be very helpful.

Yes. Thank you. So on the improvement of net working capital, there is 2 items to note. The first one is really a structural item, so that will also continue to drive an improvement in net working capital over the coming years. And that is the continued rollout and further use of our HomeToGo payment service. So more and more of our partners, especially on the Marketplace segment, use our HomeToGo payment infrastructure, and that means we receive the money actually a lot earlier. So before we had to wait up to half a year to receive our money, and we now receive this at the time of the booking. So this is a very structural driver of this.

I think the second effect that we're seeing is in relation to Interhome. As you may remember, Interhome was part of Migros, so a cooperative. Strict working capital management was not a priority under Migros ownership. They always had enough cash in the group, so that wasn't a scarce resource, and we have implemented a lot more working capital discipline at Interhome. So yes, I think this is something that we will continue to see, especially this year when comparing to last year, and it will then remain at this level.

Then your second question was some sort of background around the other adjustment costs, so the kind of like restructuring costs and so forth. It's a little bit hard to give an exact number, but I would assume something like a mid-single-digit euro million number for this year.

Okay, so a slight decline due to the completion or progress of the Interhome acquisition, I would assume. Okay. Then just a quick follow-up on the payment topic. So that would mean that structurally you would probably have sort of a shift from cash flow from the summer months more towards the beginning of the year as the booking pattern normally is if that -- if the payment -- yes, if you succeed to bring more customers onto your payment solution, correct?

Well, that is partially correct. So the working capital thing is an ongoing, right? So we don't just look at one period, but we're a going concern business. So that will repeat over and over again, and it's not just something that happens in Q1 and then in Q3, but it's actually an ongoing topic. So it's not a shift within the year, it is also a shift within the year, but not just a shift within the year, number one.

And then the second thing is, as long as we continue to grow in the B2B segment, we will also always see a positive cash effect from a change in net working capital, right? So in the B2B segment, especially at Interhome, we receive the money from customers well in advance. And again, this is something where we have any given day of the year, we have a negative working capital situation at Interhome. And so as we continue to grow that business, that will also remain a positive cash contributor. So if you think about kind of like a DCF perspective, maybe, right, then what we do in our modeling, we -- for the -- like also the forecast period, we always have a positive contribution from the change in net working capital given that we are growing the business.

Okay. Perfect. And then just final question, on M&A activities. What are you seeing at the moment? What can we or could we expect maybe throughout the year? That would be very helpful.

Yes. So there is kind of like 2 buckets of transactions that we're looking at. One, I like to call Staubsauger deals. So we're trying to hoover up small targets, and this is the core driver of our buy-and-build roll-up strategy. So these are all small, very hyperlocal agencies, having 50 units under management, 100 units under management, maybe 200 units under management. They're very small, very regional. And our -- what we're currently doing is building an internal infrastructure to do many, many, many of these deals because we really have a very good deal inflow because we have a network of 210 local service agencies at Interhome.

So the people working in these local agencies, they know the other operators in their town and they know who might look to retire and who's looking to sell their business. And so we're trying to use that as a funnel for the deal flow and then we're trying to build the internal infrastructure to actually then onboard these always very quickly. Important to understand that we're not buying businesses, we're buying contract portfolio. So we're not buying -- we're basically buying revenue, right? We're not taking on further fixed costs, but we still need to build kind of like an engine to be able to execute these really at scale. But we will definitely do more of these small transactions throughout the year.

In addition to that, we're also looking at larger M&A deals in the property management space. With these larger transactions, it's a little bit hard to say when exactly will they happen, will they happen. Different scale, we're really talking like higher single-digit million euro amounts in purchase price. So we're hoping to close maybe 1 or 2 of these in the course of this year, but it's -- that is an M&A game, right? So you cannot really forecast when they will happen and if they will happen. But the smaller ones, the Staubsauger deals, we definitely will do a couple of more this year.

We have another risen hand by [ Mr. Knut Henkel ].

So I got 2 questions. So first one is you stuck to your outlook for the full year '26, but at the same time you reported on some bolt-on acquisitions at obviously very favorable terms. So my question would be, why don't they lift the outlook for the full year? That would be my first question. And the second question more on the details on what you just outlined that you're buying contract portfolios rather than companies. So my question would be, don't you need -- don't the seller need the consent of the homeowner before he can sell these contracts? How does it technically work if you just buy contracts instead of businesses? So that would be my 2 questions.

Yes. So on the first question on the -- basically the impact of the bolt-on acquisitions on EBITDA, they're very small, right? So the purchase price was about EUR 0.5 million. So that means if we had a 1x EBITDA multiple, it's basically EUR 0.5 million of EBITDA. So in the overall context of EUR 45 million to EUR 47 million, it is more of a rounding error at the moment, and this was not something that we would use to adjust the guidance at this point in time. So it's just not big enough to really make an impact. If we do more of these throughout the year, it will become impactful, but the 3 months -- ones that we had, they're just not big enough.

The second one on the acquisition of the contract portfolios. So you can think about it the same way as, for example, in the insurance brokerage space, right? So if an insurance broker retires, they often sell their contract portfolio to aggregators or successors. No, you don't need the explicit consent, right? The customer relationship just moves over. Customers have the right to cancel the contract afterwards, but they have that in any way. So there is no change compared to that. So it's -- from a legal technical perspective, it's a very, very simple transaction.

We do have another risen hand by [ Mr. Van Neuser ].

I had a couple of questions. Regarding the revenue shift you referred to in your booking revenues from advertising driven to on-site. You said revenue shifts away from Q1 into later quarters. Can you quantify that effect?

So help me understanding what your question exactly relates to, right? I think the point I would point you to is more the revenue backlog actually, right? So that increased so -- or slightly increased by 1%. So you can use that as a measure when you look at the last year to see how booking revenue then came in at Q2 and Q3. So this is, I think, a pretty good guideline to look at. I think that's, for me, the best way to try to answer your question there.

Okay. Yes, because you had a particular decline in the advertising-driven booking revenues and you said more is on-site now, on your own sites, but there you can only realize the revenue later, so not in Q1, but later. So meaning whatever you transferred out of the advertising driven to the on-site booking bucket, that is revenue realization that will have moved to later quarters. That I was trying to understand.

Exactly, right. And you can see that in the backlog. But there is 2 factors, right? So the first one is that we pulled down marketing spending by 20%. So that obviously had an overall impact on the revenue. The impact was weighted towards the advertising revenue business, which is the business that is strategically a lot less attractive for us because we don't own the customer and there is no way for us to generate repeat business out of this. So we tried to weight it towards the part of the revenue which is less valuable for us.

Okay. That makes sense. Then I saw your positive operating free cash flow, which is from the onetime net working capital effect that you explained. That would mean we will have this onetime net working capital effect probably only in '26. From '27 onwards, we should expect Q1 still to be a cash flow negative quarter, right?

No. And this is very much not what I try to say because I just had that debate with Tim Kruse, right, and I try to explain the net working capital, so it's definitely not a onetime effect. There is structural forces at work here, and I expect the operating free cash flow of Q1 2027 to be much better, also driven by ongoing movements in the net working capital. Number one, we continue to expand the part of our business which runs on our own payment infrastructure, which is structural. Secondly, we are growing our B2B business. And as long as we grow our B2B business, we will always have a positive effect from the change in net working capital. So no, both of these are structural. They are not, I repeat, not onetime in nature.

Okay. But the release of cash is particularly strong this year, right?

I would also not subscribe to that statement.

Okay. Cool. You said you have a slight sensitivity to the euro-Swiss franc FX rate. Could you give us a feel for the EBITDA sensitivity to the exchange rate for like, I don't know, 1% change or 5% or 10% change?

Yes, yes. I would point you to a note in our annual report 2025, in which we actually have published such a sensitivity.

Okay. I will take a look there. You've given us a EUR 45 million to EUR adjusted EBITDA guidance. Could you also give us a rough free cash flow guidance?

No, we don't officially guide on free cash flow.

Okay. But I seem to remember from the previous bond roadshow that there's roughly EUR 5 million of lease payment. Is that number correct?

Yes. I mean we -- [ Mr. Neuser ], I think we do...

[ Mr. Neuser ], we actually have another -- a lot of other risen hands.

That is my last one. That's the last question.

So [ Mr. Neuser ], I would invite you for a call because we've gone through a lot of your questions. The things that we debated during our bond roadshow, they still hold. There is no change. If you have further questions, please send an e-mail to Carsten Fricke. Very, very happy to set up a call, but we have a couple of other investors who also would like to ask.

We are going over to Bharath Nagaraj.

Hope you can hear me.

Yes, we can.

Just a couple of questions, please. Do you have any KPIs to share how the internalization of the distribution margins by using your own HomeToGo marketplace to fill your vacation rental inventory? How is that helping you to improve profitability?

Yes. So at the moment, I mean, that was also something that we always said. At the moment, we are focused on generating the EUR 10 million in cost savings that we had promised, then the EUR 20 million in value creation upside. Our guidance was always that we would see this in the numbers from 2027 onwards, so that statement still holds.

Okay. Okay. With regards to the booking backlog, just wondering, despite the lower ad spend, how was it that this was so strong? And what -- in terms of your strategy to operational excellence in the marketplace, how do you plan to do that with the lower spend? Any further color on that would be helpful.

Yes. I mean we're trying to do a couple of things, right? So number one, we're always looking at additional marketing channels, right? So we're trying to always reallocate marketing towards the channels where we see the best return on advertising spend. Number one, this is an ongoing exercise. Number two, we had just a very deep and granular look into our marketing spending, and we tried to disaggregate it by the marginal dollar return that we can generate and move much, much more aggressively towards the high ROAS end of our marketing efficiency. So it's an ongoing game. We are generally very good to steer in markets and in channels. So this worked out very, very well for us. I would leave it at that because it starts otherwise to inform our competitors and we would like to keep that a little bit to ourselves what we're doing exactly.

Okay. Sure. Just a very quick follow-up, that's the last one for me. North America, do we expect that to continue to decline? I know it only declined 1% year-on-year right now, but given that's not your focus anymore, do we -- should we expect that to continue to decline rest of the year and next year as well?

Yes. I mean, generally speaking, we're opportunistically operating in America, right? So this is the part of the business where we're really only playing in the advertising revenue game. So we're steering this from Berlin. We don't have an operational footprint in the U.S.A. So it's very, very opportunistically for us. If we see good ways to make money there, we will absolutely do it because we should. If this is a market that we see where we cannot make good money, then we will pull back from it again. But again, it's very opportunistically the way that we look at it.

We are moving on to Mr. Volker Bosse.

It's Volker speaking from Baader Bank. Congrats on the results. I would have 2 questions left. First one is on current trading. I mean obviously, market environment is challenging. Families have less disposable income, but on the other hand, your alternative accommodation offer provides families the opportunity to keep costs under control. So question, how is booking behavior changing? Do you see any trends? And then update how April and May worked out so far would be helpful. And the second, just a brief one on the take rate for on-site bookings. What was the take rate? And how did the take rate develop year-over-year?

Yes. So the first one, maybe just a little bit of market backdrop, what we're seeing. So we're really seeing 2 countervailing effects at the moment. So the first one is that we see a shift in travel behavior when it comes to destinations. So the package holiday, especially going to Turkey and to Egypt, is definitely under a lot of pressure, is what we can see and hear from the market. That is a trend which redirects people who want to travel more towards Continental Europe, and in many of those countries, like, for example, Spain and France, the vacation rental space would be the natural destination. So that is something that is positive for us.

But we do also see, and you can see this in a lot of surveys, that consumers are under stress. They're worried, especially customers in Germany are very worried, and we can see that they're looking overall at their household disposable income. I mean they start pulling back in other areas, especially ordering a Lieferando or going out to restaurants or buying expensive clothes. So the big family holiday, which is our core product, comes relatively late in the kind of like cutting back part of the household's disposable income. But depending on how this whole second and third order impact from higher oil prices, higher kerosene prices, maybe flights being canceled. How that all plays out over the couple of months is just something that we need to watch, right, and need to see how this all plays out.

At the moment, I would say it is neutral or slightly positive for us. So the -- what we can see in our own numbers is that travelers continue to behave how we expect them to behave. So there is no large shifts in booking behavior. So this all kind of like is within expected parameters, but we really need to have a very watchful eye on how this develops over the first couple of -- next couple of months. So on the take rate, I think it's down slightly versus last year. So last year, it was, I think, 13.1%. It is down to 12.8%, so a touchdown. This is mainly driven by a change in partner mix.

We are now moving on to our last question today, who is [ Mr. Ramon Huber ].

Congratulations to the strong figures. I just have one left. Was that like surprising for yourself that cutting the marketing so much that the sales ended up on the same level, or you expected it?

To be honest and without wanting to be arrogant, we expected it, right? So we did a lot of analysis work upfront. The good thing is that our team has gone through these exercises a number of times before because the first thing that you do in times of crisis and especially in times of external shocks, for example, during COVID you cut down advertising spending. So we had a lot of experience from the past, and our team had a lot of experience from the past. There is always execution risk involved when you make such drastic shifts in budgets, but it came out actually a little bit better than we expected it to be. So we're really thankful and proud of the job that our marketing team and especially the performance marketing team in the marketplace did. So well done, [ Mitsos ] in case you are listening.

We have not received any more questions in our chat box or risen hands. So dear participants, if there are any further questions, please raise your hand or put your question in our chat box. We're happy to answer them. We still have some minutes' time. But I guess everything has been answered, and I would say thank you very much for your participation.

We will now come to the end of today's earnings call as we have not received any further questions. You will find the presentation on HomeToGo's website and also on the Airtime Platform by clicking into today's event. Dear participants, thank you for joining and your interest in HomeToGo. Should further questions arise at a later time, please feel free to contact Investor Relations. Thanks once again. Have a nice day, and goodbye.

So dear investors, welcome to today's Platform Summit, where 4 leading European players will be presenting: HomeToGo, Verve, Shelly and JDC. For years, platform companies have been among the most resilient and attractive business models. They grow not despite economic uncertainty, but often precisely because of their architecture, network effects, scalable technology and data-driven processes to create a stability that traditional models can hardly match.

What investors particularly value can be summarized in 3 points: Resilience in volatile markets, scalability without costs increasing linearly and deep market integration that makes platforms indispensable infrastructure. Especially in challenging times, it becomes clear, platform companies are stable anchors in a dynamic environment, and that is precisely why they are focused of European capital markets. With that, we now start with the first company. Therefore, I hand over to the HomeToGo CFO, Sebastian Bielski. Sebastian, the stage is yours.

Thank you very much. Thank you very much for the invitation. Thanks to all the participants for being here. I will spend maybe 10, 15 minutes going through a high-level introductory presentation, and then I invite everybody to ask as many questions as you like. So I'll spend a little bit less time presenting, so we have more time for Q&A.

Who is HomeToGo and what are we all about? In one sentence, we are the backbone of vacation rentals in Europe. And we are all about houses, vacation houses, like you can see on this beautiful picture. Maybe one of you are in a happy position to be the lucky owner of such a house, and you probably take your summer vacations in such a house together with your family. So it is a very emotional thing for you. But given that you are also interested in shares and investing, I assume that you don't just see it as an emotional thing but also something that is there to make some money for you. And that is exactly where we come in and we can help you.

So you may spend 2, 3 weeks per year in that house, but it's actually empty most of the time. So you probably want to utilize that house for making money for you. And so you're looking for travelers to rent a house. So we can help you find them. We have a marketplace where you can advertise your house and where travelers can find you. You need to write invoices or manage a booking calendar, so your house is not, by accident, double-booked. We have a mini SAP that can do all of that for you.

You may have 20 houses and not just one house, so you're very, very lucky. We have then for you an enterprise-grade software to manage all of these. And if you're a very, very busy person and you don't want to look after your home, you just want to hand it over to somebody to really do everything for you, then we have an offering, a full-service property management offering where we look for travelers. We hand out the keys. We do all of the communication. We fix the broken faucet. We do the laundry. We look at the garden and everything. And for you, it is just up to receive some money for you from us.

Okay. Good. So as I said before, we are the backbone of vacation rentals in Europe. And we have 2 segments within our group. One is looking after the owners of those houses, which we call the supply side of our business. And then the other one is looking after the travelers who are looking to rent those houses. And we call that the demand side of the -- of our business. So the demand side, we also call B2C, so business to consumer, because the travelers are really consumers.

We do not deal with business travelers. We're all about mainly the big summer holiday. And that part of our business makes up around 37% of our revenue. And you can think of us as a very specialized, very European, very focused Airbnb or Booking.com. So we are an OTA, so an online travel agency, and you can book, if you're a traveler, a vacation house or a vacation apartment through us.

Then on the supply side, which is the much bigger part of our business, so that makes up about 63% of our business. We have 2 offerings. So we have the all-inclusive service offering where we act as a property manager for vacation rentals, where we do everything for you, as I said, from taking care of the house to the communications, to bookings management, to pricing, so all of that. And we also have software offerings for vacation rental homeowners who want to do some part of the servicing themselves.

Many, many investors ask us, so why do you have actually both of these parts of your business? Why are you vertically integrated? And why should we, as investors, care about you being vertically integrated? And the answer is there are a number of very interesting synergies between the 2 sides of our business, the B2B side and the B2C side.

So the first one is that having the B2C side, having the marketplace gives us real -- deep real-time market insight at any given moment. We have about 20 million offerings in our marketplace. We only have about 50,000 homes under management on the B2B side. They're obviously all also bookable through the marketplace, but the vast majority of the inventory that we have on the marketplace is not our own inventory.

But having this third-party inventory means that we can really see at any given moment which regions are in favor at the moment for travelers, where is maybe something that's going out of favor a little bit. So that gives us a lot of insight also into how we can boost bookings and how we can run pricing on the B2B side of our business.

Why is this important? This, for example, was very, very important for us, about 6 or 7 weeks ago when the war in Iran started, and all of a sudden, there was a big disruption in European travel. So a lot of people who actually wanted to take their holiday in a hotel in Turkey or in a Club Med in Egypt, they didn't want to travel there anymore because they thought, "Well, these places are a little bit too close to Iran. This sounds all insecure. Maybe flights are not going anymore."

So a lot of people changed what they were looking for, for their summer holiday, and we could actually see that in real time. So what I'm always saying is like Baltic Sea is all of a sudden really cool again for especially German travelers. And so we can see that the demand for these type of properties increase overnight very dramatically. And that means we can also ask for different prices, right? And so it helps us really manage on the B2B side of our business.

The B2C side also acts as a technology incubator for our B2B products. For example, we obviously have payment infrastructure on the B2C side and really at scale industrial-grade payment infrastructure. So we can also use that on the B2B side, be it in our full-service property management offering or also in our smaller software offerings. The B2C side also acts as a lead-generation channel and as an M&A channel for our B2B businesses.

So again, we have 20 million offerings on our website, so we really know which are the good properties. Good properties are generally those which are having a lot of 5-star reviews, which get rebooked by the same travelers again, which have a high rate of occupancy. And so we can target these offerings and -- or host and say like, "Look, hey, we have already a business relationship with you on the B2C side. Do you not just want to come over to the B2B side as well? We take over for the full-service offering." Or if smaller agencies come on to the market, especially property vacation rental agencies, we normally have worked with them for years on the marketplace, so we can really see how they're running their business, and it really helps us in understanding these businesses and have an advantage in M&A.

We also are able to internalize the distribution margin. So if we have a property in the vacation rental property management, we try to get it booked over our own channels, but also, we use third-party channels like a Booking, like an Airbnb. But obviously, if we can get the booking through our own channels, we can keep the distribution margin and don't have to pay Booking or Airbnb 13%. And that's really something that is quite valuable for us.

Last point being about brand. So HomeToGo is a consumer brand, so it's relatively well-known, and that also helps us, especially on the vacation rental property management side.

How do we make money? What is our revenue model? On the B2C side, it's very, very simple. It's really a classic commission-based model. So we get about 13% of the revenue for any booking that we broker on the B2C side.

On the B2B side, we have 2 different revenue models. One is volume-based. So we get a share of the booking value for our vacation rental property management. It is between 20% and 48%. So really depending what kind of service package you choose as the owner. In the software side, it's about 15% of the bookings that we capture. And then we also have a relatively small but really, really attractive software business called Smoobu, which has a SaaS model. On average, people spend about EUR 60 per month to manage their vacation rentals through Smoobu.

One thing to really note about our revenue is the stickiness of our revenue. So about 70% of our revenue is repeat in nature. That is especially the case on the vacation rental property management side, where there is more than 90% of the revenue repeat in nature. Interestingly, this has also increased over the last 3 years, so going from 90% to 93% between 2023 and 2025. And that is during a time where we've been also growing overall revenue. The reason for that is that we have really low churn, especially amongst our partners on the property management side. So on average, we have customer relationships, which have an average tenure of 10 years. So the 2 leading causes why people leave us is death or sale of the house.

We're very deeply integrated with our hosts. So there is -- there are certain switching costs as well to changing providers. We have a very diversified partner base. I'll talk about that a little bit in a moment. And we also have a lot of focus on product innovation, be it pricing, being the types of bookings, flexibility, downside protection, all of that, we always try to innovate on the type of products that we offer as well.

As I said before, we have a very diversified customer base. On the B2B side, there isn't a single customer which makes up even 1% of our revenue. On the B2C side, we have 2 larger partners, which are Expedia and Booking.com, but even those 2 large partners only make up about 9% of overall group revenue.

We are a very acquisitive business. The business has been founded in 2014. We already made the first M&A transaction in 2018. And since 2018, for every single year, we've acquired at least one business. That goes from very small businesses, which we can acquire for a couple of hundred thousand euros up to really, really large transactions like, for example, the acquisition of Interhome, which we did last year, and I'll talk about Interhome a little bit more because it was very, very transformational for us as a business.

So when I say transformational, I'll put some numbers behind that. The acquisition of Interhome meant that we almost doubled our revenue from EUR 212 million to almost EUR 400 million, and we more than tripled our EBITDA from EUR 13 million to EUR 42 million. So Interhome in itself is now the largest part of our business. As I said before, the B2B side of our business, making up about 2/3 of our revenue within B2B. Interhome is by far the biggest business. As I said before, it was a large transaction. So the total purchase price was about EUR 250 million, which represented about 8x EBITDA.

When we announced the acquisition of Interhome, we set certain targets for ourselves. The first one was that we said that we would generate about EUR 10 million in cost base, purely cost base, synergies within 12 to 18 months from closing the transaction. And then we also identified additional value creation upside of about EUR 20 million, which we said we would capture between 3 to 5 years following the closing of the transaction.

So at the moment, we're very focused on the cost base synergies. At the beginning of the year, we had already implemented about half of those, so more than EUR 5 million in actual cost base synergies on an annualized basis, of course, were already in the books. So we had to let go certain personnel. We closed down certain parts of the business. We closed down some offices. We exited some transitional service agreements, and we're also working on getting the other EUR 5 million in the course of 2026. So we're really well ahead, well on track with the integration of Interhome and also with the generation of the cost base synergies.

Looking at the midterm potential for the value creation upside the EUR 20 million, EUR 13 million, so EUR 1-3 million, of that is just internalization of the distribution margin, and I'll explain this a little bit more in detail. So Interhome makes about EUR 400 million of booking volume at the moment. And only about 25%, so EUR 100 million, of that is going through own channels. So it is booked in the Interhome offices or at the Interhome website or at a different HomeToGo website. So there is about EUR 300 million, which is booked through third-party channels like an Airbnb or a Booking.com, and we actually pay them for that. So there is about, again, 1-3, 13% on average that we pay to get the booking. If we're able to increase the share of the bookings through our own channel, which at the moment is 25%, to 50%, then we capture another EUR 100 million in booking volume and 13% of the EUR 100 million is EUR 13 million that we save. And so that is just immediate EBITDA upside if we can generate that.

Why do we think that this is very doable? We bought a smaller vacation rental property manager called Casa a couple of years before we acquired Interhome. When we bought it, the share of internal bookings stood at 30%, and it's 70% right now. So we have a proven track record of actually capturing this kind of upside.

A quick look at the financials for HomeToGo. This is presented on a pro forma basis. So as if we had already owned Interhome on the 1st of January 2023. So these are on a like-for-like basis without any distortions through such a large M&A transaction. And you can see that on average, we were able to grow revenue with 10% but EBITDA with 30%. So it shows how scalable the platform is and what kind of fixed cost degression effects you can also get at these type of businesses.

For this year, our guidance stands at EUR 400 million to EUR 410 million of IFRS revenue. This compares on a pro forma basis to EUR 394 million for the last year. On a statutory basis, last year was EUR 256 million. And for the adjusted EBITDA, we have a guidance of between EUR 45 million and EUR 47 million, which compares to about EUR 42 million on a pro forma basis for last year and EUR 13 million on a statutory basis.

Lastly, let me conclude with 5 reasons why I think if you aren't invested yet in HomeToGo, you should invest. The first one is that we are Europe's leading vacation rental platform. We are vertically integrated. We're very, very special. We have a very strong market position in a growing, highly fragmented market with lots and lots of upside still ahead of us. It's a unique platform that we operate with attractive synergies between B2B and B2C. There is a high share of recurring and repeat revenue. We have a highly diversified customer base, and we also have a proven execution track record over the last couple of years.

So with that, I want to conclude my presentation, and I'm really looking forward to your questions.

Yes. Thank you very much, Sebastian. Ladies and gentlemen, we're opening the Q&A session now. [Operator Instructions] There are no risen hands so far, and our chat has not received any questions yet. [Operator Instructions] And with that said, I think Mr. [ Lehmann ] has a question. He has not asked yet. Mr. [ Lehmann ], you can also raise your hand if you can speak freely.

Maybe Mr. [ Lehmann ] just wanted to say hello.

No, there's -- the question of Mr. [ Lehmann ] just popped in. He's asking all that's important is for bondholders, the FCF.

That is correct. So the bondholders are obviously cash flow lenders. Our cash flow was also quite good. I don't know, Mr. [ Lehmann ], if you were a bondholder already during the -- what we looking for this year roughly? Okay. So roughly how it works is the following. So let's take the EUR 45 million to EUR 47 million in EBITDA you have to deduct EUR 10 million to EUR 11 million CapEx for capitalized software. You have to deduct around EUR 3 million in CapEx for PP&E.

For Interhome, we have a network of 210 offices, so we have to spend a little bit of PP&E on that. You have to deduct about, I think, EUR 5 million to EUR 6 million for leasing. So this is principal and interest. And you can probably deduct small single-digit numbers for taxes that we have to pay. We, obviously, have a profitable business in Switzerland, so we have to pay taxes there. Then you have to add the increase in cash that comes from movements in net working capital.

So last year, we had a really, really good year on a pro forma basis with the inflow in net working capital. So we had a EUR 20 million cash inflow from that. A little bit hard to forecast for this year, but I would expect at least EUR 5 million to EUR 7 million in positive cash flow contribution from the change in net working capital.

Thank you so much, and thank you also for your question, Mr. [ Lehmann ]. We have not received any questions anymore and no risen hands as I can see. So Sebastian, what would you say? I guess, with no further questions -- Mr. [ Lehmann ] has a follow-up question, and he's asking, okay, thanks. So you cover interest by roughly 2x?

I'm not good with my math in my head, but if that's what it is, then so there is about EUR 10 million in interest. So you can do the math, yes.

All right. Perfect. Thank you so much. I guess with no further questions, we have come to the end of today's call. Thank you very much for your interest in HomeToGo SE, and a big thank you also to you, Mr. Bielski, for your presentation and your time. Should you have any further questions at a later time, please feel free to contact Investor Relations. I wish you all a successful day, and I'm handing over to you, Mr. Bielski, once again, for your closing remarks.

Well, thank you, everybody. We don't just have a bit bond, by the way, we also have a share. So look at that, look at both. If there is more questions, contact Investor Relations. Carsten Fricke, always happy to answer questions. Otherwise, we are at a lot of conferences as well, also at the Montega conference in the fall. So also looking forward to meeting all of you. Thank you. Bye-bye.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and a warm welcome to HomeToGo's Investor and Analyst Call following the publication of the financial year figures of 2025. I'm delighted to welcome the CEO, Dr. Patrick Andrae; and CFO, Sebastian Bielski, who will speak in a moment. And after the presentation, we will move on with a Q&A session in which you will be able to ask your questions directly to the management. So let's dive straight into the presentation. So Patrick, the stage is yours.

Thank you, and good morning, everyone, and thank you for joining HomeToGo's full year 2025 earnings call. I'm pleased to welcome you as we present our audited financial results for 2025 alongside our '26 strategy road map and financial guidance. As you have seen in our report published this morning, 2025 was a very successful and transformative year for HomeToGo. We achieved record revenues of over EUR 255 million and significantly outperformed our profitability guidance on both a statutory and a pro forma basis. Today, we will walk you through these strong results, which underscore the successful execution of our strategic pivot towards a B2B-centric powerhouse. And we are also excited to share our '26 road map, outlining how we intend to scale to over EUR 400 million in revenue while more than tripling our adjusted EBITDA to more than EUR 45 million.

To give you a structured view of our transformation, our call today is divided into 3 main segments. I will begin with a high-level summary of our record-breaking 2025 and the key takeaways from our performance. Sebastian, our CFO, will then provide a deep dive into the statutory and pro forma financials. To close, I will return to detail our '26 strategy road map and Sebastian will briefly outline our financial guidance for the remainder of the year. And then we will open the floor for your questions. So let's dive straight into the first chapter.

This first section provides a snapshot of why we consider 2025 a landmark year for HomeToGo. It was a year in which we delivered on our promises. First and foremost, we are proud to have exceeded our profitability targets across both reporting metrics. On a statutory basis, our adjusted EBITDA reached EUR 13.2 million, outperforming our guidance by 20%. On a pro forma basis, we reached EUR 42 million, beating expectations by 5%. This profitability was built on a realized scaled transformation. So our statutory revenues grew by over 20% to EUR 255.5 million, while our pro forma revenues reached EUR 394 million. And a critical driver for that was the integration of Interhome, which is progressing ahead of schedule with significant synergies already realized. To strengthen our position as Europe's leading vacation rental group, we have defined 5 key strategic priorities for the '26 financial year.

First, we will capture initial Interhome cost synergies not yet realized. Second, we will target strategic M&A within HomeToGo_PRO. Third, we will harmonize our group-wide brands to enhance global visibility. Fourth, we will drive operational excellence in the Marketplace where we focus on expanding margins. And fifth, we will remain our -- maintain our AI leadership with high pace of innovation. This comprehensive road map directly fuels our financial ambitions for the remainder of this year. Therefore, we entered 2026 with high confidence and a guidance that targets a massive step change, aiming for over EUR 400 million in revenue while more than tripling our adjusted EBITDA.

Now let's move on to our business highlights of 2025. I will walk you through the operational milestones that underpinned this record performance. Let's start by briefly visiting the strategic framework we introduced in October last year. This serves as the fundamental foundation for our 2026 initiatives. First, the acquisition of Interhome was a deliberate step in our evolution into a vertically integrated B2B focused group. Second, as a result, HomeToGo_PRO is now established center of gravity. It provides us with recurring predictable revenues and is the primary driver of our profit growth, allowing us to deploy capital with high returns at low risk. Third, we maintain a disciplined focus for our B2C Marketplace. Our strategy explicitly prioritizes profit over top line growth. The Marketplace operates as a resilient capital-generating segment that fuels the expansion of our high-return B2B businesses.

Fourth, we continue to leverage the powerful flywheel effects across our group, creating a unique competitive advantage through tangible synergies between our segments. And fifth, our growth follows a clear two-pronged strategy, organic growth with a strict prioritization of profitability and a targeted B2B rollout M&A strategy to capitalize on the fragmented property management and software market. This long-term strategy basically forms the baseline for everything we do. But now let's look at each pillar in more detail to give you some more insights. Our transformation into a B2B-led powerhouse is the result of a consistent multiyear evolution. As you know, our journey began in 2015 as a pure metasearch engine. By 2017, we had built what is now known as the Marketplace with the world's largest selection of vacation rentals. This B2B success was never the end goal, but rather the essential springboard. It gave us the scale and the unparalleled insights into traveler demand that we needed for our next strategic move.

So in 2020, we made our first decisive entry into the B2B market by launching software solutions. In December '23, we officially introduced HomeToGo_PRO as a separate B2B segment of our business. However, the true inflection point, the moment our center of gravity fundamentally shifted occurred in '24 and '25. This is when we added tech-enabled property management through the acquisition of Casa and most notably Interhome last year. Through these acquisitions, we didn't just add volume. We added a whole new dimension of value to our group. As a result, HomeToGo_PRO has now become our primary engine of growth and profit. As you can see on the right, the split has fundamentally flipped. 63% of our IFRS revenues now come from our B2B business, while the Marketplace contributes a highly profitable 37%. But beyond just the segment split, I want to highlight the quality of our revenue model.

Today, more than 70% of our revenues are recurring or repeat driven by Software-as-a-Service, SaaS and sticky property management fees. This is a massive structural improvement, and it proves that our pivot is not a short-term reaction to market trends, but the successful execution of a long-term strategy that has fundamentally derisked our business and created a much more predictable and resilient financial profile. Second, as I have emphasized, B2B is now our center of gravity. On the left, you can see the massive step change we have achieved in our top line scale. We concluded '25 with pro forma IFRS revenues of EUR 394 million. To put this into perspective, this represents a nearly 150% increase compared to our stand-alone revenues of EUR 162 million in 2023. So effectively, we have more than doubled the scale of our entire business in a very, very short time frame.

Even more significant is the fundamental strategic shift shown on the right. If you look at HomeToGo on a stand-alone basis, B2B accounted for only about 35% of our business. However, with the successful integration of Interhome, this ratio has completely flipped on a pro forma basis. So HomeToGo_PRO is now our primary business segment, representing 63% of our total group revenues. This transition confirms how well we have expanded beyond our Marketplace roots into a vertically integrated B2B powerhouse with a highly resilient and predictable revenue base. Now as we move on to the HomeToGo Marketplace. Here, our objective is crystal clear. We prioritize growing profits over increasing top line. So if you look at the left side, you can see the strategy in action. While our IFRS revenues remained essentially stable at EUR 151.7 million despite a significant decrease in marketing expenditures, our adjusted EBITDA reached a major inflection point. We more than quintupled our earnings in this segment, jumping from EUR 2.9 million to a staggering EUR 15.8 million.

This resulted in a strong double-digit margin of 10.4%, up from just 1.9% in 2024. This massive profitability boost is driven by our rigorous focus on marketing efficiency shown on the right. Since 2019, we have transformed our cost structure, reducing marketing and sales expenditures as a percentage of revenue by a staggering 43 percentage points, reaching a record low of 57% in 2025. By being more disciplined with our B2C spend, we are able to proactively reallocate capital in our HomeToGo_PRO businesses, where we've seen more attractive risk-adjusted returns and long-term growth potential on the B2B side. As we look ahead to '26, we will maintain this discipline. This will mean lower marketing investments and a deliberate resetting of the Marketplace revenue base, as you already know, but we also will ensure that this segment remains a highly efficient cash generator for the entire group.

If we now take a closer look at the health of our Marketplace, specifically our regional booking mix and the evolution of our basket size, we see the following. Starting with the regional booking mix on the left, slightly up from 2024, DACH remains our undisputed stronghold, accounting for 56% of our booking revenues on the Marketplace. Rest of Europe share remains stable year-over-year, accounting for nearly 1/4 of total Marketplace booking revenues. North America now accounts for 20%. If we now look at the basket size evolution on the right, you see overall, our Marketplace basket size grew by a robust 6% year-over-year to EUR 1,025. This growth is driven by our European core. So in the DACH region, the average basket size surged by 10% to EUR 1,262 if we exclude the short-trip business. The rest of Europe follows a similar trajectory with basket size climbing 9% to over EUR 1,200.

Turning to our fourth strategic pillar, the tangible value creation from the Interhome acquisition. So when we closed this deal, we set an initial target of EUR 10 million in annual cost synergies to be realized within 12 to 18 months. Today, I'm very pleased to reiterate that we are still ahead of schedule. As communicated alongside our preliminary numbers in February, we have already realized EUR 5 million of these cost synergies on an annualized basis. This was achieved through the rapid migration of Interhome's front-end websites onto our HomeToGo whitelabel technology, combined with personnel cost optimization and the successful exit of the first transitional service agreements with the former owner. The remaining EUR 5 million in initial cost synergies are well within our sights as we exit the next wave of TSAs and continue to drive operational efficiencies across the integrated organization.

But what makes this acquisition truly transformative is what you see in the middle of the chart. We have identified an additional EUR 20 million in midterm value creation upside. This upside is driven by 2 key factors. First, margin internalization. So by sourcing more Interhome bookings directly through our own HomeToGo Marketplace, we keep the full distribution margin within the group. And this effect also highlights the significant synergies which exist between our traveler-focused Marketplace segment and our owner-focused B2B segment. And second, tech-driven growth. We are applying our advanced data, AI and revenue management solution to Interhome's inventory to optimize pricing, occupancy and marketing efficiency. So combined, we are looking at a total synergy and value creation potential of approximately EUR 30 million in the midterm. This clearly demonstrates that Interhome is not just a scale play, but a significant driver of high-margin profitability for the entire group.

And finally, let's turn to our fifth strategic pillar, leveraging our proven M&A track record within this highly fragmented market. If you look at the left side, the opportunity for the vacation rental management market in Europe alone is huge. We see a serviceable addressable market of approximately 900,000 vacation homes in rural areas. And despite our recent growth, the top 3 players combined, including us, hold only about a 10% market share. So the remaining 90% is characterized by a massive long tail of hyperlocal agencies and small management companies, many with fewer than 100 properties. This fragmentation provides us with a unique and highly attractive consolidation landscape with very limited competition. Our advantage here is our secret sauce for M&A shown on the right. Since 2018, we have successfully completed 16 acquisitions. Our approach is notably low risk when we look at these companies. 100% of our targets were already business partners within our network before we acquired them. We don't buy strangers. We buy proven performers whose data and quality we already knew intimately.

By applying our standardized integration process, we minimize execution risk while capturing immediate synergies between our Marketplace and the B2B operations. So moving into the remainder of 2026, we will continue this disciplined, very value-generated M&A strategy to further strengthen our position as the leading powerhouse in the industry. This concludes the first part of our presentation on the strategic and business highlights for 2025. As you've seen, our transformation into a B2B-led powerhouse is not just a vision. It is already delivering tangible results. To give you a more granular look at how this strategic shift is translating into our financial performance and the segment dynamics behind, I will now hand over to our CFO, Sebastian. Sebastian, the floor is yours.

Thank you very much, Patrick, and a warm welcome to everybody also from my side. I'm very pleased to walk you through our financial results for the full year and the fourth quarter of 2025. It was a truly record-breaking year characterized by a massive step change in our scale and more importantly, a significant overperformance against our profitability guidance. Let's dive straight into the financial year '25. We will begin with a quick recap of our key highlights for the fourth quarter and the full year 2025. Let's first look at our record-breaking IFRS revenues. We achieved record full year IFRS revenues of EUR 255.5 million, which represents a strong 20.3% year-on-year growth. We set a new fourth quarter record with EUR 54.2 million, which was a surge of 52.4% year-on-year. This performance was primarily driven by our significant group expansion and also the successful and rapid integration of Interhome.

Secondly, we significantly outperformed our guidance for adjusted EBITDA. We clearly exceeded our profitability targets on both levels. On the statutory adjusted EBITDA, we reached EUR 13.2 million and beat our guidance by 20%. On the pro forma adjusted EBITDA, we grew substantially to EUR 42 million, which was a 5% beat against guidance and also a 27.7% year-on-year increase. Third, we substantially scaled our HomeToGo_PRO segment. Our B2B segment has solidified its role as a massive growth engine. IFRS revenues for this segment climbed 64.1% year-on-year to EUR 114.9 million for the full year and Q4 performance was even more dynamic with a staggering almost 175% year-on-year growth. Fourth, we successfully turned around performance in the Marketplace. Our strategic pivot to prioritize profitability over top line growth has proven highly successful. For the full year '25, adjusted EBITDA more than quintupled to almost EUR 16 million. Q4 marked a decisive earnings turnaround with a positive EUR 5.8 million in adjusted EBITDA for the Marketplace.

Now moving to a detailed look at our statutory financials for the fourth quarter and the full year 2025. Starting with booking revenues. We massively accelerated in Q4. The booking revenues surged by 114% year-on-year to reach almost EUR 107 million. For the full year, we grew by 28% year-on-year to EUR 333.6 million, which was a big jump versus the EUR 260 million, which we saw in the last year. This step change was heavily driven by the first-time consolidation effect of Interhome very obviously. On IFRS revenues, we set a new Q4 record where revenues increased by 56% year-on-year to over EUR 54 million. On the full year, we crossed the EUR 0.25 billion mark and reached EUR 255.5 million, which was a robust 20% year-on-year increase.

This strong momentum in the fourth quarter underscores the power of our expanded B2B-led group structure, including the Interhome acquisition. For the adjusted EBITDA for Q4, the statutory adjusted EBITDA was negative EUR 8.8 million. While the seasonal Q4 loss increased compared to the previous year, it is important to note that this was mainly driven by the timing of the closing of the Interhome acquisition and the seasonality profile of Interhome, where Q4 is always a quarter with weak revenue and profitability.

So what happened in the last year is we were unfortunately not able to include the very highly profitable first 9 months of Interhome, but only the unprofitable fourth quarter. For the full year profitability, we grew by 3% compared to 2024 to reach EUR 13.2 million. This EUR 13.2 million represented a guidance beat where we overachieved versus the guidance of 20%. Now let's also take a closer look at the composition of our booking revenues, IFRS revenues and adjusted EBITDA by segments for the full year 2025, again, on a statutory basis. Starting with the booking revenues. On the group level, we increased by 28% year-on-year to EUR 333 million. For HomeToGo_PRO, we clearly established this segment as our primary growth engine. Volume-based revenues in this segment surged by 126% to almost EUR 130 million, driven by the first-time inclusion of Interhome in the fourth quarter. Subscriptions also showed very solid growth of almost 20% and reached more than EUR 26 million.

For the Marketplace, again, the result reflects our strategic focus on quality over quantity. While the on-site bookings grew by 8% to almost EUR 125 million, the advertising revenues declined by 10% to EUR 66 million. This was a very deliberate result of reduced marketing spend, but also our ongoing push, which we have started a couple of years ago already to replace the advertising revenue with higher value and higher retention on-site revenue. Now moving to the IFRS revenues. On the group level, we saw a strong growth of 20% to reach almost EUR 256 million in revenues. For HomeToGo, we saw a jump in the volume-based IFRS revenues. Essentially, they doubled, jumping over 100% to almost EUR 89 million. And for the Marketplace, the IFRS revenues remained broadly stable. The 5% growth in booking revenues, which is the on-site revenues, successfully offset the managed decline in our advertising business.

Looking then at the adjusted EBITDA. On the group level, it improved to EUR 13.2 million for HomeToGo_PRO. The reported adjusted EBITDA of negative EUR 2.6 million reflects, again, the timing of the closing of the Interhome transaction. As I said before, we were unfortunately only able to include the fourth quarter of Interhome, which was unprofitable, but not the highly profitable first 9 months. As we will see in the pro forma view, the underlying profitability of this segment is already significantly higher once Interhome is fully consolidated for a whole year. On the Marketplace, we can see the ultimate proof point for our strategy. The adjusted EBITDA more than quintupled surging 445% year-on-year to almost EUR 16 million. This was powered by strict cost discipline and a massive leap in marketing efficiency.

Let's now zoom in on our booking revenues, IFRS revenues and adjusted EBITDA, specifically for the fourth quarter of 2025, again, on a statutory basis. This was a quarter defined by triple-digit top line growth and a significant earnings turnaround in our Marketplace segment. For the booking revenues, we saw outstanding acceleration on the group level with growth of over 100% to almost EUR 107 million. For HomeToGo_PRO, we again see that it is the undisputed growth engine of the quarter for us. The volume-based revenues exploded by more than 400% to reach more than EUR 68 million, and it was obviously the first time where we could also show the full impact of the Interhome consolidation of our statutory numbers.

And the subscriptions also maintained strong momentum of more than 32% growth to more than EUR 7 million. The Marketplace side, the strategic execution was fully in line with our focus on high-quality on-site growth. So the on-site bookings grew strongly by 30% to more than EUR 28 million. The advertising business decreased by EUR 26 million to EUR 8 million as we continue to prioritize marketing efficiency and on-site conversion.

So again, we can see the continuation of the trend to replace the advertising business with a much higher value on-site business. For the IFRS revenues, on the group level, they surged by 56% year-on-year to more than EUR 52 million, which is a new Q4 record for our group. HomeToGo_PRO showed exceptional performance across the board. The volume-based revenues jumped by 374% to more than EUR 31 million and subscriptions grew by 21% to almost EUR 7 million, showing the continued resilience of our SaaS business. On the marketplace side, bookings revenues for the on-site business grew by 21% to more than EUR 17 million, effectively mitigating the managed 18% decline in our advertising business. Looking at adjusted EBITDA. For the group, we reported a seasonally normal EBITDA of negative EUR 8.8 million. The Marketplace showed an inflection point. This is really a highlight of the quarter. You can see the decisive earnings turnaround with a positive result of almost EUR 6 million.

This proves that our strategy of prioritizing efficiency delivered immediate bottom line results in the Marketplace. For HomeToGo_PRO, the adjusted EBITDA was negative EUR 14.6 million. Again, as previously noted, this primarily reflects the winter seasonality of Interhome's business model and the first time inclusion of Interhome into our statutory Q4 results. Now let's also look at the pro forma view where we have included Interhome as if we had already owned it starting with the January of 2023 to show you a true like-for-like comparison of the business that we now own. You can see for the pro forma IFRS revenues that revenues reached EUR 394.3 million for the full year of 2025. This represented a very healthy 10% CAGR over the last 3 financial years. And even more important than top line growth is the quality of our bottom line development. So when you look at the pro forma adjusted EBITDA, you can see that profitability has grown significantly faster than revenue, achieving a CAGR of 30%.

This also means that the EBITDA margin expanded in every single year since 2023. The adjusted EBITDA reached EUR 42 million in 2025, which represented a 27% increase compared to the previous year. Key takeaway when you look at this development is the fact that adjusted EBITDA growth is outpacing revenue growth and that highlights the scalability of our combined cost base. It also demonstrates the very powerful operating leverage we are beginning to realize within the new HomeToGo with its core being the B2B side of our business and Interhome being the single biggest business within the group. Now it's time to get a little bit nerdy. We have received a lot of questions from analysts and investors relating to items which are below adjusted EBITDA in the P&L. And I would like to give some background and provide transparency and clarity. So for everybody, who is not that interested in the finer points of IFRS and how we account for share-based payments, now will be a good time to go grab a cup of coffee and maybe come back in 5 minutes when Patrick will talk about more important strategic issues.

So I'll start with the share-based payments. You can see that the noncash expense was EUR 13.2 million in the last year. This was primarily driven by grant of new share-based awards to members of the Management Board. So obviously, I joined as a new member, but also the other 3 members of the Management Board renewed their contracts and in that context also received new grants. We had one-off items below EBITDA of EUR 11.2 million, which was relatively stable versus last year. The main drivers were the Interhome acquisition with cost of EUR 4.7 million, so for M&A costs and also subsequent integration costs of about EUR 3.6 million. Then moving further down in the P&L to depreciation and amortization. Amortization amounted to EUR 19.2 million. This includes about EUR 4.2 million for capitalized software and also EUR 14 million for M&A-related intangibles from previous acquisitions. We also had a relatively large impairment charge in this year, which impacted our net result after tax. So we had a significant noncash item this year totaling EUR 61.4 million.

This mainly composed a EUR 54.3 million goodwill impairment for the Marketplace segment and also a EUR 5.6 million impairment related to the e-domizil restructuring. So for all of these items that I named until now, we also have slides and I will go into more detail. Then quickly looking at the net financial result, it decreased to EUR 5.3 million. This reflects mainly the interest expense associated with the EUR 75 million bank loan, which we took out in relation to the acquisition of Interhome. And then lastly, also looking at taxes, you can see a positive tax income of EUR 3.2 million, which obviously looks weird because it looks like the tax authorities is giving us money, which unfortunately is not the case. So this was due to the recognition of deferred taxes. The actual cash outflow for income taxes in the last year was about EUR 5.3 million. So then let's take a more granular look at the one-off adjustment items.

As I said before, the total one-offs for the last year amounted to EUR 11.2 million, which remained relatively stable versus the EUR 2.6 million in the previous years. The biggest single item was in relation to expenses for M&A activity. This includes legal fees, transaction advisory, due diligence costs and was obviously primarily driven by the Interhome acquisition. Then we had EUR 3.6 million in relation to reorganization and restructuring. These are nonrecurring costs mainly for severance and personnel-related restructuring. And last year, this item mainly relates to the strategic decision to close the e-domizil offices and integrate the e-domizil business operations into the existing Interhome structure. So this is one item that is actually a big part of the EUR 5 million of the cost synergies that we have already realized and that Patrick talked about earlier. Then we had about EUR 700,000 in relation to legacy tax risks. This relates to a tax risk that we have identified regarding potentially incorrect historical treatment of VAT at one of the subsidiaries which we had acquired in previous years.

And then the last bigger point is the amortization of fair value step-down of EUR 1.2 million. This is a very, very technical IFRS accounting point and it relates to the purchase price allocation back when we acquired the GetAway Group and it covers the fair value step down on vouchers and advanced payments that GetAway had received. So really important to remember, all of these items are nonrecurring and non-operational. They do not reflect the underlying day-to-day performance. And this is also why we adjust for them to show you an EBITDA that really truly reflects in the most -- from our perspective, accurate way, the underlying operational profitability of our business. Now let's address the large noncash impairment loss that we had to record in the last financial year. So our statutory net loss for the last year was significantly impacted by that onetime noncash impairment loss of EUR 61.3 million. The biggest part of that being EUR 54.3 million relates to a goodwill write-down, which we recorded for the Marketplace business.

And this is a direct accounting consequence of the strategic decision that we announced in October 2025 to reallocate capital away from the marketplace and into our HomeToGo_PRO business. The goodwill, which was impaired importantly originated from the de-SPAC/business combination transaction through which HomeToGo listed on the stock exchange. It does not relate to any of the businesses or bolt-on acquisitions we have made since the de-SPAC. So it's really truly an accounting technical adjustment that we're doing here. Then there is also the EUR 5.6 million impairment relating to e-domizil. So as I said, this was a part of the cost synergies which we captured last year already. We closed down and merged the e-domizil business. And following that transaction, we also had to write down or impair the M&A-related transaction intangibles that were created when we originally acquired e-domizil. Really important, and I want to emphasize this again.

These impairments are entirely noncash and they are onetime in nature, and they also have no impact on the group's very, very strong liquidity position. Moving into the second topic where I would like to provide a little bit more clarity and transparency. And this is the depreciation and amortization charges. So again, you can see for the last year, we had the big impairment charge. So I will not go into detail on that again, but rather focus on the ongoing amortization and depreciation charges. You can see that the depreciation for PP&E, so things like desks, laptops and so forth is relatively stable. It's not a big part of our cost base. Also the amortization for general intangibles like software licenses that we acquire is pretty low. So there is 2 remaining points which are big. So the first one is the amortization of internally generated software. So we capitalized about EUR 11 million per year in software, which we develop internally, and this has to be then amortized over the following years.

But the biggest single item, and that is the dark blue box on this chart relates to M&A-related intangibles. So when we acquire a business, and as Patrick has outlined, we are serial acquirers of business. So since 2018, we have bought a business, at least one business every single year. And we have to go through an accounting exercise called the purchase price allocation, PPA, where we look at the different assets that we acquired, and we have to put into our balance sheet intangibles for things like brand or customer list or software. And we then have to amortize these over a potentially quite long period of time, right? So brands, for example, we have to impair or amortize over a long time. So these charges, they are all noncash, right? So the biggest single point in the DNA is really all that stuff that is M&A related and which accounted for EUR 40 million in the last year.

Then also another point where we get a lot of questions from investors and analysts, and this is the share-based compensation charge. We try to, again, disentangle this a little bit to provide more clarity and transparency. So a couple of things I want to note. So the first one is that there were certain share-based compensation programs, which actually predated the IPO of the company. So these were given to employees and managers when the business was still private. And you can see that over the last couple of years, this was actually a pretty large part of the share-based compensation. This is now -- has worked its way through.

So the EUR 0.9 million that we recorded in the last year is the last bit that you will see from that. So these pre-IPO programs, they are -- now they're done. They are terminated, discontinued, and you will also not see any reflection of that in the P&L anymore. The 2 things that you will see on an ongoing basis is the cost from the LTI program in relation to virtual stock options and also in relation to restricted stock units. You can see that the stock options accounted for EUR 8.9 million last year and the RSUs, restricted stock units accounted for EUR 3.9 million. The biggest point to note here is that of the EUR 8.9 million, about 44% is due to appointments and reappointments of members of the Management Board.

All 4 of us actually opted to take the maximum amount that we can in the form of stock options. So all of us at HomeToGo have the ability to choose a mix of RSUs and stock options. We, as senior managers, all opted to take as much as we can in stock options. And that reflects really the belief that we see a lot of upside in this business and that this upside should also, in the future, reflect into the share price. So the options are obviously the higher risk. So I will come to that later. At the moment, unfortunately, all of our options are out of the money. But again, we expect to be rewarded for taking that risk once the share price hopefully appreciates in the future. If you have talked to me in one-on-ones before, you probably heard me rant about the IFRS accounting treatment of share-based compensation and how I have a personal belief that it is the opposite of giving a fair and true view and that it's also a quirk in the sense of that it is probably the one area where IFRS is, for some reason, not following a mark-to-market logic.

So I would like to walk you through again how this actually all works. So a couple of things to note. Firstly, all of our share-based compensation is entirely equity settled. So meaning no cash transfer occurs, right? So all of us, we will actually eventually receive shares. And that is for both the RSUs as well as for the virtual stock options. The structure of the LTI program is as such that we as participants can split our annual award between restricted stock units and virtual stock options with a minimum allocation of 30% to each instrument. So for example, personally, I have chosen to have 30% in RSUs and then 70% in virtual stock options. The vesting usually occurs over 2 to 3 years in quarterly tranches. And once a tranche has vested, we have a 3-year window to exercise the instruments before they expire. For people who joined the company new, for example, myself, there is also a 1-year cliff so if I would leave the company within the first 12 months, actually, all of my RSUs and options will be forfeited. Unfortunately, the P&L recognition does not follow the logic of our program.

So the way IFRS and the very wise people living somewhere in the ivory tower writing these accounting guidelines have thought and saw fit to make us do this is that the fair value of all the granted units is determined exactly once at the time of the grant, and it is not remeasured. That's what I mean. It is really a break with mark-to-market logic under IFRS. The value is then also recognized in our P&L aggressively, and this results in a front-loaded cost distribution. So I've given you an example on this slide, and you can see that under a 3-year vesting schedule, 61% of the total cost is recognized in year one and then only 28% in year two and then 11% in year three. And this, in my personal view, nonsensical treatment is made even worse by the fact that, again, there is a cliff. So I'm a new joiner so 61% of the cost of my options is recognized in the first year, even though if I would leave in the first year, I will get exactly nothing.

So key takeaway for you here, this front-loading explains why new grants like the recent Management Board reappointments and appointments create a temporary spike in P&L expenses, even though the actual vesting period is much, much longer. Then to conclude our deep dive into share-based compensation, let's look at the accounting recognition versus the actual intrinsic economic value of both the RSUs and the virtual stock options. Again, there is a strong disconnect between IFRS and mark-to-market logic here. IFRS does not follow a mark-to-market approach for these equity settled grants. The cost recognized in our P&L is fixed at the time of the grant and remains unchanged for subsequent years regardless of share price performance. This has an impact on the RSUs. They obviously retain some value. But if you would mark-to-market them again, the actual economic value is lower now.

So that means that the fixed accounting costs shown in the P&L are significantly overstated compared to the actual intrinsic value held by the -- for the employees who have RSUs. That is made even worse for the VSOs. So we have about 34.1 million virtual stock options outstanding. And as of close yesterday, our closing share price was EUR 1.38. We have given you a chart with the strike prices. So the lowest strike price any of us actually has at the moment is EUR 1.42. So not a single virtual stock option is actually currently in the money. Also not a single stock option has ever been executed and exercised in the last couple of years. So all of these 34.1 million stock options have strike prices above the current market value, meaning that exactly 0 of these options would be exercised today. Then when you look at the price -- at the pie chart, you can also see that a significant portion of our options have relatively high strike prices, even 21% of them above EUR 3.

These are the oldest virtual stock options. So they have the shortest remaining tenure, and they will likely unfortunately expire unexercised. So the key message here for shareholders is the dilution, which you should expect from our option programs is much, much, much lower than what you think from the cost that was recognized in the P&L. So this concludes my very public rant about, in my personal opinion, the stupidity of IFRS accounting principles when it comes to share-based compensation. And I will now hand back to Patrick to talk about much more important things.

Thank you, Sebastian. So I will now walk you through our strategic road map for this year, so 2026. As I've already shared, the HomeToGo Group will focus on 5 strategic priorities for the remainder of this year, which will further strengthen our position as Europe's leading vacation rental group. As a reminder, first, we will capture the Interhome cost synergies, not yet realized, aiming to fully achieve the target of EUR 10 million in annualized short-term savings. As of the end of 2025, we had already realized EUR 5 million in annualized cost synergies, and we plan to capture the remaining EUR 5 million over the course of 2026. These additional cost synergies will come from exiting further TSAs so these transitional service agreements we talked about and additional operational efficiency gains.

Second, we will target strategic M&A within the HomeToGo_PRO segment, leveraging our strengthened balance sheet and the EUR 200 million bond framework to pursue value-accretive acquisitions in the property management and B2B software space. We will focus our M&A activities on 3 specific areas: a, acquisitions of small local property management agencies through asset deals at very low single-digit EBITDA multiples. The integration of these bolt-on acquisitions is straightforward, leveraging our existing geographic footprint and Interhome software platform; b, larger scale acquisitions in the vacation rental property management space to enter new local geographies in Europe or to strengthen supply in adjacent business segments like luxury villas. And C, B2B software applications for the vacation rental industry that enhance our service offering for property managers and hosts.

Third, we will harmonize our group-wide brand architecture to enhance global visibility, which will be led by the continued rollout of our HomeToGo Originals umbrella brand for our property managing businesses. This initiative will streamline our ecosystem, making it easier for partners and guests to navigate our B2B and B2C offering. We aim to leverage the significant strength of the HomeToGo brand beyond our consumer business. So therefore, after a successful introduction at ITB earlier this month, we will begin implementing the HomeToGo Originals umbrella, for instance, across our various businesses units throughout 2026 in the property management area. Fourth, we will drive operational excellence in our Marketplace. Our focus will be on expanding margins through optimized marketing efficiency and continued disciplined capital reallocation. We will continue to stay extremely focused on cost discipline.

For instance, by using AI at every opportunity. In fact, if you look at the daily operational work we do, we've adopted a very clear rule for hiring. Before we add any headcount, we ask ourselves if the job can be done by AI instead. This aligns perfectly with the strategy we shared back in October. We have already started to scale back marketing spend, as you heard earlier, in the Marketplace, and we expect this to drive a significant increase in ROI throughout the year. The first month of 2026 have already looked very promising in that regard and underline that our pursuit strategy works. And fifth, we will maintain our AI leadership, sustaining a high pace of innovation to remain the leading AI-powered travel platform in our industry. We were the first in vacation rentals to embrace this technology, already launching AI tools for our customers back in 2023, well before it became a global trend. And as you know, we have a history of machine learning basically since the beginning of HomeToGo.

Most recently, we launched Dash, the next generation of our AI companion. That is already making an impact, cutting customer escalations to human agents by 85% compared to our previous third-party solutions. To stay at the forefront of AI, we're also implementing new protocols like MCP. This ensures us that our inventory is directly accessible to the world's most advanced large language models. And by doing this, we're ensuring that as new AI agents emerge, they can seamlessly access our supply, positioning HomeToGo as the essential partner for the next generation of AI-driven commerce. So this comprehensive road map directly fuels into our financial ambitions for next year. And throughout the year, we will give you more information and report on what we have achieved on our strategic road map. And with that, I hand over to Sebastian for the guidance for 2026.

We're entering really a new growth chapter for HomeToGo with the year 2026, and that year will be characterized by a massive step change in both scale and also most importantly, our bottom line results. So for 2026, we're targeting IFRS revenues of between EUR 400 million and EUR 410 million, which represents more than 55% year-on-year growth. And we're targeting adjusted EBITDA of EUR 45 million to EUR 47 million, which is more than 240% year-on-year growth compared to 2026 (sic) [ 2025 ]. There is a couple of things I want to note on our guidance. As we unfortunately all have seen over the last 2 weeks, there is significant macroeconomic uncertainty arising from the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. While for us at HomeToGo, the direct impact of this is very, very low. We don't really have bookings in the Middle East, it's not a holiday region for us. What is unclear for us is the indirect effect, especially from a prolonged war and the transformation that could come into the broader economic environment from a sustained higher level of oil prices and gas prices.

So that is just something that creates significant macroeconomic uncertainty, not just for us, not just for the travel industry, but really for everybody in the world at the moment. With the acquisition of Interhome, we are now also to some degree or an increased degree exposed to foreign exchange volatility, particularly regarding the Swiss franc to euro pair. And what we have seen also in these times of uncertainty is a flight to safety in currencies and that flight to safety means that there is a lot of capital going into Switzerland, which meant that the value of the Swiss franc has increased quite a lot. So again, this is uncertain. I think a lot of that is also tied to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East and how that will follow through.

And this, again, is something that is outside of our control. What is inside of our control is the strategic capital reallocation from the B2C marketplace to B2B segment, which Patrick has outlined and which we have also introduced already in October of last year. Just one thing to remember when you look at our top line guidance, that capital reallocation away from B2C to B2B results in a one-off step change down for the Marketplace segment, which is reflected in our top line guidance. And with that, I'm handing back to Patrick for some closing remarks.

So to wrap up the 3 key takeaways from today. First, 2025 was a landmark year for HomeToGo. It marked a decisive turning point where we not only realized a massive scale transformation, but also proved our ability to generate profit. We achieved record statutory IFRS revenues and significantly exceeded our profitability targets. Second, our strategic pivot is now fully operational. Following our business update in October, we have successfully shifted our center of gravity towards the high-margin HomeToGo_PRO B2B segment.

In 2026, we are driving this evolution forward through our 5 key strategic initiatives from capturing the further Interhome synergies to maintaining our leadership in AI. And third, we are scaling to new financial highs. We ended the current year with record visibility and a strengthened capital structure. This gives us the firepower we need. Our guidance for financial year '26 is clear. We are targeting IFRS revenues of EUR 400 million to EUR 410 million, representing over 55% year-over-year growth and an adjusted EBITDA of EUR 45 million to EUR 47 million, which effectively means more than tripling our profits with over 240% year-over-year growth. And with that, I thank you very, very much for your attention today, and we will now open the floor for your questions.

[Operator Instructions] And in the meantime, we have received the first question from Tim Kruse via the audio line.

A couple of questions from my side. First will probably be to Sebastian on the EBITDA guidance. If I remember correctly, the pro forma EUR 42 million for 2025 does not include any cost synergies, right? Is that correct?

Yes, that's correct. So the synergies were really captured in November and December. So the implementation was in November and December. So only a pretty small portion is in the last year.

Okay. Then help me sort of -- because you said on a full year basis, you have EUR 5 million cost synergies realized at the end of 2025. And then you are very well on track in realizing the EUR 10 million on a full year basis throughout this coming year. So what am I missing on that when I look at then the guidance of EUR 45 million to EUR 47 million in terms of cost effect? Is that these currency uncertainties or are there other cost effect that we have to think of sort of counter-moving against those synergies you mentioned?

Yes. I mean, broadly right. So the EUR 5 million that we had already implemented at the end of last year will be then fully in the 2026 numbers, right? The EUR 5 million on an annualized basis that we are still generating this year will only be partially in the numbers for this year. So depending exactly when we can get that realized. And there is a couple of operational initiatives, which will probably be a little bit back-end loaded for this year. So the kind of like the bridge that you're looking for is really what we laid out on the guidance slide in terms of what we said with macroeconomic uncertainty, right? So we see effects in the travel industry already. So SAS, the airline has canceled 10% of their flights in April yesterday because they see kerosene prices go up by over 100% in the last 2 weeks.

Air New Zealand has canceled 10% of their flights globally. We see a lot of just things happening in real time at the moment, right? So we also obviously have a strong belief that we could be a net beneficiary, right? So we can also see, for example, the very wealthy people are changing their holiday bookings from Dubai to Mallorca, but not quite our target audience, like we -- kind of like middle-class family is more our target audience. So there's just different things happening in real time. And it's very, very hard for us to get a read on it. So we just want to take effect of these things that are unfortunately outside of our control. So we're continuing to work very, very hard on all of these operational initiatives and getting the synergies in, which is something that we absolutely have control over. But we also just want to be very open and transparent that there could be macro wind coming from -- into our face that is outside of our control.

Understood. Understood. Yes, I was wondering on sort of the net effect of the current situation. Would you concur that on the one hand, as you say, travel patterns could maybe, like in Corona, sort of move more to the local vacation? On the other hand, you have the sort of the discretionary spend or the household income being affected by higher energy prices.

That's exactly right. So I think the benefit will be that I think families are a lot less likely to fly to Egypt or Turkey this year. right? And so a lot of these families may actually choose to take their summer holidays in Europe, potentially in a holiday house, right? That thing that we talk a lot about instead of going to Club Med in Egypt with kind of like everything included and you drive your car to Italy, rent a house and you cook yourself, right? So this is definitely something that we expect. However, if -- and that is a scenario, right? If oil prices go even higher, right, and we saw oil prices spike by almost 10% yesterday alone, right?

And they stay maybe at over $120 for a prolonged period of time, right? We will see or we are worried about an inflationary impact that you will see coming from the supply side. And we're also worried about what that will do with the mindset of the consumer, right? And so these are just things that are too early to call at the moment. And so as a management team, we just want to take a cautionary stance at the moment and not overpromise on something that we may not be able to deliver on because it is just outside of our control.

Okay. Then just one final on the sort of the midterm guidance, the EUR 20 million additional synergies. Can you give some kind of time line? And then maybe the final question for Patrick. In terms of AI leadership, how do you define that? And what are you experiencing in the customer journeys? And I was wondering, I saw that Booking has a ChatGPT app already available and how you think about that, can we expect the HomeToGo app in other LLM models as a sort of direct integration, that would be helpful.

Yes. So very quickly on the midterm, EUR 20 million upside, we've always said that will come 3 to 5 years after closing of the transaction. So we may see the first part of that maybe next year, 2027, but really, I think, 2028 onwards. Patrick, AI.

Yes. So I think like the interesting thing we can talk about this, as Sebastian said about learning about IFRS, we can nerd about AI also for a longer time. Maybe we do a separate session on this. But like generally, what we see, right? Like we've always been at HomeToGo like the leveraging technology, not for the sake of the technology, but to make either our operational business better or obviously like in the end, which counts most like make something better for the customer. And so like when we started HomeToGo, we were leveraging long before people were talking about AI, machine learning for various topics, right, like consolidating our inventory and so on and so on, which in the end is nothing -- also the large LLMs are nothing else than machine learning.

But like obviously, with the new advantages that came with AI, we could like leverage them on the existing pipelines and what we did for prior with, I would say, normal machine learning. And we could also utilize this then for various like things that you see in our product today, right, like not only starting with the things early and having now Dash, which is the companion that can go -- that can on the Marketplace like support you through the whole booking channel, but you also get from Dash like information about summarizing reviews and these things that you might also know from Amazon, we had it way before them. And these types of things for the customer. And it also means what you just asked, right, like that -- so we have this MCP actually running in the first version already for HomeToGo. So like LLMs can access HomeToGo via that.

We anyway have, as you might know, our integration with Google with the Google vacation rental finder, where we also have a partnership with Google where we will also -- where this will also be utilized in their AI mode and in the AI topics. And the same is also we are speaking, obviously also to OpenAI, and you will also see us being active there with our app and all these types of things. So in the end, the interesting thing is for us that we see a huge advantage how our business model is structured with the rise of this new era of AI. And so this is for us definitely a net positive how we look at it today, though, and no one can tell you where AI and how far it will go. But especially, as you know, as a reminder, with the last mile we have to the inventory via software, but even more so via the Interhome business, we have the best moat in this kind of industry with this direct connection to the inventory.

Thank you for your questions, Tim. And ladies and gentlemen, before we move on with the questions from Bharath Nagaraj, let me tell you shortly as we're a bit over the time, but we want to cover all your questions. So again, we have some questions in our chat as well. So now Bharath, we are happy to take your questions.

Just a couple from me then in the interest of time. With regards to the synergies of EUR 20 million that you've talked about, additional synergies, shouldn't that be a percentage of, let's say, your revenue in the future because for every booking that you now make using other OTAs, you can potentially internalize that with the HomeToGo Marketplace. So just wondering what is that EUR 20 million based on? Is that based of today's revenues or anything else? That's the first question. And how should we think about the split between Marketplace and HomeToGo_PRO in terms of the guidance for 2026? And just to sneak in one more, free cash flow expectations for 2026.

Yes. So starting with the EUR 20 million in value creation upside. So the biggest bucket of that is actually the internalization of the distribution margin. And how you can think about that is that Interhome has about EUR 400 million booking volume at the moment, of which about 25% go through their own channels and also through HomeToGo channels and about 75% go through third-party channels. So you can book Interhome inventory through Airbnb, through Booking.com and Expedia. And if that happens, we have to pay them about 13% on average margin for the distribution. So what we're intending to do is to increase the percentage of the bookings we receive from about 25% at the moment to 50%. So that means capturing another EUR 100 million booking volume for Interhome and then saving 13% on that. So that's EUR 13 million of that EUR 20 million.

The reason why we think that is possible is that for another acquisition that we did called Casa, so we acquired that 2 or 3 years ago, when we bought the business, that portion of the internal bookings was about 30%, and we actually got it to 70% at the moment. So it is something where we have shown in the past that we can implement that. In order to implement it, there is a whole lot of small levers that you need to pull. A lot of them require changes in the way that customers can book. Given the timing of the Interhome acquisition closing, we were not able to implement that for the booking season of this year. So we're working on that. We may be able to implement some of that already for next year. But again, this is like a hard slog, right? There's a thousand little things you need to do. So really, I would only expect that to be relevant 2028 going forward.

And then the rest, the EUR 7 million to get to the EUR 20 million is really about growth in the Interhome business, and that is especially growing the number of properties that we have under management. So we have put in a big push on sales. Also how, for example, how the Interhome sales team is being able to be incentivized. So under Migros, for example, it was illegal internally to give salespeople any bonus. So you can imagine how easy it was, "To run a sales team for the Interhome management team where you're not able to give [ bonus ] to them." So we've obviously changed that. We're also, again, rolling up smaller players as a source of growth. So yes, EUR 13 million of that is internalization and EUR 7 million is really growing the inventory. On the split for the marketplace versus PRO, I think you can look at the pro forma numbers and take that as a split. So I would invite you to look at the pro forma numbers and take that as a pretty good starting point for modeling.

On free cash flow, we have decided not to give guidance on free cash flow for this year. There is a couple of reasons for that. So free cash flow in 2026 will be subject to significant technical noise, right, as we complete the first full year cycle of the Interhome integration. So there's just stuff that we need to learn. Unlike our Marketplace business, Interhome's managed portfolio involves also complex payment cycles between guests and individual homeowners. So we also need to just really figure out how that works with net working capital. And as outlined in our strategic road map, we're also actively looking at M&A. So we don't want to put out a free cash flow guidance, which may restrict us in going after very good M&A opportunities at low multiples with high expected synergies. And again, also looking at macro, right? It's hard to see how that works through. So we expect as a business to be cash flow positive, obviously, and also significantly cash flow positive, but we do not want to guide at the moment towards a specific number.

Yes. Makes sense. Just if I may just ask a quick follow-up because you based your EUR 13 million of the internalization of the margins of the EUR 400 million of booking currently. So if those bookings grow, that could grow as well, right, is what I was trying to get at.

Yes, absolutely. So the way that you look at these like synergies or value creation potential is always you pick a point in time, right? So it is a static view. But like you're absolutely right, right? If we're able to grow the Interhome business, that could potentially grow as well.

And then let's move on with the further questions from our chat box and there, we received a couple. And one from [ Mr. Johansen ] already answered with Tim's question. So we move on with the next one. Please remind us on the currency split on revenue and cost given your FX comment.

Yes. Look, the -- as I said before, the euro-Swiss franc is the most important currency pair that we have. I would also invite you to look into our annual report, where you can see like a sensitivity analysis on that. It's in note 36 of the annual report. So you can see how that actually works mathematically. Strictly speaking, our exposure is bigger on the revenue side than on the cost side. So we do have operations in Switzerland with Interhome, but it is higher on the revenue side than on the cost side.

And the next question, do you believe the greater marketing efficiency and improvement profitability in marketplace is sustainable?

Yes. From everything that we can see, like the answer is an absolute yes. So as Patrick has also mentioned, we had a very, very good start into the year with the Marketplace business. The return on advertising spend that we see this year is really stunningly better than last year. So all of the operational improvements that we started to do in the last quarter of last year, they have really paid off in the start of this year. So we're really, really, really happy with the marketing efficiency in the Marketplace business.

And it also shows like the strength of our organic share of the Marketplace business, right? Like because if you scale back marketing on the paid side. This is obviously the interesting part, and it shows that brand and retention so recurring customers are really working in the way that we wanted it to see.

And the last question from [ Mr. Johansen ]. What is the normalized D&A level you expect ahead?

I mean, number one, there is -- my question back would be what exactly is meant with normalized D&A. So we -- like that's not a metric that we have. So we obviously wanted to give much more clarity and transparency on D&A so that investors and analysts can form their opinion about that. Most importantly, we do not expect an impairment charge again in 2026. So that like EUR 61 million, you can take out. The M&A-related amortization will continue and will continue for a couple of years still, right? So this is something that will stay with us. So all of that, basically, except for the EUR 61 million is what you could call "normalized D&A." And you can see how it has developed over the last couple of years. And I think the trends that you can see, especially over the last 2 years is something that you could also expect to continue.

All right. Thank you so much. And then we have another virtual hand. So we received it from [ Benjamin Bailey ].

You mentioned in the last earnings call that you see yourself as a tech company, but you're trading at a forward EBITDA ratio of 6, which is significantly lower than competition. Booking trading at a multiple of 12, Airbnb even higher and share price performance was very poor against any benchmark over the last 12 months. So with that in mind, are you planning for the next 6 months any measures to increase shareholder value through share buybacks?

No, we do not plan any share buybacks.

So just a quick question. And then we have further questions in our chat. So from Mr. Friedman, can you please split the sales guidance for 2026 into Marketplace and PRO?

Yes. So we do not give guidance on a segment level. But again, the same that I also said to Bharath, I think when you look at the pro forma numbers for 2025 and you look at the split between Marketplace and B2B for the pro forma numbers for 2025, that is a good guide that you could use for 2026.

And then the last question from Mr. Friedman. As we received another question from Mr. Hinkel, but you already answered this question. So Mr. Hinkel, you can take a look on the annual report, Note 36, for further information. So the last question by now is, what kind of organic growth in PRO can we expect in the years to come?

Look, I think the answer that we've given to that question in the past kind of stays true, right? Like -- and this is something looking through economic cycles and things like the Middle East, right? But what we've said before is that we can see like double-digit growth in the B2B segment. The growth will be a little bit lower than that for the property management side of the business. We expect it to be a little bit higher for the software side of the business. Again, we can see a really good growth in the software business that we've also pulled out, especially with our SaaS revenues growing very strongly last year. So on a blended basis, we would expect double-digit growth over the next couple of years.

Okay. So I think that was it. I'm not hearing any more questions. In case you do have more questions, we're happy to answer them. Please contact us, especially Carsten from our Investor Relations team or [ Izy ] from our PR team. Thanks very much for taking the time today. I know we talked long and I think also longer than we expected to talk. I hope it was useful. Thank you very much for your interest in our company. And yes, have a very nice day. I hope it is as sunny wherever you are as it is in Berlin at the moment. Goodbye.

Thank you. Goodbye.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and a warm welcome to HomeToGo's Investor and Analyst Call following the publication of the Q3 financial figures of 2025. I'm delighted to welcome the CFO, Sebastian Bielski, who will speak in a moment. After the presentation, we will move on to a Q&A session in which you will be able to ask your questions directly to the management.

Well, let's dive straight into the presentation. Mr. Bielski, the stage is yours.

Thank you very much. Good morning, everybody, and thank you for joining HomeToGo's Q3 2025 Earnings Call. I am pleased to welcome you as we present the results for our third quarter of this year. As you will see, this quarter clearly demonstrates the successful execution of our new B2B led strategy, delivering record revenues and our highest ever quarterly adjusted EBITDA. We're excited to walk you through these strong results. Given Patrick, Valentin and I had already given you a pretty comprehensive update on our strategy and the Interhome transaction about 3 weeks ago, I will today focus on the numbers rather than talking in depth again about strategy and operations.

Let's start with a recap of our key highlights for the third quarter of this year. The first one is our IFRS revenue, which surged by about 24% to hit EUR 108 million. This is the best quarter we ever had as a group. Secondly, we had a really strong adjusted EBITDA. We reached an all-time record of about EUR 43 million for a quarter, which represents about 20% growth year-on-year. Looking at the 9 months numbers, growth was even stronger at almost 31% year-on-year.

The third point to highlight is the development of our HomeToGo_PRO segment, which represents our B2B business. We have clearly established this business and segment as our new core for the revenue that we generate, for the growth that we generate and also for the profits. IFRS revenue climbed by more than 83% year-on-year to almost EUR 51 million and profitability also scaled massively with adjusted EBITDA more than doubling to about EUR 13 million.

Fourth, the development in our Marketplace segment. As we have talked about in our last presentation and also in the Q2 presentation already, we have executed a shift in our strategy for the Marketplace segment where we now focus on profitability over incremental top line growth. And as you can see in the results for Q3, we have successfully executed and implemented this strategic shift. The execution of our strategy resulted in about 60% year-on-year increase in adjusted EBITDA for the first 9 months with results reaching EUR 10 million. This was especially driven by increased marketing efficiency and also a very good development of our take rate.

Lastly, the successful closing of the Interhome transaction and the very strong start of the integration process. As you all know, we closed the transaction on the 28th of August and the progress on the integration is fully on track. We have already achieved a number of key milestones, some of them even ahead of schedule, including the successful migration of the Interhome B2C channel and front end to HomeToGo's core technology platform.

Let's now take a closer look at our key financials for Q3 and the first 9 months of this year. I will start with booking revenue. Growth in booking revenues has accelerated significantly in the third quarter with booking revenues growing by about 17% year-on-year to EUR 73 million. This strong quarter also helped to lift our 9-month performance to almost EUR 227 million, which represents an 8% year-on-year growth.

Looking at IFRS revenues, we achieved a new quarterly record with revenues surging 24% year-on-year to more than EUR 108 million in the third quarter. As you can also see from this slide, IFRS revenues grew even stronger than booking revenues for both the third quarter and also the 9-month period. For the first 9 months, IFRS revenue crossed the EUR 200 million milestone now reaching EUR 201.2 million, which represents a growth of about 14%.

Lastly, looking at the adjusted EBITDA. We had a very strong Q3 performance and we reached an all-time high of EUR 43 million in adjusted EBITDA, up 20% year-on-year. We maintained a very strong margin of almost 40%. In terms of the first 9 months performance, profitability improved even faster than revenues growing 31% year-on-year to EUR 22 million. Overall, for the first 9 months, this resulted in a margin expansion to almost 11% for the 9-month period. The development of the adjusted EBITDA highlights the scalability of our business where we couple tight cost control with growing revenues and that leads to expanding margins.

Now let's take a closer look at the composition of our booking revenues, IFRS revenues and adjusted EBITDA divided by segments for the first 9 months of 2025. The group overall is up 8% year-on-year, as I said before, to almost EUR 227 million. HomeToGo_PRO is clearly our growth driver. The volume-based revenues surged by about 40% to almost EUR 61 million driven by very good organic strength and also a 1-month contribution from Interhome following the closing on the 28th of August. Subscriptions also showed very solid double-digit growth of about 14%.

Looking at the Marketplace, again the results reflect our focus on quality over quantity. Onsite bookings grew slightly by about 2% while advertising actually declined by 7%. This was due to reduced marketing spend as well as an ongoing push to replace advertising revenue with higher value onsite revenue. You may remember in the second quarter results, we had also talked a little bit about this and as an example, I want to highlight again that we moved Expedia and Vrbo, which is one of our 2 big partners in the advertising side, to onsite for most of the business we do with them.

Now looking at IFRS revenues. Again very strong growth for the group of 14% to over EUR 200 million. HomeToGo_PRO, the volume-based IFRS revenues jumped by about 64% to almost EUR 62 million. And lastly, Marketplace remained broadly stable with onsite booking up 2% offsetting the managed decline in advertising. Again the decline in the advertising revenue is one of the strategic choices that we made for the Marketplace business.

Lastly, looking at the adjusted EBITDA for the group. Significant improvement of 31% year-on-year to EUR 22 million, which confirms our strong commitment to sustainable and profitable growth. Looking at HomeToGo_PRO, it continues to deliver profitable growth with adjusted EBITDA up 14% to EUR 12 million while we continue to invest into scaling this business. Lastly, the Marketplace. I think looking at the adjusted EBITDA is really the strongest proof point for the strategy and where you can see it really yielding results. The adjusted EBITDA surged 60% year-on-year to EUR 10 million driven again by very strict cost discipline and higher marketing efficiency.

We will now zoom in at booking revenues, IFRS revenues and adjusted EBITDA for the third quarter. Starting with the booking revenues. Growth for the group accelerated to 17% year-on-year or about EUR 73 million in booking revenues. For HomeToGo_PRO, again you can see that it's the clear growth engine of our business. Volume-based revenues nearly doubled surging 92% year-on-year to almost EUR 28 million, which was obviously also partially driven by the inclusion of Interhome for 1 month.

But also the subscriptions saw very, very strong growth momentum and are up about 28%, which is purely organic. Looking at the Marketplace, results are in line with our strategy and also our expectations. Advertising revenue declined due to the intentional reduction in marketing spend and moving partners from offsite to onsite and you can see that the onsite bookings actually remained resilient growing by about 6%.

Looking at the IFRS revenues. Again, group revenues surged by 24% to over EUR 108 million. We saw outstanding performance at HomeToGo_PRO. Volume-based revenues jumped 97% to over EUR 44 million, almost doubling year-on-year. Subscriptions grew 28% to about EUR 7 million benefiting from super, super strong Smoobu performance with growth of 41% year-on-year in the third quarter. So again Smoobu, one of our really beautiful businesses. Lastly, Marketplace onsite grew by 6%, which helped to offset the managed decline in advertising resulting from the strategic measures that we took for that part of the business.

Lastly, adjusted EBITDA, very strong growth of 20% for the group reaching EUR 43 million. Also, please do remember that the third quarter is always our strongest quarter. So while we would love to see EUR 43 million in each and every quarter, I think that may take 1 or 2 years to get there. I'm kidding. It will probably take longer than 1 or 2 years. HomeToGo_PRO adjusted EBITDA more than doubled 109% year-on-year growth to EUR 13 million and remember that this only included Interhome for 1 month.

If we had owned Interhome for the full quarter, this number would actually have been around EUR 70 million higher. So you can see again the really strong earnings and EBITDA contribution that will come from EBITDA. Lastly, the Marketplace remains the largest absolute contributor for this quarter on a statutory basis at least with EUR 30 million, which is 1% growth, and it maintained the high profitability despite the top line calibration.

Short look at the development of the onsite take rate for the Marketplace business. Our onsite Marketplace continues to generate high quality demand. which our partners highly value. Our attractive value proposition continues to translate into further growth of our onsite take rate. We reached 13.5% in the third quarter, up from 13% in the same quarter of last year. This marks a very solid 0.5 percent point increase year-on-year, which highlights our ability to drive monetization and value from our existing user base on the Marketplace side of our business.

Then also a quick look at the development of our regional booking mix again for the Marketplace business and our average basket size. On the left-hand side, you can see our regional booking mix and you can see that the DACH market; so Germany, Austria and Switzerland; remains our by far most important market, which accounts for about 70% of the booking revenue for the Marketplace business. It actually has also increased by about 6 percentage points year-on-year while the rest of Europe and North America are slightly lower in terms of the share.

Now looking at the basket size evolution. Overall, our group basket size grew by about 2% to EUR 917. When we then zoom into the DACH market, you can see that the average DACH basket size increased by 4% to about EUR 810. If you exclude the short-term business, the DACH basket size grew even faster at about 6% to EUR 1,158. The reason why I wanted to talk a little bit about this is that many investors ask us if we see an impact from consumer spending weakness in our numbers and at least for our core DACH markets, which again represents 70% of our Marketplace business, this is really not the case.

I believe that the best indicator to look at would be the basket size and they should decline from travelers shortening their holidays or trading down to cheaper properties and we currently really don't see that. What we do see is some weakness in the North American markets where basket size declined by about 8%. So we see some strain on the consumer on the other side of the Atlantic, but this market only accounts for 10% of our Marketplace business.

We also had some investors asking us if the, so to say, flight restrictions due to the government shutdown in the U.S. had any impact on our business. Again travelers from the U.S. vacationing in Europe and using vacation homes is a very marginal part of our business. So we really did not see any impact from these flight restrictions.

Slide 8 shows the evolution of our cost base, which is crucial for understanding our profitability and the impact of the Interhome consolidation. Let's focus on the Q3 numbers where you can see really the impact most clearly. When you look through the different cost items, you can see that cost of revenues shows actually an increase when it comes to the percentage of revenue which it represents from 1.2% in 2024 in the third quarter to 9.9% in the third quarter of this year. There is 2 drivers of this development.

The first one, which is the much smaller one, is that we are continuing to scale our payments business on the Marketplace. You may remember that we talked about that in depth in the second quarter results. And then the much bigger impact is the 1-month consolidation of Interhome. Interhome also provides cleaning services and janitorial services to the properties which they manage and that is included in the cost of revenue and thus, the share of cost of revenue has increased because it is a relatively material part of their business.

However, when you look at the more fixed cost blocks in our P&L, especially product development and admin expenses, you can actually see that even with 1 month of Interhome already included, we improved those costs as a percentage of revenue. We have included a chart in the back of the presentation in the appendix where we have dissected the third quarter into the organic growth and the impact of Interhome.

And you can see when you look at the organic development for HomeToGo alone that for all of these costs are actually even on an absolute number lower in the third quarter of this year than in the third quarter of last year, which again highlights the very, very strong cost discipline and focus on costs that we have in the business.

Lastly, a quick update on the progress of the integration of Interhome. Overall, we are very happy with it and I'm very pleased to report that we are fully on track. We're executing against a clear 18-month carve-out plan to transition Interhome to full operational independence from its former parent companies. We have already achieved a number of key milestones, many ahead of schedule. Number one will be the technology migration. As of November 5, we successfully launched the Interhome B2C channel on the HomeToGo core technology platform.

This is a crucial step that immediately enables faster product development, greater flexibility, ensures the future scalability of the Interhome brand and also, by the way, generates a little bit of cost savings because Interhome is now running on the same tech platform for the front end at least as HomeToGo is already. Secondly, the rapid integration. Operationally, we have successfully exited the first transitional service agreements ahead of schedule, which reduces our dependency and also at least to a small degree has some cost savings attached to it.

Unfortunately, the biggest cost savings come from transitional service agreements, which we will exit next year or at the beginning of 2027. Third, technology leadership. We have onboarded a dedicated Interhome CTO, who will drive the integration and future innovation of this business. We are clearly a tech company and we see a lot of value creation potential at Interhome to become a much more tech-driven business. And so we're super happy that we have found a very, very good CTO for this business.

Fourth, we've taken over marketing from Interhome. This includes the consumer marketing, but also marketing for finding new hosts. We are leveraging our group's advanced data and technology solutions and again are also starting to generate some small cost savings because our existing marketing team at HomeToGo has taken that over without needing to scale its employee base.

Let's also turn to our full year guidance for this year, which we had updated a couple of weeks ago and which we are confirming today. This slide presents 2 views of our guidance. The pro forma view, which reflects the true economic status quo and the statutory view, which reflects the accounting impact of the actual closing of the Interhome acquisition, which again only took place on the 28th of August. In our view, the pro forma guidance is most helpful for valuing our company today and also for modeling the next year.

On this basis, we include Interhome as if we had owned it from January 1 of this year and we expect to generate IFRS revenues of about EUR 400 million, adjusted EBITDA of about EUR 40 million and a positive free cash flow for the full year. The key numbers here is the 22% year-on-year growth on our pro forma adjusted EBITDA, which clearly shows again the underlying profitability and operating leverage of the combined group.

Lastly, the statutory guidance. This will allow you to benchmark us against numbers, which will be in our audited report for this year. But this view is distorted by the late consolidation of Interhome, which again was on the 28th of August. On that basis, we expect IFRS revenues of more than EUR 260 million, adjusted EBITDA of more than EUR 11 million and a negative free cash flow. I will not go through the bullet points again at the end of this slide. We also talked through them pretty much in depth 3 weeks ago. If there is any questions, I'm happy to take them at the end of this presentation.

So lastly, to wrap it up. Our strategy is yielding strong results. Q3 has been a pivotal quarter. It provided the first clear proof point that our transformation and focus on B2B is working. HomeToGo_PRO is now our largest segment and is driving scalable growth in terms of revenues and EBITDA. The Marketplace has successfully shifted and delivered higher profitability, which was exactly what we intended for this part of our business. Second, the Interhome integration is on track.

We have progressed swiftly and have already hit key milestones ahead of schedule as we have successfully, for example, completed the B2C channel migration to our HomeToGo tech platform. And lastly, we confirm our financial guidance based on the strong strategic execution and our robust 9 months. We are confident that we will hit our guidance. Again, we believe that the pro forma guidance is a good measure for the business as it stands right now and we expect about EUR 400 million in pro forma IFRS revenue and EUR 40 million in pro forma adjusted EBITDA.

Thank you very much for your presentation. We will now move on to the Q&A session for an engaging conversation. We kindly request to ask your questions in person via the audio line. To do so, please click on the raise your hand button. If you're not able to speak freely today, you can also place your questions in our chat.

Mrs. Cuneo. She actually asked the question in the chat box so I will just read them out loud for you. On marketing spend relocation; given the strategic focus towards the B2B-led HomeToGo_PRO segment, could you elaborate on the current stage of marketing spend reallocation between the Marketplace and HomeToGo_PRO segments and what further shifts we can expect, for example, in terms of marketing costs as a percentage of revenue? And secondly, on typical gross profit margin in large business, considering the significant increase in cost of revenues due to Interhome, what would be a typical gross profit?

Okay. So I'll start with the marketing and just to clarify, we are not reallocating marketing euros between B2C and B2B, but we are reallocating capital. So what we're doing is we are reducing marketing spending in the B2C side of our business so the Marketplace and we're reallocating that capital to the B2B side. But that doesn't mean that it will end up in the B2B side in the form of marketing. It can also be or it will actually be not majorly marketing. It will rather be sales, it will be tech and product development and it will also be M&A. So just to clarify that there is no misunderstanding there.

As we've also outlined a couple of weeks ago, we're about or we're in the process of putting together our budget for next year. So we're expecting a relatively material drawdown in the marketing for next year, but we're not in a position at the moment to guide on any specific numbers. In terms of the gross profit margin, I think the best way to look at it is in the back of this presentation, you can see the pro forma numbers that we have prepared and also shown to the market in the last presentation that we gave 3 weeks ago, which on a pro forma basis includes Interhome. So you can see the gross margin there, which is very indicative also how we would see it going forward.

There are actually 2 more questions by Ms. Cuneo. The first one is on a typical gross profit margin in large business considering the significant increase in cost of revenues due to Interhome, what would be a typical gross profit margin we should expect for the enlarged group on a full year basis after accounting for seasonality? And secondly, within subscriptions revenue streams, you called out Smoobu. Can you please remind us of how much that represents of the mix and what trends have you observed in other products? Perhaps you could talk about subscribers' trends versus.

Yes. Maybe we can jump to the slide in the back of the presentation where we have shown the pro forma numbers on a quarterly basis. So this slide shows the pro forma view so that is Interhome together with HomeToGo. I think the easiest way for you to model is to just look at it on an LTM basis. So if you take the sum of the quarter 4 2024 up to and including the third quarter of this year, that gives you a full 12-month view, which is not distorted by any seasonality trends and that should be very indicative of the gross profit margin that you can assume. Can you repeat the Smoobu question maybe?

Yes. The second question was within subscription revenue streams, you called out Smoobu. Can you please remind us of how much that represents of the mix and what trends have you observed in other products? Perhaps you could talk about subscribers' trends versus.

So the subscription revenue, the biggest part comes from Smoobu. So Smoobu in itself is almost purely subscription. So we have another software or we have 2 other software businesses within the group. But in terms of the subscription revenue that we break out, most of it comes from Smoobu. The churn development that we're seeing at Smoobu is in line with historic trends and is very, very good. So we have relatively short payback periods for onboarding new customers and it is a very nicely scalable business.

All right. Thank you so much for your questions, Ms. Cuneo. We do have another risen hand from Mr. Nagaraj.

You have several brands now within the B2B side of things, multiple SaaS software businesses and some other brands as well. My question is when it comes to capital allocation given that you're now more focused on B2B, how do you plan to drive each of these brands or do you plan to like kind of consolidate the brands or what's your plan there? That's the first question. The second one is around the on-site take rate. It's improved, as you said, to 13.5% now.

What's the kind of upper limit here and what's driving the current improvement? And then lastly, on the carve-out plan by March 2027, what does that actually mean in practice in terms of the improvements to the costs or anything else that you would expect perhaps from the upside to the margins from internalizing some of the OTA spend that you had historically. Sorry, when I say you, I mean Interhome had historically.

So I'll start with the first one, which was your question in relation to the brands. So we will consolidate the branding on the B2B side. So the term HomeToGo will always visible. So we will likely start with a co-branding exercise. So it will, for example, be Interhome, the HomeToGo originals. So we want to make it obvious to our customers on the B2B side that they are part of the HomeToGo ecosystem and we also want to make it easier for our customers there to transition between different parts of our business.

So for example, Smoobu is targeted at owners with a small property portfolio so say kind of like 1 to 10 properties. If you keep buying properties, then probably SECRA is the better solution for you. And with co-branding, we also want to make that very obvious for you so that if you're looking for another solution, that you can move to SECRA or even to InterHome. So co-branding and we'll start that work in 2026. So in terms of the take rate, the good development that we're seeing is there's really not a single factor that I could call out. So we're constantly renegotiating our take rates with a host of partners.

So that's really a daily occurrence. And overall, we do see that the added weight that we have in the market also coming from the Interhome transaction. So we're really a big player now, helps us to renegotiate take rates upwards. I don't want to give a numerical guidance on an upper end there to be honest. But it's a daily task for us to always look to improve our margins. And then lastly, your question in relation to the end of the TSAs in 2017. So step by step we will replace the TSAs with internal solutions. All of that is part of not just the plan to transition Interhome to stand-alone business, but also the plan to generate synergies.

So we had given a couple of times some very specific guidance on the synergies and we had said that within the first 12 to 24 months after closing of the transaction, we expect to see EUR 10 million of synergies mainly coming from the cost side and getting off the relatively expensive services that the former owner had provided to the business and replacing them with cheaper internal services is an important part of that program. And I would invite you to just have another look at the presentation that we gave 3 weeks ago. We have a slide in there with the synergies and you can also see how the EUR 10 million synergies break up into the different buckets.

May I just quickly ask a quick follow-up. I know you probably don't want to make too many comments on this particular question, but just trying to see if there's any color you can provide at all that's to do with the organic kind of growth rate that we should be thinking about for the pro forma business going forward. I note the 4% growth that you have said on a pro forma basis for this year, but just wondering if any further color on that at this point in time.

I mean I don't, at this point in time, want to give any specific numerical guidance. But I think it should be clear to investors that the B2B part of our business is by far our biggest part now. So it represents about 64% of revenues. So any revenue growth will come from that side of the business. We have businesses within the B2B group, which grow at different rates. So we have businesses like Smoobu, as I said during the presentation, which had an outstanding Q3 with growth of 41%, but it's a smaller part. Then we obviously have Interhome. You can see how Interhome has developed over the last couple of years.

So we would expect, unfortunately, not quite 41% growth there, but maybe high single-digit or low double-digit growth there. And for the Marketplace, as we have said 3 weeks ago, we're resetting that business in 2026 through lowering the capital allocation into marketing there, which should most likely lead to a negative growth for a single year so '25 to '26. And we then afterwards expect also the Marketplace business to go into growth mode again, probably growing in line with the overall market.

We have another risen in hand from [indiscernible].

I just have a question. You also announced that you are considering a placement of a bond of up to EUR 150 million. I was a little bit surprised of that since you already have the financing at hand and I would think that a bond would probably, all costs included, be a little bit more expensive than the bank liabilities. So should I see this step as a clear indication that you have other deals on the table and want to be ready for that or how should we see this potential bond placement?

So yes, you're right. So we have made an ad hoc announcement last night that we have engaged banks; which is Pareto, ABG and UniCredit to explore a potential bond offering for us in the Nordic bond format of up to EUR 150 million with a duration of 5 years. We expect to start the marketing in the next couple of days. So the purpose of this bond is to: number one, refinance the existing debt. So of the EUR 150 million, EUR 75 million will be used to refinance the existing debt that we have from UniCredit and KfW.

We would then also, so to say, prefund the first 2 payments of the deferred purchase price, which adds up to EUR 22 million, which then leaves about EUR 50 million for M&A. So your assumption that we have a deal pipeline that we want to execute is absolutely correct. So we have been a serial acquirer of businesses in the past. We have a long track record going back all the way to 2017. We've acquired many, many businesses. As we stated a couple of weeks ago, we do see M&A as absolutely a part of our growth strategy. We intend to acquire businesses on the B2B side so that is software businesses and then also agency businesses.

We have a very active deal pipeline of more than 10 companies that we actually currently are in discussion with, all of them on the B2B side, and there is some very actionable targets on that list. And as I said, EUR 50 million of the Nordic bond would be to fund that M&A. In terms of more expensive, actually our loan at the moment is also not cheap. So we have an interest rate with a base rate of 3-month Euribor and a margin of 5.75%. We expect the Nordic bond to be relatively similarly priced so with a 5% handle in front of it. So it could even be maybe a little bit cheaper than the financing that we have in place right now and much, much, much more flexible.

We do have another question in our chat box by [indiscernible]. He's asking please compare adjusted EBITDA with EBITDA quarter-by-quarter for the last 12 months.

Look, I think I would invite you to call our Investor Relations people so Carsten and Sebastian, I think this is more a data request. So we're very happy to give you that. You actually can also find that information in the quarterly reports where we always have a very detailed schedule showing differences between EBITDA and adjusted EBITDA, but we're happy to walk you through it again. But I think this is more a data request. So happy to answer it through our Investor Relations people.

We have another risen hand by Mr. Huber.

On the pro forma base, you're showing the only stand-alone for HomeToGo. Can you give an indication how much is the PRO business in there, the growth for the last quarter if you want?

So the Interhome business is fully included in our PRO business. So there is no part of Interhome included in our PRO business if that's your question.

We do have another question in our chat box by [indiscernible]. He's asking do significant marketing savings in the B2C sector pose a long-term threat to traffic and thus to the number of bookings. Can you give please more color on this?

No, we don't think so. So what we're pulling back from is a fight about market share on the B2C side, right? So the B2C market has a certain growth and if you are trying to grow faster than that, you will have to go into hand-to-hand combat with people like Booking and Airbnb and Expedia. So they are unfortunately all big organizations. And what our strategic thinking behind that is we do not want to fight about market share on the B2C side anymore with these people. We see them as partners especially on the B2B side. So all of our properties are also available through Booking.com and so forth and we don't want to be in competition with them anymore on the B2C side. So we're happy to grow with the market. We're happy to see our marketing spending yielding even better results than it shows right now, but we don't see this as a long-term threat to that side of the business.

We have not received any risen hands or questions so far. There's nothing in the chat box. So please, ladies and gentlemen, if you have any further questions, please ask them now into our chat or raise your hand. We have not received anything anymore. So I would say we have come to the end of today's earnings call. You will find the presentation on HomeToGo's website and also at the Airtime platform by clicking into today's event.

Dear participants, thank you for joining and your interest in HomeToGo. Should further questions arise at a later time, please feel free to contact Investor Relations. Thanks once again and have a nice day and goodbye.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and a warm welcome to today's investor and analyst call of HomeToGo, following the publication of the updated full year 2025 financial guidance.

I'm delighted to welcome the Co-Founder and CEO, Dr. Patrick Andrae; COO, Valentin Gruber; as well as CFO, Sebastian Bielski, who will speak in a moment. After the presentation, we will move on to a Q&A session, in which you will be allowed to place your questions directly to the management.

So let's dive straight into the presentation. Dr. Andrae, the stage is yours.

Thank you. Good morning, dear analysts and investors, and a very warm welcome. Thank you for joining us today. We are thrilled to discuss the implications of the successful closing of our acquisition of Interhome, Europe's second largest vacation rental management company, marking the beginning of a new era for the HomeToGo Group. Today, we will also share our updated financial guidance for 2025, reflecting this transformation. But first, let me show you what we have planned for today.

We have structured our call into 3 key sections to give you a comprehensive overview. First, I will give you an overview of how the landmark acquisition of Interhome fundamentally repositions HomeToGo as Europe's leading vacation rental group, marking not only the largest, but also the most transformative deal in our history. Second, our COO, Valentin, will give you a detailed look into the Interhome business. And finally, our CFO, Sebastian, will present our updated 2025 financial guidance and a look at the financial profile of the combined group. So let's now begin with our new strategic positioning.

With the Interhome acquisition, we are not just growing. We are now Europe's leading vacation rental group. So we are entering a new phase of scale and strategic focus, but let me walk you through exactly what this means. First, we outlined the 5 key pillars that define the new HomeToGo and our strategy going forward. We will go into more detail with each of them afterwards.

In summary, first, the acquisition of Interhome is the next logical and deliberate step in our long-term evolution, making us Europe's leading vacation rental platform, B2B focused and vertically integrated.

Secondly, as a result, our B2B segment, HomeToGo Pro is our new core and center of gravity, and it will be the primary driver of our profit growth. The B2B business provides us with reliable, recurring and highly predictable revenues in a market with limited competition. This allows us to deploy capital with a high expected return at lower risk.

Third, we are implementing a clear and disciplined focus for our B2C marketplace. Our strategy prioritizes growing profits over growing top line. The marketplace will operate as a resilient and profitable segment that generates capital, which we will actively redeploy to fuel the growth of our high-return B2B businesses.

Fourth, we have identified tangible and large synergies across the group. There's a powerful flywheel effect between our marketplace and HomeToGo Pro, but also within the HomeToGo Pro businesses themselves, creating a unique competitive advantage that we will leverage to drive further profitability.

And fifth, this brings me to our clear focus for future growth. We will pursue a 2-pronged strategy. First, we will drive organic growth with a clear prioritization of growing profits over top line growth. This is a discipline we will apply across the entire group, but especially for the Marketplace segment. And second, we will execute a targeted roll-up M&A strategy for B2B, capitalizing on the significant opportunities within the large, growing and highly fragmented property management and software segment of the market. And now we go a little bit more into detail of these 5 pillars.

Our first slide illustrates our long-term strategic evolution, starting with our first pillar, where our story first began with Metasearch. By 2017, we had built the foundation to what became Europe's #1 vacation rental focused marketplace, giving us unparalleled insights into traveler demand and this strong B2C success paved the way for our next strategic move.

In 2020, we made our first decisive entry into the B2B market by offering software solutions, especially for the supply side of vacation rentals. The next inflection point, however, began in 2024 when we added tech-enabled full-service property management to complement our B2B offering by acquiring the German leader on the Baltic Sea, Kraushaar and now culminating with the acquisition of Interhome, Europe's second largest vacation rental management company. So this step elevates our B2B segment, known as HomeToGo Pro to become the center of our success in our business.

So our shift to a B2B focus is not a recent decision, but the successful execution of a clear long-term strategy. This strategic journey empowered us to create a unique and integrated ecosystem. The Interhome acquisition in February 2025 massively strengthens our B2B capabilities. Within HomeToGo Pro, we cater basically to every type of host. So to those who want to manage properties themselves, we provide best-in-class software solutions. And for those who want a full service like Interhome is offering our tech-enabled service solutions now operate at an entirely new scale.

Through our acquisition of Kraushaar in early 2024, we gained already valuable hands-on experience in property management and how to scale them further utilizing marketing -- our marketing and tech capabilities. Now with Interhome, we are taking this proven strategy to a pan-European level. And finally, this is all complemented by our powerful B2C marketplace, Europe's largest online travel agency for vacation rental and its positive network effects also for the B2B businesses. So this newly -- new vertically integrated ecosystem has a profound impact on our strategic and financial profile. So let's look at what this means in numbers.

As already said, B2B is our new center of gravity. The chart on the left clearly illustrates a significant step change in our top line. Our pro forma IFRS revenues are forecast to reach approximately EUR 400 million in 2025. This represents an increase of nearly 150% from our stand-alone revenues of EUR 162 million in 2023. So we are more than doubling the scale of our business in just 2 years.

Even more important is the strategic shift you see on the right. Previously, our business was 2/3 B2C. With Interhome, this completely flips. HomeToGo Pro becomes our primary business segment, accounting for approximately 2/3 of our total group revenues on a pro forma basis. A key reason we are so confident in our B2B-centric strategy is the exceptional quality and predictability of the revenue it generates. What we know from our software business is also true for Interhome. As this chart clearly demonstrates, Interhome's business is built up on an incredibly loyal customer base with recurring revenues.

Over the past 5 years, an average of 92% of annual revenue has consistently come from existing customers. This is a powerful testament to the value and stickiness of the service offering. So what this means for us and also for U.S. investors is a high degree of financial predictability and a stable recurring revenue stream. This is not a business that needs to reinvent its customer base every year. It's a reliable compounding model. And this inherent stability provides a resilient foundation for profitable growth and is precisely why we are making our B2B segment the new center of gravity for HomeToGo.

This brings me to the third pillar of our strategy, our B2C marketplace. As the headline states, our priority is on growing profits, not on increasing top line. This is a deliberate strategic decision. As you can see from our recent Q2 results, this strategy is already delivering. We increased our adjusted EBITDA by EUR 4.5 million year-over-year in quarter 2 on virtually flat revenues. This demonstrates our ability to actively manage and steer this segment for profitability. And going forward, the Marketplace will operate as a resilient and profitable cash contributor to the group. We will reallocate capital from the Marketplace into our HomeToGo Pro segment, where we see stronger growth potential and more attractive risk-adjusted returns.

And to be very, very clear about the implications, especially for next year, so for 2026, this means lower marketing investments and a relentless focus on marketing efficiency and as a result, higher profitability. It also means a resetting of the revenue base for the marketplace as we optimize for these higher returns. So this disciplined approach will ensure our B2C segment effectively supports the accelerated growth of our B2B core.

Let's now talk about the fourth pillar of our strategy, leveraging the tangible and large synergy and network effects that exist across our group. Our integrated model is our core competitive advantage, creating a powerful flywheel that is difficult to replicate.

Let me highlight the key synergies between our B2C Marketplace and HomeToGo Pro in an overview. First, our Marketplace acts as a Bloomberg for vacation rentals. It provides us with deep real-time insights into travel demand and market dynamics, which we use to optimize performance for our B2B partners and businesses.

Second, it serves as a technology incubator. So what does it mean? We develop and test innovative products at scale in our B2C environment like our HomeToGo Pro ‘Doppelgänger’ redistribution tools, checkout and payment solutions or dynamic pricing.

Third, the marketplace is a highly effective lead generation acquisition channel for our B2B segment and actually also vice versa. It also gives us unique insight into the performance of M&A targets.

And fourth, there's a direct and significant financial benefit. When we distribute our B2B inventory through our own marketplace, we internalize the distribution margin that we would otherwise pay to third-party platforms, boosting overall group profitability.

And finally, there are powerful synergies within the HomeToGo Pro segment itself. We offer our host a full spectrum ecosystem of software and services. This allows them to trade up or trade down based on their evolving needs, which makes our platform incredibly sticky and significantly reduces our overall host acquisition costs.

Our goal is that once you are a Pro customer, you will stay a Pro customer, even if your needs change. So HomeToGo Pro will always have the right solution with the right level of service. And this brings me to the fifth and final pillar, our clear and actionable growth strategy, which is the engine that will power our future. Our strategy was and is boosted by our proven M&A track record. As you can see on the left, we have successfully acquired and integrated 16 businesses since 2018. So our M&A journey has mirrored our strategic evolution, starting in B2C and shifting decisively towards our new core B2B. This is exemplified by key acquisitions in the software and service solutions space like Smoobu, SECRA, Kraushaar and now, of course, the transformational addition of Interhome.

So our future M&A focus will be mainly on expanding our HomeToGo Pro segment with, like already in the past, value-accretive profitable additions. So building on this foundation, our path forward is driven by 3 specific engines. First, as already mentioned, disciplined organic growth. For HomeToGo Pro, this means expanding through new customer acquisition, upselling, price optimization and geographic expansion. For the Marketplace, on the other side, our focus remains firmly on marketing efficiency, further increasing customer retention and deepening the synergies with our B2B segment.

Second, strategic M&A. We have a proven playbook for value-generating acquisitions. We will continue to act as a consolidator, rolling up small and midsized European vacation rental agencies and acquiring strategic software capabilities.

And third, leveraging our powerful segment synergies, as I've already detailed out, the interplay between our B2C and B2B operations creates significant competitive advantages and efficiencies that will fuel further growth.

So as a summary, as I have emphasized several times, HomeToGo Pro is now our core growth engine. It is our new center of gravity, and we are already operating at a significant scale. Today, HomeToGo Pro source over 60,000 paying customers with an inventory of over 250,000 properties, enabling a gross booking value of around EUR 3 billion. This scale established us as the leading one-stop shop for vacation rental software and tech-enabled services. We are now a market leader in European property management and the largest direct vacation rental supplier to third-party channels. So therefore, the logical next step that HomeToGo Pro will be the group's key focus area for capital allocation and future M&A. This is where we will direct our resources to accelerate growth and build on our market leadership.

To conclude my section, the HomeToGo Group has a clear vision, a transformed business model with B2B at its core, a disciplined approach to capital allocation and an actionable plan for the growth. This is the new HomeToGo.

To now give you a deeper understanding of the key ingredient Interhome for the path forward, I would now like to hand over to our COO, Valentin, and he will walk you through the Interhome business in more detail.

Good morning, and also a very warm welcome from my side. I'm delighted to share some more background and some more insights on Interhome and the market that it is placed in and also answer some more operational question on what does Interhome actually do.

So let's start with some key highlights of Interhome. It's an iconic market-leading company with over 60 years of experience as a Swiss vacation rental management company. It provides its services through over 200 local service offices, providing a wide area of full service options, everything from property management through rental services as well as listing and distribution.

The focus is clearly on rural properties, and this they do with over 40,000 vacation rentals across 28 countries, of which 70% of those they manage exclusively. So this clearly marks the second largest vacation rental management company in Europe. And that they are successful in it is clearly proven by the average service contract lifetime. So owners stay on average 9 years with Interhome leading to the over 90% in recurring revenues that Patrick just mentioned prior. This is possible through a service-driven model combining tech as well as personal support, but the business model is by far not yet done. There are multiple growth levers.

On the one side, what they've done in the past, but what we can do even more aggressively is expanding our portfolio in existing as well as in new geographies, which we can do organic, but also inorganically through M&A because in a moment, when I embed Interhome in its wider market, you will see that the very high fragmentation in the short-term rental market offers a wide optionality for further consolidation.

Additionally, also optimizing distribution mix, I think, has a lot of potential in growing the market share of the largest 3 VRMCs at the moment to much more of what we see today of Interhome. As a last point, but also very important and which was also very relevant to us during the entire process is Interhome is led by a very experienced management team with a very proven track record that brings over 100 years of industry experience.

But let's start with where are we in the market. So as I said, it's a large market because there are over 70 million vacation rental homes in Europe. If we break it down, what is rural and what is serviceable, we are getting to 2.5 million vacation rentals, our service addressable market. If we break that further down to where VRMCs are servicing these vacation rentals, we are at 0.9 million vacation rentals.

If we then go into the differentiation of what of the serviceable addressable market is managed by owners. We see that for the VRMCs or vacation rental management companies, only 30% to 40% remain, out of which roughly 90% today are managed by a very, very fragmented set of vacation rental agencies, usually with less than 100 properties under management. So you see that there is a significant gap versus the top 3 players that combined bring a 10% market share roughly, that this market offers growth in multiple perspectives becomes quite obvious not only when we look into the VRMC market, but also when we look at the EUR 70 million because what happens is that in many places, generational changes are happening, younger generations take over, younger generations see historic vacation rentals also as an additional source of income and are there with transforming them into vacation rentals, not only serving the family, but serving a crowd of customers.

So aside from the service addressable market growing, it likewise clearly states the potential for further M&A in this. But there are also further trends. If we look at market insights, we see that there is a trend moving from vacation rentals being managed by owner to seeking more professional management services on the one side. And likewise, but this is no news to anyone. Obviously, booking trends are also going more and more online, while the vacation rental market still seems many times a bit conservative, the trend clearly points to the direction that a significant amount of the bookings will be made online, all which favors Interhome and Interhome in the combination working together with HomeToGo and its relative expertises.

So -- but what does Interhome offer? It's not a one-stop shop. It's a wide area of services that homeowners can pick from. It's from partial service vacation rental management where listing and pricing, 24/7 off-site support through central service centers, where invoicing as operating as a tour operator or quality management are part of so solely managing the properties schedule and distribution on behalf of the owner to also the option of going full service and full service classically brings the part of the key handover, the on-site guest welcome and handling all requests during the stay, the cleaning and the laundry part of the vacation rental as well as classic maintenance of the object or, for example, of the garden.

So it's really end-to-end full service property management for owner that is provided through Interhome. And last but not least, also the distribution part is a very relevant one, where we have our 2 own platforms, Interhome and them as part of HomeToGo, the HomeToGo platform, but also third parties are very important in advertising the property to give it an as wide audience as possible to maximize revenues for owners and the company itself.

If we look at this on the property portfolio, there is a significant service part. Service always means that either there is a local office just right in that geography that provides all third-party services, everything like mentioned from cleaning to maintenance and organizes these on behalf of the owners with many times the owners being far away, maybe even in another country from the vacation rental that is being then managed by Interhome.

This is also for us the part that is of highest value. It brings the highest margins. It has significantly more than the 9 years average contract duration that I mentioned previously. And the service part is for us the entry stage into the local service office part. So this is where we do provide the services even though we don't have a local office. The guests are billed for the owner services or the owner at least coordinates the services that are provided at the property.

Here, our goal is clearly to figure out geographies that have a certain density in the property portfolio to also develop them into LSO property into LSO geography as said for the highest margins and also for the longest contract durations. But then there is also a significant part of the portfolio that is non-service. So these are private hosts that are organizing all the services by themselves, but that also trust the distribution strength of Interhome and therefore, hand over all distribution and also 24/7 guest support and so on over to Interhome that then do take care primarily of the distribution and the booking process.

So this, they do, like mentioned before, across 28 countries, the 3 largest of which are France, Italy and Spain, classic vacation rental destinations, each with 23%, 21% and 15% share of properties consecutively. It's also a property portfolio that grew over the past years purely organically. There wasn't any significant M&A in the past, something that we plan on changing significantly moving forward. But exclusive properties at the end of '24, we stood at 27,500 roughly.

Also, the expansion highly aligns where there's a lot of properties. There's also a lot of local service offices across the various countries.

And let me bring you back to something that you've seen multiple times previously, also now having been the owner of Interhome for quite some weeks. We are still very confident with the plan that we presented with you in the past on short-term and mid-term effects of the acquisition. So we remain very confident that in the short term, next 1 to 2 years, we will manage to get the company to above EUR 30 million in adjusted EBITDA and in the midterm horizon 2 to 5 years, certainly to above EUR 50 million.

So with this, thank you very much for the attention and for allowing me to take you a bit deeper into the business model of Interhome, and I there hand over to Sebastian, our CFO.

Thank you very much, Valentine -- Valentin. As Patrick has already said a couple of times, the acquisition of Interhome was very, very transformative for HomeToGo. And this is not just true strategically or operationally, but also financially. As you can see on this slide, the transaction significantly increases revenue, triples profitability and also will enable significant positive free cash flow going forward. You can see this especially when you compare the pro forma figures with the statutory figures for '24. So the pro forma IFRS revenues, which we expect for this year are about EUR 400 million, which represents an increase of about 88% compared to the reported numbers for last year. You can also see, again, the strategic shift, which Patrick has also mentioned a number of times towards the B2B segment.

So the revenue share of our B2B segment as a percentage of total IFRS revenues almost doubles and will reach about 64%. Lastly, when looking at the adjusted EBITDA, the pro forma adjusted EBITDA for this year is set to triple, so about 213% increase from the about EUR 12.8 million that was reported for last year to about EUR 40 million this year. At the same time, the EBITDA margin will expand from 6% to about 10%. This chart shows the group as it now stands on a pro forma basis. So what you can see here is if we had acquired Interhome already on the 1st of January in 2023, how would the combined group have looked like over the last 3 years? As a very important note, these numbers do not include any synergies, but they just show a sum of the 2 businesses, obviously adjusted for consolidation effects between the 2 businesses.

So over the last 3 years, the combined group has shown double-digit revenue growth and even faster EBITDA growth. This highlights the new overall group's margins and also potential for further operating leverage. The pro forma revenue growth shows double-digit growth with a CAGR of about 11% from 2023 to the expected number in this year. Pro forma EBITDA has grown even faster than revenue with a CAGR of about 28%, as you can also see from the margin expansion from 7.6% in 2023 to about 10% this year. This again highlights the scalability of the cost base of our combined group, and we expect to be able to increase EBITDA margins even further in the future.

Also as a note for analysts and investors, we want to be as transparent as possible, so you can really understand the financial profile of our group as it stands right now following the acquisition of Interhome. We have, therefore, included 3 pages with detailed financial information into the appendix of this presentation, and we really invite you to have a look at them.

On those pages, you can find the quarterly P&L starting with the first quarter of 2023 up to and including the second quarter of 2025 for, A, the HomeToGo Group without Interhome; B, Interhome stand-alone; and C, the combined pro forma group. As I said before, for the pro forma financials, we have not included any expected or actual synergies for the historic periods. We hope that this additional information will enable you to update your models to reflect the new HomeToGo and to inform your view of the valuation of our company.

As Patrick has said, and as you can also see in our ad hoc release from last night, we have updated our financial guidance for 2025. The statutory guidance, which you can compare with our audited annual reports for this year will include from an accounting perspective, Interhome only from the 28th of August up to and including the 31st of December, i.e., from the date when the transaction closed.

Our old guidance, which was for HomeToGo on a stand-alone basis was EUR 270 million in booking revenues, EUR 230 million in IFRS revenues, EUR 19 million in EBITDA and positive free cash flow. The new statutory guidance, which again only includes Interhome from the 28th of August stands at IFRS revenues of about EUR 260 million, adjusted EBITDA of EUR 11 million and free cash flow is now expected to be negative. Because of the transformative shift to B2B, which Patrick has also outlined, we will not provide guidance on booking revenues for the group anymore as this metric is not very meaningful for a business where 64% of revenues are from B2B. The group's free cash flow for FY '25 on a statutory basis, as you can see, is now expected to be negative.

This is driven by Interhome's normal working capital cycle. Cash from guest bookings for Interhome is collected leading up to the summer, but large payments to hosts are made after the peak travel months. These significant cash outflows fall into the post-closing period for us, leading to a negative free cash flow contribution for that specific time frame starting on the 28th of August up to and including the 31st of December. I will show you these effects in more details on the next slide to explain this a bit further.

But in our view, the statutory guidance, especially for EBITDA and cash flow is distorted by the late closing date. I will also explain this a bit further for EBITDA on the next slide. We have, therefore, also included a guidance on a pro forma basis, which includes Interhome for the full year, i.e., starting from the 1st of January. This pro forma view reflects the true economic status quo of the group. In other words, if you want to value the company today, we believe that the pro forma financials are much more helpful to form a view on the valuation than the statutory financials.

The pro forma financials will also help you to compare our performance in 2026 with our performance in this year. On a pro forma basis, the guidance is around EUR 400 million in revenues, adjusted EBITDA of EUR 40 million and also positive free cash flow.

Looking a little bit further on the statutory guidance change for IFRS revenues and EBITDA. This slide is meant to transparently explain how the new statutory guidance is composed of the old guidance plus the contribution from Interhome for the time period from 28th August until the 31st of December.

On revenue, the bridge works as follows. The old guidance was EUR 230 million. You add EUR 30 million contribution from Interhome for the post-closing period, which gives you the new guidance of EUR 260 million for this year. Interhome's contribution is impacted by the business' seasonality. The consolidation date of the 28th of August means that the peak summer travel season, where the majority of revenues is generated had already largely concluded by the time we acquired the business.

For EBITDA, the bridge works as follows: The old guidance was EUR 19 million. You deduct a negative contribution from Interhome of about EUR 8 million. So the new guidance is EUR 11 million. For Interhome, profits are heavily concentrated in the high demand and high travel quarters, which is the second and third quarter, while operational costs are incurred more evenly throughout the year. This means that for the post-summer period, which is mainly Q4, the business is typically loss-making. You can also see this seasonal profile and pattern on the next page.

As I said before, Interhome's business is highly seasonal, by the way, the same as for HomeToGo's Marketplace business, with more than 50% of revenues and nearly all profitability generated in the summer quarter, which you can see is the third quarter. As a reminder, under IFRS, revenue is not accounted for when a traveler is booking a holiday, but when the holiday actually takes place.

For Interhome, as for HomeToGo, this means that the summer holiday season is most important. In practice, most holidays are booked in January and February, so the first quarter, but are taken in July and August, the third quarter. And you can see this clearly in revenue and also in profitability. So Q1 and Q4 are loss-making typically because revenues are much lower, but operational costs continue.

Furthermore, for Q1 for Interhome, as again is the case for HomeToGo, especially on the Marketplace, it is also impacted by higher marketing costs because this is when the holidays are booked, and this is when we try to acquire customers. As you can see over the last 2 years, the fourth quarter showed a negative EBITDA of between EUR 8.7 million and EUR 11.3 million. We expect the same seasonality in this year, which is why you have seen the negative EUR 8 million EBITDA contribution from Interhome in the previous slide.

For the M&A transaction, so for the acquisition of Interhome, we used a so-called locked box mechanism. This meant that HomeToGo had benefited economically from Interhome since November 1, 2024, even though the actual consolidation and the transaction closing happened almost 10 months later on the 28th of August. The important distinguishing factor here is economically versus accounting view. So economically, we had benefited since November 1, 2024. On an accounting view, we're only on a statutory basis allowed to include Interhome when the transaction has actually closed.

So in terms of the economic benefit, the economic result generated between November 1, 2024 and August 27, 2025, are attributed to HomeToGo as a new owner, and this is reflected in the high cash balance, which was transferred to us at closing and which stood at about EUR 75 million. Again, for the accounting view -- for accounting purposes, however, revenue and profits are only recognized in our financial statements on a statutory basis from the official closing date onwards, which again was the 28th of August.

This slide provides more background why on a statutory basis, we expect a negative free cash flow for this year in contrast to the previous guidance of a positive free cash flow without Interhome. As you can see, the transaction closed at the peak of Interhome's annual cash position right before seasonal payouts to host decreased the cash balance.

So what happens is that up to and including July, August, Interhome actually collects more and more cash. The cash balance is building up. And then once the holidays are actually concluded, the share of the cash, which is owned economically by the host is then transferred to those hosts. And that's why you can see a relatively steep decrease in the cash balances basically from the time between, say, August and November, at which point it then is stable.

This is the normal working capital cycle for Interhome, and we continue to expect that this year is not going to work any different to any previous years. So while we continue to expect the positive free cash flow from HomeToGo stand-alone on a statutory accounting basis, i.e., including Interhome for the time where we own it, this is more than offset by the negative seasonal cash movements for Interhome from the end of August until the end of this year.

This slide compares our guidance on a statutory view and on a pro forma combined view, both for IFRS revenues and adjusted EBITDA. As I said before, in our view, the pro forma view is the much more strategically relevant perspective as it shows the true underlying performance of the combined business. The statutory view, while being the official accounting guidance, so you can compare it to the audited annual accounts for 2025 is heavily distorted by timing and seasonality effects from the late closing date.

As you may also remember, there was a holdup in the closing of this transaction due to a phase 2 merger control, which had nothing to do with Interhome and HomeToGo, but to the connected transaction under which DERTOUR bought Hotelplan and this pushed out the time of the closing of the transaction by a number of months.

So looking again at this chart, IFRS revenues. So the statutory year-on-year increase of 22% is from EUR 212 million up to EUR 206 million. But on a pro forma basis, the increase will be from EUR 383 million up to EUR 400 million.

So importantly, again, as Patrick has also mentioned, the transformative nature of these transactions, which can be seen by the 88% increase from statutory EUR 212 million last year to the EUR 400 million pro forma of this year. And this is also mirrored and even amplified in the view when you look at EBITDA. So the EUR 12.8 million on a statutory view is going down to about EUR 11 million, as I've explained before. Again, in our view, this is not really reflective of the business as it stands right now. So the EUR 40 million pro forma EBITDA for this year is, in our view, much, much more meaningful. And you can see the huge step-up from about EUR 30 million last year to EUR 40 million. But even if you compare just on a pro forma basis, 2024 and 2025, you can see the 22% increase in like-for-like EBITDA for these 2 years.

One word on the financial guidance for 2026. We will provide this together with the annual report for 2025 on the 19th of March of next year. This is in line with how HomeToGo has always done it, so that 2026 guidance will be provided together with the annual report for the previous year.

And now back to Patrick with some closing remarks.

Thank you, Sebastian. So summarizing a little bit what we have looked at today. So the HomeToGo Group, as pointed out before, has a clear vision, a transformed business model with B2B at its core and a disciplined approach to capital allocation and an actionable plan for growth. So this is what we call the new HomeToGo.

So if you look on the strategic transformation to B2B as the core of HomeToGo, we have fundamentally repositioned HomeToGo into a leading B2B focused and vertically integrated vacation rental platform with HomeToGo Pro now our new center of gravity and core growth driver.

We also see a step change in scale and profitability. The acquisition of Interhome is a transformative deal that elevates our financial profile. So as mentioned several times, we expect pro forma IFRS revenues of around EUR 400 million and a tripled pro forma adjusted EBITDA of around EUR 40 million for 2025. Our growth is now built on a more resilient foundation with over 60% of revenues from predictable recurring B2B streams.

And lastly, we have a clear path to further profitable growth. We have a disciplined strategy for value creation, focusing on prioritizing profit over top line growth and reallocating capital to high-return B2B opportunities and a targeted roll-up M&A approach in the property management and software space.

So with that, I thank you very much for your attention today, and we will now open the floor for your questions.

Yes. Thank you very much for the presentation, and we will now move on to the Q&A session. [Operator Instructions]. So we look forward and then Mr. Bharath, you should be able to speak now and place your question.

So we move on to the next participant because Mr. Nagaraj is not able, and we can't hear him. And we move on. Mr. [indiscernible], you should be able to speak now and place your question.

Yes. I have for the first question, just a general question regarding the numbers you have showed us in terms of the pro forma revenue base for 2024 in your February presentation, you had a pro forma revenue of above EUR 330 million, and now you showed EUR 383 million. So I was just wondering where this difference is coming from. So let's start the first question and do it one by one.

Yes. And thank you very much. The old numbers, they were based on the due diligence, which HomeToGo was able to do. And so this was based on a more limited information basis. And the information that was provided during the due diligence was in Swiss GAAP and not in IFRS. So during the due diligence, we, together with our external advisers from PwC took a step at transforming the Swiss GAAP numbers based on the limited information that we had to IFRS.

And so the biggest change actually is how we treat cleaning and laundry services costs. So back then, it was shown to us in a way that we thought under IFRS, we had to use it as a negative net of item within revenue. But now that we have access to the actual underlying information, really, we can look into SAP. We came to a different conclusion. Again, this was also not just our conclusion. We took advice from PwC on this as well. So we think that this is now the correct way to showing it under IFRS.

Okay. Understood. And then the second question, you mentioned the locked-box mechanism. So can you share how much cash Interhome generated since the beginning of November last year?

I think the most important number to focus on, to be honest, is the EUR 75 million in cash that we got together with the business. So again, this like basically represents the economic benefit for the time period. There was some dividends paid to Migros, which was not included here. So I think the most important number is the EUR 75 million to focus on.

Okay. And then for 2026, you mentioned the lower marketing budget regarding the B2C business. Can you already share some ideas you have in terms of reducing the marketing budget in 2026 versus this year?

Look, we're in the process of doing the planning for the next year, which is a deep planning process that we go through that involves the whole group, obviously, including our marketing people as well. We're looking at a number of different scenarios with the view of generating the best return. This involves different marketing mix, different channel mix, different timing throughout the year. So there is a number of scenarios that we want to look at further.

As I said before, we will provide the financial guidance for 2026 in March of next year, which will probably then also include a little bit more detail on marketing. But the strategic focus point will absolutely be to provide the best return on the marketing and also to have the best potential capital allocation between the businesses. So that means the marketplace business versus the B2B business, but there is no specific number that we've landed on so far.

Yes. Thank you very much. And we try again to get to Mr. Nagaraj, you should be able to speak now and place your question. So this seems not to be possible, maybe you check your microphone.

Yes. Now we can hear you.

Thank you. So sorry about that. I'm not sure what's happening. Just a few from me, please. What's the take rate differential between the different kinds of service packages that you offer? I know the average is around 30%, but just wanted to understand what you can potentially get up to in the future. That's the first question, and I'll ask the rest of the questions after this.

Yes. Very happy to take this. So it depends. If we are only looking for the exclusive distribution services, so everything from the distribution across major booking channels as well as on the own channel and then the booking handling, we're usually in the area of 20% to 27%. Once we go full service, it depends also a bit on the market, on the geography within that market and on property type, et cetera. But this is where we usually are between 30% and 36% as a take rate. And then it depends like Sebastian just explained the differentiation between IFRS, our past and new view on how we look at external costs that we get contracted with on cleaning and maintenance. And yes, this is what the [indiscernible] does and so...

Understood. That's very helpful. The next quick question is around the statutory guidance for 2025 for the EBITDA. Does that include the synergies? Because I know you said it doesn't include synergies for the pro forma number, but just checking because some of the synergies, I know you previously highlighted would be realized pretty quickly.

Yes. No, it does not include any synergies.

Okay. Understood. Okay. Then just a couple of other questions for me, if that's okay. One is around the -- I know you don't want to give the guidance right now, which is as is normal for HomeToGo, you give it in March. But just for investors and analysts to anchor towards like a growth rate in terms of modeling for the future, should we kind of like be closer to the 4% kind of number pro forma growth that we have seen? How do we think about it given the reset in Marketplace expectations, given you're focusing more on profitability? Just some kind of input there would be really helpful.

Look, we -- as I said, we're at the moment, going through our planning process for the next year, which obviously this year is also different or quite different to last year given that it includes Interhome for the very first time. So we don't want to give any guidance on revenue or on EBITDA at the moment, neither on growth rates because, obviously, implicitly, this would then also be kind of revenue or EBITDA guidance.

Okay. Fine. No worries. Last one for me, if that's okay. The management, I think, had presented after the acquisition in February -- sorry, in February or March, approximately that we were presented with targets, short-term targets for the EBITDA margin and long-term or medium-term targets, respectively, of 15% to 20%. Does that still hold in general, not immediate guidance?

I think in general, that absolutely should hold. Given the underlying profitability of our business, especially on the B2B side, we're -- yes, we remain highly confident to be able to reach that, especially also including the synergies that we will be able to generate within the different businesses, that is definitely a mid- to long-term target, which remains in place.

Well, thank you for your questions. And we have some questions in our chat. I will read them out for you. So what impact will the acquisition have on HomeToGo's balance sheet? How much goodwill will result from the acquisition? And what amortization of intangible assets will there be in the future?

Yes. So we're going through the exercise of producing the PPA, the purchase price allocation at the moment, again, including external advisers. This work is ongoing. For the financial results at the end of September, we will book it all into goodwill, but this is only on a temporary basis. So the PPA will be done until the end of the year. So for the 31st of December, we will have the full PPA. At this point in time, I don't know how much will be the different parts within the PPA. So I don't know yet what will be goodwill versus other assets.

Okay. And we have another question in our chat. I will read this out as well. Could you please provide some clarity on how depreciation, interest expenses and other below EBITDA items are expected to evolve over the coming year? In particular, it would be helpful if you could outline the expected impact of these factors so we can better bridge from EBITDA to net income and get a sense of the potential bottom line results.

So for the first part of the question, as it relates to depreciation, and I think depreciation here probably should also then include amortization. So I don't know that yet. Again, it is -- it will be a thing that will drop out of the PPA exercise. In terms of the impact on interest expense, as we have said before, we have taken out a loan of EUR 75 million to fund a part of this purchase price that we had to pay. This loan was taken out at relatively standard terms for a transaction of this nature and size. So you can, for modeling purposes, assume about something between 7.5% and 8% interest on the EUR 75 million for your modeling.

Okay. Thank you very much. [Operator Instructions]. By now, there are no further questions. And therefore, we would come to the end of today's earnings call, and I once more hand over to the CEO for some final remarks.

Yes. Thank you. So again, we're very delighted that you joined us today for this call, which, as said, marks a really step change in how HomeToGo, the new HomeToGo is moving forward. And we look forward to welcome you again at our next earnings call in November. Thank you very much, and see you next time.

Yes. And to all the participants, thank you for joining and your shown interest in HomeToGo. Should further questions arise at a later time, please feel free to contact Investor Relations. You will find the presentation on the website of HomeToGo and also at the Airtime website by clicking into today's event. And for now, we say thank you. Have a lovely remaining week, and goodbye.