Supermarket Income REIT Stock

Good morning. Welcome to SUPR's full year results. This is a year as the title says in that we've really established SUPR as a platform for growth. So we're committed to delivering value for shareholders. We've been progressing on that strategy to grow to gross assets today at GBP 2.2 billion. That includes our 50% share of the joint venture and is up from GBP 1.6 billion last year.

So as we've been delivering those earnings-enhancing transactions to grow the portfolio, we're now able to announce a 2% increase, which is sustainable in our dividend for the coming financial year or the current financial year. And then the benefits of that scale coming through also now in the cost ratio, so 9.2%, and we expect that to improve further as we grow.

So that's the result of a highly active year of strategic progress. We've scaled the joint venture with Blue Owl to GBP 855 million through a series of transactions, and that includes capital recycling as we've transferred further assets from our balance sheet into that vehicle. We've also then -- that's enabled GBP 676 million of earnings-accretive acquisitions since July last year. That includes a number of portfolios, sale and leasebacks direct with operators and also 19 stores, which we acquired in the secondary market.

We've also undertaken GBP 1 billion of debt financings. That included our debut public bond, which was well backed. And then also following the end of the financial year, the proactive lease renewals. So this is proving sustainable rents on 2 stores as well as we expect it to be accretive for total return.

And then lastly, of course, delighted to raise GBP 100 million in July, the proceeds of which have now been fully deployed. And that deployment was the first step towards our ambitions to double the size of the portfolio, and you'll recognize this slide from our interim results back in March. And we then talked to the avenues for growth across store formats, geographies, also grocery distribution and the ability to, as we grow the portfolio, maintain those attractive investment fundamentals across the bottom of the page.

So those proceeds have been fully deployed in the space of 2 months. It was our first equity raise since 2022, and we've acquired 9 high-quality grocery properties for a total of GBP 222 million. 82% of that income is investment-grade, 87% is inflation-linked and at a 6.6% net initial yield. That means it's accretive to earnings, and therefore, supports our dividend growth target. And of course, that scale also further reduces the already very efficient cost ratio.

To take you through a few examples of what we've been buying, the high-quality grocery properties on the left, Tesco Edinburgh. This is a large-format top-performing omnichannel store for Tesco, 5 years remaining on the lease, and it's a bit over-rented, but that gives us a really good opportunity to unlock some value in the future through a lease renewal.

Then in the middle, Sainsbury's Avonmouth. This is a brand-new mission-critical logistics warehouse for Sainsbury's. And with a 14-year lease and a very low affordable rent of GBP 14, we've also seen the tenant make significant capital investment in the fit-out of this building.

And then on the right, M&S, a grocery-anchored retail park in Nottinghamshire. Now this was an interesting one because we had it under offer back in February. And then we -- when the Iran conflict began, we sought to reprice that asset. The vendor chose to walk away at that time, but it came back to us very recently on the basis that we could transact very quickly. We've done pretty much all of the due diligence back in February, so we were ready to go. So it came back at an even lower price than before.

But the interesting opportunity for us here is there's an open market rent review coming up. And I'll talk later to some of the evidence we're seeing in the market for higher rents, but certainly an opportunity for us to really push that on. So we've been clear on the ambitions to grow. We've got various sources of capital to deliver that. I've talked already there to equity raising. Also joint ventures as we've successfully done with Blue Owl. And of course, we get the benefit of management fee with that.

Also debt financings, we have very strong liquidity in the various debt markets. And then lastly, capital recycling. And now that can be outright store sales as well as transferring further assets into potential joint venture vehicles.

So with that, I'll hand you over to Mike to take you through the numbers.

Great. Thanks, Rob, and good morning, everybody. As Rob mentioned, it's been a busy period for the company. We've executed a number of strategic initiatives that have been designed to strengthen the business and position it for future growth. As outlined at the half year, these actions have had a short-term impact on earnings. However, they've materially strengthened the company's foundations and enhanced our ability to deliver sustainable long-term shareholder value.

So if we turn to the headlines for the period, you'll see net rental income increased by 6% to GBP 122 million. The EPRA cost ratio improved to 9.2%, which is a reduction of 380 basis points. EPRA earnings of 5.7p was down 4%. The portfolio, which reflects post year-end activity, increased to GBP 2.2 billion, which is up 37% since June '25. Our EPRA NTA was marginally higher at 87.5p, and taken together with dividends paid in the period, the total accounting return was 7.5%.

So as I mentioned, the key focus this year has been on redeployment of capital following the completion of the joint venture in May '25. As you can see from the bridge, passing rent stood at GBP 117 million immediately prior to this transaction. The assets that were transferred into the JV reduced rent by GBP 21 million, but this was more than offset by the GBP 454 million of acquisitions that were completed during the year, which added GBP 31.8 million of rent, and that reflects an average net initial yield of 6.8% -- 6.5%.

Together with the GBP 2.1 million of like-for-like growth, passing rent increased to GBP 129.5 million at the year-end. And following the equity raise, which completed shortly after the period end, we deployed these proceeds into earnings-enhancing acquisitions, adding a further GBP 14.8 million of annual rent. And therefore, as a result, the pro forma passing rent has increased to GBP 144.3 million, which represents a growth of 23% since completion of the JV.

Now, importantly, we've delivered that growth while maintaining the quality of our income with 100% occupancy and rent collection, 75% investment-grade income and a sector-leading 99.5% gross to net income ratio. And what we've shown on this slide is the value created through our capital recycling. We've transferred GBP 635 million of assets into the JV at a 6.2% net initial yield, and we've redeployed those proceeds at an average yield of 6.8%.

Together with the recurring management fee, this has generated an incremental spread of around 120 basis points. And as we've shown on the right, this translates into approximately 0.3p per share of annualized net income accretion. And we've achieved this whilst maintaining 50% exposure to the underlying portfolio and delivered net income growth through high-yielding assets and the recurring management fee.

So key objective of internalization was to create a scalable platform that is capable of supporting growth without a material increase in overheads. And the chart on the left shows the progress we've made. Since internalization, the EPRA cost ratio has reduced to 9.2%, which is a reduction of 440 basis points or equivalent to approximately GBP 4 million of annual cost savings.

While we will continue to invest selectively to support our future growth, we remain on track to reduce the EPRA cost ratio to below 9% for FY '27, which will reinforce our position as one of the most cost-efficient companies in the listed real estate sector. As we continue to grow the portfolio, additional income can be delivered at relatively little incremental cost, creating operational leverage and supporting future earnings growth.

So turning to earnings. EPRA EPS reduced by 4% to 5.7p per share compared with 6p in the prior year. One of the drivers was the transfer of assets into the joint venture, which reduced earnings by 0.3p, as we recycled the capital and redeployed the proceeds into future growth opportunities. The increase in our weighted average cost of debt reduced earnings by a further 0.4p, which was largely driven by the issuance of our debut public bond.

Now while this has reduced earnings in the short term, it's materially strengthened the balance sheet through longer debt maturities, a more diversified source of funding and has increased our proportion of fixed rate debt at attractive pricing. And against these items, the business continues to deliver growth. The new JV management income fee is contributing 0.1p whilst like-for-like growth added a further 0.1p. In addition, the benefits of internalization and our disciplined cost management contributed 0.2p, reflecting the operational leverage now within the platform.

Overall, while EPS was marginally lower during the year, we strengthened the balance sheet, reduced our cost base and invested capital into earnings-accretive acquisitions that are expected to support future earnings growth.

So turning to the balance sheet. We continue to deliver an income-led total return. Starting with the chart on the left, EPRA NTA increased to 87.5p, up from 87.1p at June '25. EPRA earnings contributed 5.7p, while dividend paid totaled 6.2p in the year. And the portfolio delivered 2.8p of realized and unrealized gains equivalent to 2.5% like-for-like growth, which was partially offset by acquisition-related costs. Overall, EPRA NTA was 87.5p, and the total accounting return for the year was 7.5%.

Now turning to the chart on the right, what really differentiates SUPR is the quality of that return. Approximately 90% of our total return is from contracted income to investment-grade occupiers, and that compares to a sector average of 57% income return. Now, as a result, shareholder returns are driven by -- primarily by recurring cash earnings rather than being reliant on valuation movements, providing a more resilient and reliable source of long-term returns.

We've been active in the debt capital markets, and we will continue to manage our structure proactively. Since June '25, we've completed approximately GBP 1 billion of refinancings, improving both maturity and diversification. The chart on the left shows our position a year ago, where maturities were more concentrated with an average of 2.8 years. And since then, we've completed a number of strategic initiatives, including our debut public bond issuance and the refinancing of our revolving credit facilities after the year-end.

Now on the chart on the right, you'll see these actions have extended our debt maturities to 3.6 years and removed any refinancing requirements now until June '28. Following the refinancings, our weighted average cost of debt improved and today stands at 4.4%. But importantly, 98% of that is fixed or hedged until June '28, providing a high degree of protection against any interest rate volatility.

And our BBB+ investment-grade credit rating remains an important strategic strength, and we continue to manage the balance sheet in a manner consistent with maintaining this rating. We've been very active in the investment market and on a pro forma basis have taken leverage to 45%, as we executed on our pipeline. As we have demonstrated historically, we'll manage leverage through the cycle balancing growth opportunities with maintaining our investment-grade credit rating. We monitor leverage through both loan to value and net debt to EBITDA. For the year to June '25, our net debt to EBITDA was 7.8x. And with the benefit of a full period of income from recent acquisitions, we expect to operate at the lower end of 7 to 8x range on a normalized basis.

As I said, our income is largely backed by investment-grade tenants, providing resilient and predictable cash flows that support operating at the current LTV. At the same time, we will remain disciplined in managing leverage and continue to maintain significant headroom across all of our debt covenants.

So in summary, we are well placed to deliver on our strategy. We have successfully redeployed capital, completing GBP 676 million of earnings-accretive acquisitions. We've built a scalable platform with one of the lowest cost ratios in the sector, and we've delivered a 7.5% total accounting return, which is underpinned by highly secure investment-grade income. Collectively, the actions we've taken this year have strengthened the business and positioned us to deliver future earnings growth and long-term shareholder value.

And with that, I'll hand you back to Rob.

Right. So the grocery sector now, which is, of course, growing, also highly resilient and backed by nondiscretionary consumer spending. And it's the omnichannel grocers that we continue to see dominating the market. So Tesco, our largest tenant, GBP 44 billion of annual sales in the U.K., 28% market share and that increases to 37% in the online channel. And we said this before, but it's the omnichannel grocers that are best placed to win through scale and particularly the scale of their large-format store estates.

And we're seeing that with omnichannel stores capturing the majority of sales growth. So on the left-hand side, double-digit growth in online, and omnichannel stores is combining that with large-format store sales in the middle, in-store sales growing at around 4% a year for the last 2 years. And this is from Tesco's full year results. And then in the convenience channel remaining broadly flat over that same time period. So the reason for that is large-format stores provide better value and greater choice for consumers.

On the left-hand side, the price comparison of a weekly shop if you're in the Tesco convenience, Express channel versus if you shop in the large-format stores, around GBP 800 a year of savings. And then on the right-hand side, so not only are items often 10% to 20% cheaper, you've got a much bigger product range, of course, at 20,000 to 30,000 products. And not only that, the chance of the product you want being in stock is much higher with availability at 91%, that increases to more like 97% in the best cases compared with 82% in convenience stores.

So we're seeing this come through at the portfolio level. So omnichannel sales are growing. Store sales are growing ahead of rents. This is -- this chart is a store from our portfolio. This is actual sales data over the last 3 years. And you can see store sales in that time have grown by around 18%. At the same time, the contracted rental growth of around 12%. So that means the rent to turnover has improved from 4.1% to 3.9% over that period. And that just means that, that contracted rental growth that we receive is absolutely sustainable for the tenants.

And omnichannel stores are also great drivers of footfall, and we're able to generate value for shareholders through active management of the sites that we own that are retail parks, and we've got a number of these in the portfolio. This is our site in Bristol anchored by Tesco, but where we're building a new Lidl store as an extension to the retail warehousing terrace that's there, 20-year lease to Lidl, inflation-linked and with attractive returns at an 8% yield on cost.

And then, if we look a bit closer at that retail warehousing lineup, so you can see how since acquisition, we've improved that tenant mix. So we had Argos paying rent, but wasn't trading from the store. That had been relocated to nearby Sainsbury's. So clearly, that was going to go void in the future. And then we also had concessionary lettings to OneBeyond and Poundstretcher. So since acquisition, we've combined 2 of those units to create the new B&M store on a 10-year lease. We've renewed the Boots lease for a new 5-year term.

So those 2 transactions combined with that new Lidl means that we've increased the WALT by 6 years. We've got 100% occupancy to national retailers, and we've grown the net rental income for that retail warehousing by GBP 400,000 and achieved a 10% valuation increase. We're also able to unlock value through lease renewals. So 2 of these signed in July, large-format omnichannel stores, top performers, where, in one case, 15% rent reduction. In another, we renewed at passing rent, both through a new 15-year term.

And it's worth noting that there's no rent-free periods. There's no landlord capital contributions, which are very much standard in lease renewals in other sectors. So through these lease renewals, we expect a positive impact on valuations, and therefore, to enhance total return. And not only are we seeing evidence of those affordable rents through lease renewals, you're now also seeing it come through on new store lettings. So the examples on this page, 2 of the M&S conversions of Homebase stores, new 20-year index-linked leases being agreed at initial rents of GBP 24 and GBP 28.

And we're starting to see that inform open market reviews. So the example there, Waitrose in Surrey, achieving GBP 24 rent per square foot on open market review, that's up 16%. So in that context, our average rent to turnover of 4%, average rent per square foot of GBP 23 looks highly affordable.

And then, in the investment market, so we're seeing some pretty tight yields being achieved, core capital buying into food stores. That isn't anything new, but Sainsbury's in Hertfordshire on the left there, 5% net initial yield, 15-year lease with open market rent reviews. So the purchaser is absolutely buying into the prospect of rental growth to achieve their returns there.

In the middle, Lidl sale and leaseback, 20-year leases. These are stores that are being built at the moment, 4.8% net initial yield, and that's come from local government pension scheme, or LGPS, money.

And then lastly, on the right-hand side, Morrisons Plymouth, 22 years on that lease. So this was a sale and leaseback a few years ago, around a 6.1% net initial yield for that, and that just reflects the sub-investment-grade covenant, again from government pension scheme money. But the point here is it just reinforces the attractiveness of grocery property to core capital. And of course, we looked at these opportunities, but we've seen better returns elsewhere.

And we have been very active in the investment market ourselves, GBP 676 million of earnings-accretive acquisitions. That's redeploying the capital from the joint venture with Blue Owl, but also from the equity raise in July. Across that range of strategies, you can see on the page. And as I mentioned earlier, being able to maintain those attractive fundamentals. So 6.5% net initial yield, 13-year average lease length, 94% of that is inflation-linked and 74% is investment-grade.

So with that, we're well positioned to continue to grow. It's been a highly active year of significant strategic progress for us. We're targeting a strong total return, and that's backed by high-quality income from the leading supermarket operators. And we've got multiple avenues to grow and drive those shareholder returns going forward.

So with that, we will hand over to questions. Thank you.

John?

John Cahill from Stifel. Your growth ambitions are clear and very much welcome in a sector that's otherwise feeling pretty down in the mouth about life. So I just wanted to ask you about the investment market, 2 sides to it. First of all, what are the supermarket operators thinking about life? Are there sale and leaseback opportunities? Are they buying back in again?

And then secondly, in the sort of secondary investment market, is the uncertainty in the wider macro environment throwing up any opportunities? Is there anybody coming to market, not naming them, but are you seeing supply coming forward?

Yes. So I guess on the supply demand for the operators, it's still very much led by balance sheet. So Tesco particularly still very much active buying stores in selectively. So individual stores in the secondary market, slightly opportunistic there maybe certainly don't buy everything. As we've said before, it's not a blank checkbook for them. So we're still able to get our hands on, and I spoke to one of the Tesco stores we bought being a really strong opportunity for us to renew that lease going forward.

At the opposite end, you've got Asda and Morrisons. Now, they have done quite large-scale sale and leasebacks already, but I think there's potentially some more to come there. And we did the sale and leaseback into the Blue Owl joint venture. So with the phase of deployment we've just been through, most of it or 82% was investment-grade income. So we've got some capacity, I'd say, to do a bit more with the sub-investment grade names.

And then beyond that, into the investment market, I think I spoke to some of those transactions with the core capital. I think it was quite interesting, 2 out of those 3 were kind of well after the start of the Iran conflict and when you've seen cost of capital increase. So I certainly think that, that core capital isn't going anywhere. I think we've still got very strong demand at that end.

That said, the M&S example I gave was one where the vendor when we repriced back in February, thought they could do better and came back to us and maybe there was a bit of pressure because it was done through a very expedited timetable, but at an even better price. So we'll continue to look very closely.

We see everything in the market given our position as sector specialists. So that means we can be selective, and the pipeline today is over GBP 500 million. And kind of it just comes down to where we can best allocate the capital between those opportunities, and we've got a range of funding sources to do it.

It's Matt Saperia from Peel Hunt. I had 2 quick questions from me, if I may. First one on the 2 lease renewals you did. Driven by yourselves or by the occupier? And given your sort of comments around, it feels like rental growth across the -- increasingly across the market. Are you likely to be more proactive on tackling some of the upcoming lease renewals? And what does the sort of pipeline look like?

Yes. Thanks, Matt. So look, I think those were, again -- those ones were proactive on our part, as were the lease renewals we did a year ago or so. Now, the point with those first lease renewals was proving that some of the fears around over-rentedness were overbaked. So that actually rents on what were over-rented stores wouldn't come down by as much as some were speculating as they came down to 4% rent to turnover in that case.

The point here for us was showing actually some of the stores in one of the examples there, renewed at passing rent. So there was no rent reduction. So we do have some stores that are more under-rented and we're able to extend the term without having to give a rent reduction. So it was really kind of trying to prove the opposite end. I don't -- we're certainly not under pressure to renew any leases. We haven't got anything shorter than 5 years or so, but it will just come down to, yes, if we can achieve a positive total return then, then we'll continue to consider doing it, but there's certainly no pressure.

I might add to that. And what we've said before is that where you have these regears and the examples that Rob gave where there was a rent reduction in the prior year, the contracted income we have in the rest of the portfolio should offset any rent reduction. And you saw that this year with the EPRA like-for-like rent was up broadly 1% with those sort of regears into account. So we have the ability with that, yes, the contracted nature of income to offset those. And if there was a material amount in any one given year, we've proven we can sell assets into a tighter yield environment.

And the second question, you talked about the opportunities and you talked about third-party capital. Can you just remind us what capacity you've got left in the existing joint venture? And is there the potential for additional either capital into that joint venture or potentially other parties coming along and creating structures with you?

Yes, definitely. Thank you. So the Blue Owl vehicle, we set an aspirational target of GBP 1 billion when we formed that vehicle. It's now at GBP 850 million or so. So there's still some capacity before we reach the GBP 1 billion. That isn't a hard cap by any stretch. But I think it's fair to say at a certain point, you would probably like to diversify funding sources and capital partners. So there is definitely still room to grow that. Blue Owl is very much still in growth mode. So that's a very good partner for us.

We're also having some early-stage conversations around potential for further joint ventures. What might fit quite neatly alongside the Blue Owl vehicle is if we had a core capital partner with a lower return and yet targeting that low risk, low return type opportunity set, that might work quite neatly. We've also seen with interest, announced this week, Realty Income's JV with KKR, and that looks like some pretty low cost of capital there. So we're very much open-minded. We've shown our ability to grow through JVs, through equity raising. It will just come down to wherever the numbers look best, and we'll kind of keep pushing on all fronts.

Matt Norris from Gravis. Can you provide some commentary outlook on the dividend, dividend growth, dividend cover? How we should expect it to grow in the future, please?

Sure. Happy to take that one. So yes, as we expected this year, dividend cover was 93% and the reason we set out in terms of recycling the capital from the JV. We set in -- set out in March that the minimum uplift or guidance for dividend is 2% per annum. And for us, the important part is it's sustainable. So we would expect to get back to that kind of sustainable dividend, 2% is the minimum target for us now.

And we'd expect to -- as I said, sustainability is the key for the dividend. The next job for us, and what we've shown with the equity raise, is how can we drive that 2% on to eventually get back to passing through inflation that we're getting at the top line down into dividend growth. But the work that we've done over the last 18 months has got to a point where we can sustainably grow at 2%. As I said, the next job is to try and grow it by more than inflation.

And when does -- when is cover achieved?

Yes. And when we -- on the equity raise, we said that we'd be fully covered on the first full financial year after deployment. I'd expect us to be, yes. Without giving forecast guidance, consensus analyst forecast would suggest that we get pretty close to cover next year and then fully cover the year after that.

Ashnaa Vyas, Deutsche Bank. On Slide 7, you list out the various sources of capital for growth. You sort of alluded to it in your earlier questions, but maybe you can just talk about which you expect to be the biggest contributor to your scale in the near term? And how you're sort of thinking about capital recycling and if there's any more you can do there?

Yes, definitely. So look, I think it's probably hard to say because the numbers move around week-to-week at the moment, right? So we were very pleased to get the support to raise in July. I think we certainly used to raise years ago twice a year. Now, it will just depend on the numbers and what's most accretive.

And our platform is actually quite attractive to partners to work with. So we've seen some quite good inbound interest as well, and the Blue Owl vehicle's caught attention, and there are partners that would like to do something similar. So yes, sorry, it's sitting on the fence, but it's quite hard to say as to which will be the main driver, but we're -- the pipeline is there. So it's just a case of what's going to be most accretive to -- as to how we fund it. But we're, otherwise, very open-minded. We're going to have to work hard, be creative to deliver it. But I think we've shown over the last year or so that we can do that.

And then in terms of capital recycling, yes, there's some opportunity for some outright sales as we look at it with some of that core capital out there. There may be some opportunities as Mike alluded to, so maybe once we've regeared a store, sell into that to kind of prove the concept as we talked to. So yes, we're kind of exploring all opportunities on that front as well.

I think Chris might have some online.

So from -- this is Andrew Saunders at Shore Cap. So what are the longer-term ambitions in grocery distribution? And are the current acquisition opportunities more sort of accessible and attractive than stores at the moment?

Yes. And look, something we spoke to previously was these avenues for growth, and just thinking more broadly about grocery property, it's very much relationship-led. It's -- yes -- it's not necessarily that we see better opportunity in either channel. It's not that we're going to start selling stores to buy into sheds. It's just a case of where we see value and attractive returns. We will continue to allocate capital across whether it's large stores, convenience, sheds, Europe. And it's not necessarily that one is better than the other. They all offer slightly different profiles in terms of returns. So we look at it on a blended portfolio basis.

We talk a lot about rent to turnover at the store level. How does that compare to rent to EBITDA at the store level?

Yes. So in the U.K., at least, it's broadly kind of 3x covered. So store level EBITDA margin will be 10% to 12% on a large store. And if your rent to turnover is around 4%, it's broadly 3 -- 2.5 to 3x covered. So that is -- that's -- it's actually the rent to turnover, the way we articulate it is an oversimplification. The operators are very much looking at profitability as well.

And then a couple from Jonathan at GS. So on the recent rent reduction that was agreed, how did this compare to ERVs in the store?

Broadly in line. So the store renewed at -- that renewed at passing was slightly below ERV, which is why we were able to renew it at passing, and it actually -- we converted it from open market rent to inflation-linked. So we've unlocked some decent value by doing that. But that is why at the end of the day, it was a proactive renewal on our part, and there has to be some incentive as well for the tenant in those cases.

Final one. You speak to the GBP 500 million pipeline. How do you see the pacing of these opportunities coming through?

The pipeline is very much live. That's in front of us today. And there's some very interesting opportunities that would be accretive. So yes, it's very much on the agenda at the moment. We've got the team working hard on -- both on the pipeline and how we can fund it. So yes, I guess, watch this space.

That's all. Thanks.

Thank you, all. Cheers.

Right. Good morning, everyone, and welcome to Super's Interim Results to the 31st December 2025. So I'm going to start us off with a strategic overview, and then I'll hand you over to Mike to take you through the numbers.

So it's been an incredibly busy period for us with significant levels of activity as we delivered on our strategy to grow earnings. And shareholders are now seeing the benefits of this as we're increasing the minimum dividend uplift to 2% from the next financial year onwards. And we're positioned for further growth with an attractive near-term pipeline of over GBP 500 million.

So just to take you through some of the proactive steps we've taken over the last year to create a platform for growth. We've achieved much greater shareholder alignment through the internalization of the management. And shortly after that, we completed the joint venture, which has allowed us to undertake capital recycling and also generate management fee income.

And during the period, we scaled that to GBP 845 million, demonstrating our access to capital alongside the debut bond issue that Mike will talk to in a moment. We've established a cost-efficient and scalable platform, evidenced by our 9.2% EPRA cost ratio, and this continues to trend lower as we look to grow the business.

And to support this future growth, we've also been making investment hires. So just to take you through a couple of the more recent names that bring a depth of grocery property expertise.

Jamie Cowen, who joins us as Strategy Director with 30 years of experience in real estate, the majority of which has been with Sainsbury's as a Director of Estates & Investment.

And also Justin Upton as Head of Investment, who most recently was CIO at Urban Logistics REIT and also prior experience as a Fund Manager, investing in a portfolio that also included supermarkets and grocery-anchored retail parks.

So we've doubled down on our sector specialism and now have a team -- a dedicated team of 18 across investment, asset management, finance and investor relations.

And it's the sector specialism that allows us to underwrite opportunities for growth across grocery real estate. And in the left-hand columns there, you've got U.K. food stores across the range of both formats and grocers, but also it's about investing in mission-critical top-performing food stores for us. And sometimes that comes with adjacent retail, and we absolutely have the in-house capabilities not only to manage that, but also to maximize the returns.

And then lastly, the column on the right there, our European exposure, and we've taken France to scale now with our latest tranche of sale and leaseback with Carrefour. And then lastly, along the bottom of the page there, you've got some of the grocers that we see opportunities to work with going forward.

And with these plans to grow, we have ambitions to double the size of the portfolio. But all the while maintaining those attractive investment fundamentals, such as 90% or so grocery income, long leases on average of around 12 years and of which around 80% is inflation linked and always maintaining that high quality of income with around 70% being investment grade.

And what we've shown at the bottom of the page is an illustration of the evolution of the portfolio as we double in size. And you'll see that the core driver of the business is still U.K. food stores, but with an allocation as we already do to grocery-anchored retail to European food stores.

And then lastly, you'll see the new addition there, grocery distribution. Now what we're saying here is that it will be opportunity led, and it will come down to where we can best allocate capital to deliver returns, but we've got the team, the expertise and the relationships to be able to underwrite anything in the grocery property investment universe.

So with that, I'll hand you over to Mike.

Thank you, and good morning, everybody. As Rob said, it's been an exceptionally busy period for the company. We've delivered a number of important strategic milestones, each designed to position the business for growth and create long-term value for our shareholders. As anticipated, these proactive steps have had a short-term impact on H1 earnings. However, they have significantly strengthened the foundations of the business and our ability to deliver sustainable returns.

So turning now to the headlines of the period, which we explore in more detail shortly. Net rental income was GBP 57 million, down 2%. Our EPRA cost ratio improved to 9.2%, a reduction of 440 basis points. We paid dividends of 3.1p, up 1% on the prior period. The portfolio, including post-period end activity, increased to GBP 2 billion, up 20% since June '25. Our EPRA NTA was marginally higher at 87.5p. And taken together with dividends paid in the period, we delivered a 4% total accounting return for the first half.

Net rental income reduced by 2% in the period, which is in line with our expectations. This was largely driven by the timing gap between receiving the JV proceeds, which completed in May '25 and the subsequent redeployment. Operationally, performance remains very strong.

On the left-hand side of this chart, you'll see we completed 19 rent reviews, achieving an average uplift of 3.8% transferred into the joint venture. And as Rob said earlier, the JV proceeds have now been fully redeployed with a financial benefit expected to come through for FY '27 onwards.

We continue to have a highly secure and efficient income profile, another period of 100% occupancy and rent collection, 76% of our portfolio is investment grade, providing strong visibility and security. And our gross to net rent ratio of 99.5% is among the highest in the sector.

So turning to our administrative costs. We've made very good progress so far and have delivered over GBP 2 million of cost savings in the first half. As the chart shows, our EPRA cost ratio of 9.2% now places us firmly at the low end of the peer group.

As I mentioned previously, we're still working through a small number of transitional costs following the internalization. However, we remain on track to reduce the cost ratio to below 9% for FY '27.

So bringing these elements together, EPRA earnings per share were 2.7p compared with 3p in the prior period. The main drivers were as follows: Firstly, and as I set out earlier, the transfer of assets into the joint venture reduced earnings by 0.2p. Management fee income from the JV alongside GBP 2 million of cost savings, increased earnings by 0.3p, which has fully offset the increase in debt cost further to our proactive decision to refinance and extend the term of our debt.

And finally, 0.1p reduction from a general increase in weighted average drawn debt compared with the prior period.

So turning to our portfolio, which has increased by 20% since June '25. On the left-hand side of the chart, you will see we have deployed GBP 398 million of capital at a 6.5% net initial yield. The portfolio delivered revaluation uplift of GBP 7 million or 1.3% on a like-for-like basis, outperforming the MSCI All Property Capital Growth Index by 90 basis points.

The movements post period end reflect the agreement with Blue Owl to transfer five of our assets into the joint venture and the deployment of a further GBP 9 million of capital. Altogether, this results in a combined portfolio value of GBP 2 billion.

The chart here illustrates the movement in EPRA NTA per share, which increased to 87.5p, up from 87.1p at June '25. Starting with the bar on the left, EPRA earnings were 2.7p. We paid dividends of 3.1p during the period. The portfolio delivered a 2p uplift on a like-for-like basis, which is partially offset by acquisition-related costs.

The total accounting return for the period was 4%, driven primarily by income, which represented approximately 88% of the return and is underpinned by a portfolio predominantly of investment-grade occupiers. We've also been very active in the debt capital markets, and we continue to manage our extending the average maturity and further diversifying our funding sources.

The chart on the left shows our maturity profile. We have only one drawn facility maturing in the next 12 months, which we expect to refinance imminently. Of the debt that's maturing in FY '28, GBP 284 million benefits from extension options out to FY '30.

Our debut bonds and U.S. private placement notes were issued with a blended tenor of just over 6 years and an attractive fixed rate of 5%. As the chart on the top right shows, we have successfully diversified our sources of funding, giving us access to greater pools of capital and the flexibility to enter different markets when conditions are favorable as we have demonstrated in the period.

At 4.8%, our weighted average cost of debt has now largely adjusted to market levels. And importantly, 92% of our drawn debt is either fixed or hedged, which we expect to increase towards 100% in the coming months.

In December, Fitch Ratings reaffirmed the company's BBB+ investment-grade credit rating, and we remain fully committed to at least maintaining this rating. We have been very active in the investment market and have taken leverage to 43% as we executed on our pipeline.

We monitor leverage through both loan-to-value and net debt-to-EBITDA. On a pro forma basis, net debt-to-EBITDA is 8.2x, but with a full period of income from recent acquisitions, we expect to operate at the lower end of the 7x to 8x range within the next 12 months and consistent with historical levels.

Our income is largely backed by investment-grade covenants, which supports operating at the current levels. However, we do remain prudent in managing leverage and maintain significant headroom across all of our covenants.

So in summary, we have delivered material cost reductions, a 32% reduction in overheads in the first half. We completed earnings accretive acquisitions, deploying GBP 398 million of capital at an attractive 6.5% net initial yield. And we are pleased to upgrade our dividend guidance to a minimum uplift of 2% per annum for FY '27 onwards.

And with that, I'll now hand you back to Rob, who will take you through the market and investment update.

So U.K. grocery is one of the world's most competitive markets. So it's really impressive that we've seen TESCO and Sainsbury's in this environment continuing to grow market share. And of course, that's coming from like-for-like sales increases from existing stores rather than new floor space.

ASDA remains the third largest grocer, but has continued to lose market share. But there is a clear -- a new management and a clear turnaround strategy for that business. And another name just worth calling out on this page, little impressive market share growth, but of course, that is coming from new store openings. I mentioned some of ASDA's challenges there, and we did undertake a further 10 store sale and leaseback into our joint venture at an accretive 7.4% net initial yield during the period. And as ever, it's about strong trading established grocery locations for us, evidenced here by the 23 years of average of trading history. And that just gives us absolute confidence that there'll be alternative occupier demand for these locations that are mission-critical assets with low competition.

The rents have also been set low at GBP 19.90 per square foot, which is highly affordable relative to the store turnover performance. And being a sale and leaseback, it means we get 3 years of trading history to be able to diligence that. We've also got attractive lease terms of 25 years of annual inflation-linked uplifts.

And then the last point on this page, capital value per square foot is around GBP 250, which is well below replacement cost. And that's a function of that wide acquisition yield and also the low rents.

And it's worth pointing out that if we had TESCO or Sainsbury's on those same attractive lease terms, that capital value would be more like GBP 400 to GBP 500 a square foot. So this is a great deal for us, and we'd love to do more of it if we get the chance.

And it's the scarcity of new foodstore locations that supports this demand from alternative occupiers. And we've shown an example on the left here, a site in Wolverhampton over 40 years of trading history as a supermarket location under multiple grocers.

Most recently, TESCO, who acquired from Waitrose. And we know that TESCO have been looking to get into that catchment for over 25 years. The point being that strong food store locations simply don't go vacant.

Then on the right-hand side of the page, the Homebase administration and the vacancy that provided a rare opportunity and Sainsbury's paid a premium to take on 12 of the former Homebase leases and some of the rents there that we're seeing are upwards of GBP 28 a square foot, so setting some strong evidence for us.

Right. Online grocery. We've seen now return to its long-term growth trend, reaching 12.2% last year, and that's the highest it's been since the pandemic levels. But when you drill down into that growth, you can see that it's the omnichannel grocers that continue to dominate online.

And on the left-hand side, you can see strong growth from TESCO's and Sainsbury's. And yes, Ocado was the fastest growing.

But when you look on the right-hand side of the page and if you look at TESCO's online market share, the light blue at the top of the bar, you can see that, that TESCO's online business is more than double the size of Ocado's entire business. And when you take account of the in-store sales as well, GBP 44 billion of annual sales for TESCO, that's more than 14x the size of Ocado. So grocery is all about scale.

And so you can see it's the omnichannel grocers that are best placed to win. And an interesting area of the market is that we've now seen rapid online grocery where consumers can get their products within a 30-minute drive time. That's now around 10% of the convenience channel.

And a few years ago, we saw a number of disruptors attempt to come into the market, investing significant amounts of capital to try and establish their own Dark stores networks and supply chains. And in the bottom left there, we've given the example of Amazon that shows you even the most well-capitalized entrants to the market. It's not easy.

And in the middle, you can see, again, it's the omnichannel grocers that are able to respond to this new competition, and they've introduced rapid online fulfillment at a low cost through existing store networks and supply chains. And that's both through their own solutions in the middle, but also on the right through those third-party delivery providers. So it just creates a very high barrier to entry or to disruption. And it's the mission-critical real estate for the supermarket tenants that we own.

And we've shown you on the left, TESCO's online omnichannel distribution map, the blue dots being each of the omnichannel stores in their network. And on the right, in that illustration there, the green dots on the map are these regional grocery distribution centers, of which there's around 20 in the country, and that supports the entirety of the store network. So these are absolutely mission-critical, supporting that 800 or so large-format stores, around 3,000 convenience stores. So it doesn't matter whether a product is sold online or in-store, it all goes through that same distribution network. And of course, when we're acquiring these properties, we're talking to the tenants, the grocers to understand exactly how important they are to their distribution networks.

Turning now to the joint venture. So we've mentioned that we rapidly scaled this through a series of transactions to now be 23 stores, total value of GBP 845 million at a net initial yield of 6.5%. But this is really demonstrating the value of both the platform and our sector specialism as we're generating GBP 2 million a year of management fee income now.

And we've been recycling that capital from the joint venture into GBP 398 million of earnings accretive acquisitions since July. And on the left, again, that range of both store formats, but also grocers, and we took that our French exposure to scale, which I'll come on to in a moment.

But I mentioned earlier our ability to maintain those attractive investment fundamentals as we grow. And you've got that on the right-hand side of the page there, 6.5% net initial yield, average lease length of 15 years, a 100% of which is inflation-linked and again, maintaining that high quality of income with 70% being investment grade. And all the while we're targeting this mission-critical grocery property led to the leading grocers.

So in keeping with that was the EUR 123 million further tranche of Carrefour sale and leaseback. Now this is a great grocer for us to be working with 21% market share, EUR 42 billion of annual sales and again, investment-grade credit rating.

And then at the store level, we've acquired a 6.6% net initial yield. So it's accretive, but also being a sale and leaseback, we get that 3 years of store trading history. So we're able to ensure, again, the rents were set very low and producing a very low capital value per square foot, which again is below replacement cost.

So as we grow, we're absolutely maintaining our capital discipline with that focus on quality and returns. And we've just shown you a few examples on this page. On the left-hand side, a TESCO in Hampshire, which on the face of it, rents were affordable relative to trading. And so the returns would have stacked up. But actually, when we did our diligence on it, site cover is high, competition is high, and that just meant store trading is actually pretty average. So it didn't meet our quality criteria.

The example in the middle there, another TESCO in Berkshire, which on the face of it, 14 years annual inflation-linked lease, strong performing store, omnichannel. So it ticked the boxes. But actually, it was really quite over-rented. And where the pricing got to on that, it just started to stretch our returns assumptions too fast. So we walked away from that one.

And then lastly, on the right-hand side, the store we did buy. So 16 years annual inflation-linked lease to Sainsbury's, very strong performing store. So the rents are very affordable. And this was a store that we acquired in a truly off-market transaction. So just proving how our sector specialism unlocks those unique opportunities for us.

So now we're well positioned for the next phase of growth. We operate in a highly defensive sector that's resilient through economic cycles. We own a portfolio of mission-critical food infrastructure assets with those attractive property fundamentals under triple net leases. The proceeds of the JV have now been fully redeployed. And with that, we've updated our guidance to that 2% minimum dividend uplift per year from the next financial year.

And as I mentioned, we have these ambitions to double the portfolio in size through an attractive pipeline. And that is where our sector specialism comes in, the team, the expertise, the relationships to underwrite anything across the grocery property investment universe. And we have the access to capital as we've shown through the joint venture and through also the bond issue.

So with that, we will hand over to questions. Thank you.

John Cahill from Stifel. On presentation, particularly pleasing to see the significant increase in the dividend guidance. I just wanted to refer back to Slide 7 in terms of your longer-term ambitions and 2 questions, if I could, please.

First on the grocery distribution 10% element, maybe you could just give a bit of detail as to what that might look like in terms of the size of the units. Could you even go for something forward funded, particularly at the Dark stores, a bit more color on that, please?

And then secondly, not to try and sort of lead the witness too much, but it will take time to achieve this ambition. But when you get there, is the view that you'll then be in a position to perhaps look at a dividend that is more closely aligned to inflationary increases as good as the 2% is, that will be sort of the holy grail.

Yes. I'll take the first bit and I'll let Mike do the second. So look, the point for us is it's again about mission-critical properties. So we're open-minded as to what that might exactly look like. And what we've shown here is an illustration because we may sit here in a year, 2 years' time and we've not bought any. It will be opportunity led. It will come down to where we can best drive the returns.

But what we want to be clear about is, anything that is in that grocery property investment universe, the same tenants where we're speaking to them and we can understand that it's mission-critical and we can deliver returns, we will absolutely kind of be looking at. And we've brought the team. That's why we talked to some of the team members we brought in who have that expertise in the whole range of grocery property, whether it's distribution or stores.

Yes. And just on the dividend point, clearly, the last 12 months have been very transformational for the company. We've worked extremely hard to deploy the capital from the joint venture proceeds. So we are now fully deployed, which gives us also in addition, the cost savings, gives us the confidence to increase the dividend to that minimum 2% target. Of course, with being so heavily linked to inflation in terms of our lease structures, that would be the ambition at some point that we can pass through the inflation uplift that we're getting at the top line through to dividend growth. But I think notwithstanding the point that we've worked incredibly hard to get from a position where we were to today where we can upgrade that guidance to a minimum target of 2% uplift from next year onwards.

Jonathan Kownator from Goldman Sachs. So obviously, a strong ambition in terms of growth. Would all these type of assets also apply to non-retail assets, i.e., would you also look at distribution assets on the consumer interest, the first question. And second, on the cost, obviously, as you scale up, potentially substantially over time, where do you think that type of conversation takes place or who controls it within government or multiple stakeholders?

I'll do the first, Mike. Can you do the second? See, again, I think what I'd say is we're open-minded. I think the move when with Carrefour was a good example of working with an operator that ensured we've got sufficient scale in the market, but we could also understand that market. So any new geographies or asset class in that, whether it's stores or distribution, we will be doing a lot of work before we enter that market. I think the easiest move for us in the near term would be TESCO, Sainsbury's, given our relationships and the extent of our exposure to them. That's the obvious step if we were to do something in the distribution space. So yes, anything overseas, I think, will be very measured to it, to put it that way.

And just turning to the cost ratio point. We're, again, very pleased to see the benefit from internalization coming through, 32% reduction in overheads in the first half, 9.2%, we're very much on target to deliver that sub 9% for next year. Obviously, we've made some investment hires. Operationally, we've got a very efficient business platform. So as we scale, yes, I would expect that kind of hurdle to reduce. Probably be reluctant to put a number on it today. But clearly, there would be a lot of operational leverage we'd be able to get that drive that more close to 8%.

It's James Carswell from Peel Hunt. Obviously, you rotated some of the assets from your own balance sheet into the JV and that looks to be pretty accretive. I mean, in terms of the appetite from Blue Owl side, is there more appetite to do more of that? And equally on your own balance sheet, do you have more assets that would be suitable for that JV that you could rotate in? And then thinking about building, what's your thoughts on kind of establishing new JVs and some of the kind of site adjacencies you've discussed?

Yes. So look, aspirational target when we created the joint venture was GBP 1 billion. We've got to just shy of GBP 850 million already. And certainly, look, we just transferred that further set of stores into the vehicle. So the appetite is definitely still there from Blue Owl. And from our perspective, it's a great way for us to be able to scale. It's very efficient for us. We generate that management fee. So there are more stores that we potentially would have earmarked to move across.

And what it means is, if there are stores that are in the market that don't necessarily fit the JV, where we can acquire those directly on to our balance sheet and fund it by moving some more across. So yes, it's just a very flexible way for us to grow. So we'll be, again, open-minded to how we deliver that.

And yes, the Blue Owl vehicle has a kind of specific strategy, and therefore, there is room for further joint ventures. And yes, given the platform and specialism around our unique portfolio, there is potentially an ability to see something maybe at the lower yield again. So we're absolutely having those conversations.

Matt Saperia also from Peel Hunt. 4% total accounts are very respectable, but clearly, the backdrop is an awful lot of activity in the period. Any idea how much that helped the total account returns back buying? Looking forward, what do you think a sustainable total accounting return is for the portfolio and the business as we are today?

Yes. So if I take an overly simplistic view of kind of what the adjusted accounting return might be, we showed that there was about GBP 25 million, GBP 26 million of acquisition-related costs. So again, simplistically, that is just over probably 2p. I would then say our adjusted total accounting return would have been more like 5% or low 5s, but notwithstanding the point that we've been the strategic importance to entering into the joint venture and redeploying that capital. All things being equal with kind of stable -- in a stable yield environment. You can comfortably see a pathway where we're delivering kind of 8x to 10x total accounting return or 10% total accounting return towards the upper end of that is very achievable for us.

A lot of the growth coming through over the last few years has been capitalizing from the rental uplift we get on the portfolio that are contractual. So you've seen that growth coming through. So yes, absolutely, the upper end of 8% to 10% should be achievable for us.

Jonathan Kownator from Goldman Sachs again. On the valuations, I mean, obviously we've had these discussions before about are you recognizing where you could find ERVs and evidence versus what they're pricing? Where are we in that debate currently?

So valuers are ultimately conservative, I would say. And look, we proved when we re-geared some stores last year at rents that were 13% above the value of ERV, and we saw a capital value uplift on those stores of around 10% since then. So under the valuers' numbers, we're, again, give or take, 9% to 10% over rented. Our view is we're absolutely rented affordable at that 4% rent to turnover average of GBP 24 a square foot. So one of the jobs we have tasked Jamie, our new arrival from Sainsbury's with is to get out there and educate the market on what an affordable rent is and pushing on that growth agenda. So it's as much on us as anyone else, I think, to drive that.

But in the meantime, we're very comfortable that the rents are absolutely affordable in the portfolio. Thank you, everyone. I think that's everything.

Sorry, Rob, just online. So it'll keep you there for a moment longer. What's the rationale for operators to sell their mission-critical assets into the market, and when they could potentially find cheap credit sort of using their own balance sheet? And is there -- from Super's perspective, is the high-yield segment should it be most interesting to the company? Or is there other attractive opportunities across the piece?

Yes. I guess, look, from operator perspectives, TESCO, Sainsbury's, for instance, still own only around 60% or so of their stores. So it's one element of their financing and balance sheet strategy.

We've seen obviously ASDA, Morrisons undertaking sale leasebacks more recently, and that's in part driven by the private equity buyouts, but also historically, they own 90% or so of their stores. So they've absolutely had the capacity to do it. So yes, it's -- from our perspective, it's a great way for us to access stock, and we're absolutely focused on making sure we buy the best performing stores when we do that.

And sorry, Chris, what was the second part of the question?

Sorry, just coming back. It was for Super, how do you balance, I guess, chasing high yield versus slightly tighter yielding stores? How do you think about that in terms of benefits to the company?

I think if we were to try and only buy things that tick every box, you wouldn't buy very much, right? It has to be a strategy where we acquire some stores that are high yielding and some are lower yielding and provided on a blended basis, it's all accretive, then that's how we manage that strategy. But I talked earlier to those investment fundamentals, so 70% or so being investment grade, 90% or so grocery income, the long leases, the inflation linkage. So that's the strategy, but we will buy stores that are tighter yielding, high yielding within that.

Only is that online? Okay. Good. Thanks, everyone.

Good afternoon, and welcome to the Supermarket Income REIT plc Full Year Results Investor Presentation. [Operator Instructions] The company may not be in a position to answer every question received in the meeting itself. However, the company can't review all questions submitted today and publish responses where it's appropriate to do so.

Before we begin, I'd like to submit the following poll. I'd now like to hand you over to Rob Abraham. Good afternoon to you, sir.

Thanks, Alessandro. Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you for dialing in for our results presentation. You can see on the page here, the headline we've been running with is it's been a transformational year. And I think we've got a really positive story that we'll take you through. I'm Rob Abraham, CEO of Supermarket Income REIT. I'm joined by Mike Perkins, CFO. And let me first just take you through some of those highlights. from the year that, as I say, has been transformational.

We've demonstrated alignment with shareholders. We've been demonstrating asset values, and we've been demonstrating affordable rents. And those 3 items have really helped us to drive value for shareholders, and we've seen a corresponding reaction in the share price. So that really has been achieved by delivering on our key strategic objectives.

Firstly, lease renewals. These were done 13% above our value as ERV. Internalization and the cost savings -- material cost savings from internalizing the management means that we're now targeting an EPRA cost ratio of below 9% and materially improved dividend cover. A strategic joint venture. That's a GBP 403 million partnership with Blue Owl Capital, and that has released proceeds for us alongside as part of our capital recycling strategy, alongside other disposals that we're now able to deploy into accretive acquisitions.

Debut bond issuance. This is something Mike and the team have worked hard on just in July, which is a GBP 250 million 6-year unsecured bond for the first time. And then lastly, changes to our listing. So, the secondary listing on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and the commercial companies category. So, we changed to that category. That just allows us to appeal to a broader range of investors and enhance liquidity in the shares, and we're starting to see the benefits of that come through now. So, I think if you were to take any kind of 2 of these deliverables in any given year and a company might refer to a transformational year with 6 of these delivered, it really has been a kind of significant step forward for the business.

And all of that's been achieved at a time when Super's investment case is as compelling as it's ever been. We're operating in a defensive sector. Grocery is nondiscretionary spend, and that just means it's resilient through economic cycles. We've got strong tenants, which are the leading and largest grocery supermarket operators, and that means we're providing stable and predictable income, and we've got 11-year WAULT on our leases. The portfolio we own is a mission-critical last mile omnichannel fulfillment hubs. So, these are critical assets to our tenants. And those stores are seeing growing like-for-like sales, and that just provides for our own rental increases coming through as landlord being sustainable.

We've also got a cost-efficient shareholder aligned team of sector specialists now following the internalization and bringing all that together means we're now positioned for growth with a very attractive pipeline to deploy capital into. So, on that, I will hand over to Mike to take you through the numbers, and then I'll come back to the strategy.

Great. Thanks, Rob. Good afternoon, everybody. If we start with the highlights for the year set out on this page, GBP 115 million of net rental income, that does include our share of joint venture rents. That was up 7.3% year-on-year. The -- as Rob mentioned, the internalization has started to deliver cost savings. So, you can see the EPRA cost ratio is down to 13%, and we'll jump into that into more detail later on in the slide deck. We declared dividends of 6.12p, which is up 1%. Portfolio valuation of GBP 1.6 billion was up 1.9% on a like-for-like basis and EPRA NTA was 87.1p, which was broadly flat over the year, but we'll take you through the evolution of NAV since June '24 later on in the slide deck and total accounting return of 7.2%.

So, looking at rental income in greater detail, as mentioned, 7.3% increase year-on-year set out in this chart is the drivers of that growth. You can see GBP 1.9 million growth coming from like-for-like growth. We completed 45 rent reviews across the year, and they were settled at an average uplift of 3.4%, GBP 8.6 million coming from acquisitions. Now that reflects in part of full years of income from assets we acquired in '24 and also some revenue coming through from assets we've acquired in the current financial year. And the disposals of Tesco Newmarket and our joint venture disposal resulted in GBP 2.2 million reduction in rent, but that is a part year impact, and we'll take you through the next slide, the impact -- the full year impact on passing rents as a result of those transactions. But those charts, graphics on the right, you can see 100% occupancy, 100% rent collection again, really gives us underscored by our asset quality and tenant base.

And we have predominantly single-let assets. So, there's very little income leakage through to service charge or void costs. And you can see 99.3% gross to net rent ratio is one of the highest across the sector. So just to go into slightly more detail around the impact of the disposals on passing rents. So, we set out on this slide here, the movement in passing rent from June '24 to June '25. So, you can see the first chart, GBP 7.4 million of growth coming from acquisitions and like-for-like growth. The new market disposal resulted in GBP 3.5 million reduction in rental income. The proceeds of the new market disposal part of the proceeds were used to fund the management internalization, and that was done at a 19% yield on cost. And then the final chart bar on the chart, the joint venture. So, we completed the JV with Blue Owl in May '25, and that's resulted in GBP 14.3 million reduction in passing rent. But what that has transaction has unlocked is that we've now received GBP 200 million in net proceeds. The disposal was a 6.6% initial yield, and that was done at a 3% premium to previous book values.

And set out here on this slide is the evolution of the EPRA cost ratio. As we've mentioned, we are targeting the 9% cost ratio. You can see from the chart that reduction from FY '24 to FY '25 was about 170 basis points. So, you can see 13% EPRA cost ratio for FY '25. And our target of sub-9%, we believe we can get to very quickly. Clearly, we've only benefited from 1 quarter's worth of savings from the management fee post internalization. So, we'll get the full benefit of those savings coming through in FY '26 and beyond. And then we'd estimate there, that equates to approximately 35% reduction in costs versus FY '24.

And just putting that into context as to where Super sits relative to our peer group. The peer group here is FTSE 350 listed REITs. Clearly, at 13%, we are already one of the leading or most efficient platforms in the sector and delivering the sub-9% target would very much further improve our sort of weighting towards getting closer to the lowest cost base in the sector.

So EPRA earnings per share was 6p for the year, which was a slight reduction from the prior year, principally due to the disposals made and their proximity to the year-end. So starting -- starting with the chart on the left, we can see the core earnings up 0.1p and that's really a reflection of 0.9p coming from like-for-like growth in our rental portfolio, but also from acquisitions. The cost savings we've achieved in the year have improved earnings by about 0.1p. And then we have been -- that has been partially offset or largely offset by an increase in financing costs now that is broadly 50% due to an increase in average drawn debt over the period and then also due to an increase in weighted average debt costs.

The disposals, you can see, 0.2p impact on the EPS, but 6p represents on the dividends declared in the year is 98% covered. So, turning to the balance sheet. We can see here in the chart is a bridge from June '24 to June '25. So, we've covered across the components of the 6p EPRA earnings, 6.1p dividends paid. And as I mentioned, that was 98% covered by earnings. And what is quite interesting in terms of the valuation or revaluation of the portfolios is we -- the NAV increased by 2.2p as a result of our active asset management during the year. And what we've done is just break that down further. So, the first bar in the middle there, 0.9p of NAV growth coming through realized gains from the disposal of Newmarket and the joint venture. They were blended 4.4% premium to book value. 0.8p coming from the lease regears, the 3 lease regears that we did in the year, and Rob will talk to those in more detail later on.

And then finally, 0.5p of unrealized gains property yields were broadly flat during the year. So that growth is coming from rent -- the contracted growth in the portfolio, leading to an increase in capital values. And those combined have offset the cost of internalization. So obviously that was a one-off payment to the previous investment adviser, and that was 1.7p relative to NAV. So across the year, broadly flat, but a lot of activity in the year. And as I said, the active asset management more than offsetting the cost of internalizing the company's management function. And then at the bottom, you can see that results in a 7.2% total accounting return, which is underpinned by highly secure income. Nearly 80% of our portfolio is investment grade. So it's a very secure income-driven total accounting return.

We've been very active in improving or targeting an improvement in our average debt maturity profile. So you see in the chart on the left, we show the debt maturity profile as of June '24, and that was 2 years average maturity, the refinancings that we've done in the year, which included 2 private placements and as Rob mentioned earlier, our debut bond issuance shortly after the year-end, we're able to increase our debt maturity profile to 3.9 years as of today. But importantly, for us, the private placements and the bonds raised GBP 355 million of new debt at an average tenure of 6.2 years and fixed at 5%, which we think is a really attractive price relative to where we're seeing pipeline transactions at the moment.

Just to take you through the bond issuance in greater detail, as mentioned completed, there was a window of opportunity for us to transact in July, we managed to execute in that window. The GBP 250 million issuance, 6-year tenor was 115 basis points over gilts and that resulted in a coupon of 5.125% with the issuance being 3x oversubscribed. So significant confidence from the investors in our business model and our strategy. But part of the key strategic benefits for us on the right there, it improves or aids our transition to 100% unsecured debt stack. 100% of our drawn debt as of today is now unsecured. We further diversified the capital structure, which will help us grow as a business in the future. As I mentioned, it extended the debt maturity profile by approximately 2 years. Lowers our medium-term borrowing costs and enhances the earnings accretion of our acquisition pipeline.

Staying on debt for now, just to look at greater detail in these covenants. So, we set out 2 charts on this slide. The top one is the net debt-to-EBITDA ratio. Clearly, with the joint venture completing in May '25, we used the net proceeds of that in the short term to repay debt. So, you can see net debt to EBITDA at June '25 was 5.1x. And in the chart beneath, you can see 31% loan-to-value, which is down from 37% in the prior year, but we would expect those 2 to increase as we deploy the pipeline. 100% of our debt is now -- drawn debt is fixed or hedged to term and the average debt cost stands today at 4.8% and we have GBP 350 million of undrawn liquidity headroom, which we'll be able to utilize to make acquisitions, which will be earnings enhancing. And just I would probably just say as a reminder, our policy on leverage is to operate between 30% to 40%, but we will where we see accretive acquisitions. We're happy to -- given the stage of the property cycle we're in, we're happy to take leverage to the low 40s as we've demonstrated previously, but we'll only do so where we've got a clear pathway to come back down to that 30% to 40% where we will look to operate in the medium term.

So in summary, we've delivered material cost reductions, targeting that EPRA cost ratio below 9% materially improved our debt maturity with the 2 private placements and bond issuance. And with GBP 350 million of liquidity headroom, we are well positioned for growth. And I'll hand back to Rob to talk through the strategic update.

Thank you, Mike. So just to start with the grocery market. And of course, we're fortunate, as I said earlier, to operate in what is a very defensive growing grocery market is nondiscretionary spend. And you can see on this chart that consistent growth, 4.3% per annum since Super's IPO in 2017, forecast to reach GBP 259 billion of sales this year. So it really is a huge market, and we've got tenants that are absolutely huge players within that. But of course, that growth isn't evenly distributed. On the left-hand side, you've got our key -- our largest tenants, Tesco's and Sainsbury's. They have been winning through scale. Grocery is ultimately a scale-driven exercise. The larger you are, the more buying power you have and therefore, the wider margins you have, and that gives you the ability to be most competitive on price whilst preserving margins. So, they've been able to capitalize on poor performance elsewhere. It's been well publicized. Morrisons, Asda, they have suffered more recently, but they have certainly suffered over the last 12, 24 months. They've lost market share. Like-for-like sales are still down for the likes of Asda, but Morrisons has returned to growth, and we're really starting to see I guess, the green shoots of recovery coming through for the turnaround strategies for those operators and Aldi and Lidl have been some of the beneficiaries there as they continue to pursue growth, they're investing heavily in new store openings. It's the fastest-growing channel, but we are starting to see them open stores or we've been seeing them open stores in more highly competitive areas.

And of course, it therefore gets increasingly difficult to make the return stack on a new store. So, it is the discounters that have been making the headlines. And you can see in this chart, the growth in sales by channel across the total market, discount food stores up 26% since 2022, large format up 13% and convenience up 9% -- but then when you adjust that to reflect the additional new space that has come online in each of those channels, you can see discount has actually only grown by 5% on a sales per square foot basis. And as I mentioned, we think it's going to get increasingly difficult to be opening new stores and finding sites. In the middle there, you can see large format. That's really been what is actually very profitable growth for large-format stores because it's largely coming from existing space. So, 12% increase in sales per square foot from existing large-format stores. And then again, you compare that to convenience, another big growth channel in terms of new space for operators. And when you adjust for that, then it's only 4% growth increase in sales per square foot. So is that middle box is where we really operate, and it's those stores that we own that are seeing the most profitable growth come through.

And it's for that reason that you're seeing Tesco also spending a further GBP 130 million during the year, buying back large-format stores such as the ones we own, 3 examples on this page.

Southwark, Congleton, and then the last one, Newmarket, is actually Super store that we sold back to Tesco at 7% above book value. So, these transactions, if you want, who knows more about kind of grocery and the value of the real estate than Tesco? They are the ultimate insider, and they're spending GBP 130 million buying back these large format stores. It demonstrates exactly how strategically important these large format stores are to the business.

And then we are also seeing market evidence, which is providing upwards pressure on rents in the supermarket space. On the left-hand side, you've got the three lease renewals that Super undertook. On the three shortest leases in Super's portfolio, we reset the term to 15 years with RPI-linked increases. That was 13% above the value of ERV, as I mentioned earlier, but very importantly, a 4% rent to turnover benchmark and that's the most important metric in our space is rent to turnover. So, it's all about the affordability of the rent relative to the sales performance. One TG Oxford share in the middle there, this was a Sainsbury's lease renewal. They entered into a 25-year inflation-linked lease. That was actually acquired at 4.5% net initial yield. Really importantly, again, the 4% rent to turnover metric being proven out. And then lastly, home-based conversion. So, demonstrating exactly how difficult it is to find sites for food stores and demonstrate the value in the existing properties. It's the fact that Sainsbury's and M&S they've taken around 25 of the former Homebase stores and they're paying rents. I believe it's Colliers reporting that rents of up to GBP 28 per square foot have been paid. And of course, that also requires, if it's a Homebase unit and you have to convert it to a supermarket, it requires significant tenant capital investment to refit those stores. As I say, the combination of this slide and the page before really highlighting the value and importance of owning good food stores to the tenants. And it's in that context that we look at Super's average rent to turnover at 4% and GBP 23 per square foot as being highly affordable.

So now turning to our portfolio. Mentioned earlier, we've got a portfolio let to the leading and largest supermarket operators in both the UK and France. Total value of GBP 1.7 billion. That's across 84 Supermarket sites. They're valued at a net initial yield of 5.9% and 93% of those stores are omnichannel. When we say omnichannel, we mean fulfilling online home delivery as well as your traditional in-store shopping. And you can see there in the bottom left, Tesco 44%, Sainsbury's 31% are very much our key tenants, and they are also the tenants seeing the strongest performance at the moment.

We also look to generate value in the portfolio through active management of the sites. I mentioned on the left-hand side already, the lease renewals that we undertook on those three Tesco stores that achieved an 8% capital value increase on those. In the middle column there, where we've got some larger sites that have some non-grocery exposure, we had two Homebase stores. They were both rapidly relet to, in the example on the screen, you've got The Range. At the other site, it was B&M, and through that, it was a 10% capital value increase. So, we underwrote acquisition of those sites. We underwrote the Homebase covenant risk very conservatively. So, we were able to achieve, by getting some better quality tenants in there, a capital value uplift. That was 78,000 square foot of what was vacancy risk. And we've been able to relet that rapidly. There's very little in terms of any lost income.

And then lastly on this page, just attractive development opportunities. Because we own these really kind of attractive sites that get high footfall, and we're able to develop, and we've got a discount operator we're developing a new store for, achieving an 8% yield on cost there for a new 20,000 square foot store with a 15-year inflation-linked lease. So where we're able to, we're pulling the levers to really maximize those returns for shareholders.

To the investment market now. So, Supermarket yields present a buying opportunity. You can see there, if you look at that dark blue line, you can see it's plateaued. It's currently at 6.3%. The MSCI Supermarket's net initial yield, it has flattened out around the level where we last saw the peak in 2009. And actually, we've plotted on there Super's own portfolio net initial yield at 5.9%, which is tighter than MSCI, just reflecting the better quality of assets we own. But it's still a very attractive level compared to the MSCI All Property Index. And of course, with a higher net initial yield, that just means you're getting a higher proportion of your return in income, which is known and certain, which is very valuable in the current environment.

Whilst we're not expecting yields to kind of, if you look back at 2009, yields tightened very quickly once again, and that was a result of interest rates being rapidly cut to zero effectively. Obviously, we're not expecting that this time, but what we are seeing is investment market activity that makes us confident that yields have peaked, and that it is therefore a good buying opportunity. Just to take you through some examples of the transactions that have been taking place in our market, a few on this page. The four on the left were acquired by other parties. We are the sector specialists, so we see everything in our market. If you have a supermarket to sell, we are one of the first calls that you will make. So, we see everything. And of course, we considered these stores on the left an example there, Tesco Bracknell in the middle at the bottom, GBP 50 million lot size, 6.2% net initial yield. This store was really quite over-rented. That was actually bought by an ultra-high net worth individual. So just -- the example above that, by a local government pension scheme. You've got a real range of purchasers in our space, including institutional buyers. That just means there's a real depth of liquidity. But then on the right-hand side of the page, two examples there of stores that we acquired. Just to take you through an example of the types of assets that we've been buying. So, this is Tesco Ashford. We acquired it in July of this year at a 7% net initial yield. That was about GBP 54 million with a nine-year lease remaining term. And it's got annual RPI-linked uplifts, rent reviews capped at 5%. We get that really visible growing contractual income growth.

It's a strong trading store. It's Q1 on trading density. It's got 14 home delivery vans. That means it's a large omnichannel hub for Tesco. If you look at that satellite in the bottom left, you can see standalone food store, big home delivery section at the back, large car park. And if you were to zoom this out, you would see it's got excellent connectivity on the roads there, and it's got a catchment population of 300,000 to 400,000 that it's serving through that online delivery. That just means it's a really mission-critical hub for Tesco in its online fulfillment, given they have such strong online market share as well. And it's not just us seeing the value in those types of opportunities. So, we did establish a joint venture during the year, and that joint venture targets those sort of higher yielding Tesco's and Sainsbury's.

The JV itself, the rationale there for establishing a vehicle like this instead of just selling assets outright, you get financial flexibility. You see you're releasing capital that we can then recycle and deploy elsewhere. We're able to scale in that instance through third-party capital at a time when raising in the equity markets has not been an option for us. It's been prohibitively expensive. Our dividend yield at 7.8% or so today is very attractive as an investor, but raising additional equity, that is relatively expensive compared to transacting with a third party. We get paid a management fee on their interest, and we've got a very credible third party supporting our investment thesis. But we also retain ownership. So, we sold 50% interest. That means we're able to retain half, and we have an option to buy those stores back in the future, ultimately at the market value as of when our partner wishes to exit. And the management fee itself is attractive. It's GBP 1.2 million a year. So that makes a meaningful contribution to our earnings with actually not too much additional management intensity. It is value add from our perspective because it's our tenant relationships that really drive the value when it comes to the higher yielding stores and being able to underwrite that risk. But that's where our kind of value and the value of the platform comes into play. There is an opportunity or an aspiration to grow this vehicle to GBP 1 billion over time. It will depend on how that pipeline evolves as to exactly how it grows.

With GBP 400 million of day-one scale, there is no pressure to grow that vehicle. It was certainly worthwhile or sufficiently worthwhile by seeding it with those assets.

So then where are we looking to deploy the capital that we've effectively raised by creating that joint venture? Well, on the left-hand side, you've got Tesco, Sainsbury's, high-yielding opportunities. These give you around 10 years of income, but from investment-grade operators, so very strong tenants. In the second column, you've got the private equity-backed operators in Asda and Morrisons. Now there is a value opportunity there because you are able to achieve net initial yields that are higher up, 6.5%, maybe 7% plus, but for lease terms of 20, 25 years. So, you are getting compensated for the additional kind of risk with the fact that they are not investment grade. In the third column there, you've got Carrefour. So only 5% of our portfolio today is in France.

That allows us to deploy capital at a net initial yield of 6% to 6.5%. But it's worth remembering that Mike and the team put in place private placements during the year. So, we're able to borrow euro funding at a much lower rate than sterling. You borrow at around 4% versus the equivalent, say, 5.25% in the UK. So you get a really attractive spread between the net initial yield and the cost of debt for an investment-grade tenant. And then lastly, smaller format. So those of you who've followed us for some time will know that our primary focus is on large format omnichannel stores. But actually we do see some value opportunity in smaller format, maybe even down to convenience, where you've got lot sizes of GBP 1.5 million to GBP 5 million or so.

But you get 10, 15-year triple net leases from the likes of Sainsbury's, Tesco, but also a broader range of operators, M&S, Waitrose, Co-op. And what you get here is net initial yields of 6%, 6.5%. You're getting about 100 basis points additional yield for the smaller format than you do for a large format store with the same lease structure. So, there is some real relative value there for us. It's not that we're going to pile hundreds of millions into that. It takes longer to deploy capital into more granular units, but actually we do see some real relative value.

Just to summarize there on the outlook, so we've got a cost-efficient platform for growth. So, with a high-caliber team of sector specialists, the internalization means that Super itself is able to capture the upside of that team as we do transactions like the joint venture. We're able to capture that in earnings, the management fee, and we are able to have one of the lowest EPRA cost ratios in the sector, as Mike talked to. We've got a really attractive pipeline and opportunity to deploy capital into those assets. And as Mike talked to, we've got a good couple of hundred million of capacity to now do that. And in doing so, we'll be enhancing earnings. And what we're targeting by the end of this financial year is to have demonstrated to the market a fully covered and growing dividend by the time we get to the end of the year. And I think that's the real catalyst, the real driver for us taking the business back to a point where we should be really trading at or around NAV, I would hope and closing out that discount. That is a big focus for us, and as is driving kind of investor demands by doing presentations, whether it's in a format like this or just we're out on our investor roadshow in the next couple of weeks, and we are seeing as many names as we can. And we're looking to build awareness of Super and looking to drive those additional buyers of the stock and create some positive momentum.

So with that, I think we will turn to Q&A. I've just done a lot of speaking there, so I might ask Mike to go first. We've got some questions on the platform. Mike, there's one there around the portfolio WAULT. Why don't you start with that one, please?

Sure. We'll do. So, the question around the historic, current, and medium-term expectations for our WAULT. As we said, our WAULT today is 11 years. We have seen that naturally tick down given passage of time, but leases now typically are set at 15 years. So, we demonstrated with the three lease regears we did, new leases are typically set at 15 years. So, on that basis, we would expect to be targeting a WAULT in the medium term of between 10 to 12 years and managing that WAULT actively by regears or portfolio composition. So, it is very much a number that's in our control and something that we're cognizant of.

There is another question here around NAV. While the company's grown through both equity and capital raises, NTA has gone from 108p in 2021 to 87p in June 2024. And commenting on that. So, I guess, real estate is cyclical. Clearly, yields probably were at their low point around 2022. And then we have this mini-budget at the end of 2022 that did see property yields move up. So, we weren't -- I guess we weren't the only real estate company that would have seen the NAV decline over that time. I guess the point for us now is trying to demonstrate our NAV. And we were able to effectively sell GBP 466 million of assets, also retaining an interest in the JV, but we sold those as a blended premium to book value at 4%. So, we are incredibly comfortable with where our NAV is. We have been able to grow the NAV. So, within the lease regears that provide an 8% increase, the relettings at home basis 10% capital uplift as a result of those. So, we are able to drive that sort of total return.

But we aren't immune to the cyclical nature of real estate, but that wouldn't be isolated to just our company. Where we see yields now, yields are flat over the year. We see much more competition in when we're bidding for assets. So, we feel that where we -- what we're seeing in the market is that definitely yields have peaked, and we would expect the next movement to hopefully be down. And we would be the beneficiaries of NAV growth thereafter.

Thanks, Mike. Why don't I take one of the next ones just around business rates review? So, what effect would a potential increase in business rates on large commercial premises have on Super? So, this is, as you'd expect, something we have, of course, to work on as soon as there were announcements around potential changes. I think the starting point is that a large format store will turn over, say, GBP 70 million plus a year of revenue for the tenant.

And the increase in business rates cost will be typically around GBP 100,000 a year for a store of that size. So relative to total trade and performance, it isn't that significant. Clearly, it has an impact on profitability, but again, it's largely marginal at the operator's total business level. It's, of course, unwelcome and just further adds to pressure for increasing food prices and food price inflation.

And because the grocers operate, supermarkets are ultimately a relatively fine margin business. So, costs are pretty efficiently passed through, and margins are largely maintained over time. So actually, we're not really anticipating an impact. It doesn't materially move the needle in terms of the tenant's occupancy cost versus rent and existing rates bill. But what I do think you'll see is just, along with national insurance changes, just it will translate into higher food prices for consumers, which is clearly unfortunate. From a landlord's perspective, we are pretty insulated. And this all comes back to the benefit of being in what is absolutely a non-discretionary sector, as the demand is very, very robust when it comes to food.

There's a question around the potential proposals for the government banning upward only rent reviews and the potential effects on Super.

I guess it is still very early stages. And so, we'll keep a very close eye on how that legislation evolves. Again, one of the differences, though, in supermarkets is your tenants want to secure long-term occupation of these assets. So, our tenants are the ones who want to lease sub 10 years. They want to reset it back to 15. If there is a ban on upward only rent reviews, well then that changes potentially the willingness of the landlord to grant those long leases. So, it's too early to say, but what we may well see is, for instance, a move to fixed uplifts of a few percent a year rather than inflation linkage. Who knows? But what I would say is, again, I think supermarkets will be one of the best placed assets to kind of deal with that.

Another one, in a moment, Mike, I'll ask you to do the one on the JV warehousing, but I'll take the one before that, which is just around two of the larger Big Four supermarkets are in a far better financial shape than the other two. How do you view the risk of acquiring supermarkets from the two weaker companies? Which is a great question. Fundamentally, supermarkets and grocery, it's a localized market. Shoppers will not travel typically more than 10 minutes to do their shop. Typically, they won't travel past one supermarket to go to another one.

So, what you really need to do is make sure you're buying the best performing stores in those markets. And that's our job as sector specialists is understanding that market, underwriting at the market level.

But also, we should have a very good handle on the balance sheets of the operators and their own strategies, and we're taking a view on those. But first and foremost, you acquire the top performing stores because top performing food stores simply don't go vacant. They might change operator. They do not go vacant. But also it's underwriting that kind of credit risk, and we're well placed to do it. I would say we are very much underweight those names at the moment. We only have 2% exposure to Asda, 4% exposure to Morrisons. So yes, we're in a good place from that perspective.

I'll take there's a question coming around the joint venture. We refer to assets being warehoused, pipeline, and what is Blue Owl Capital's asset horizon, and are they only baked in mechanics of privacy? Well, I guess to take data, when we refer to warehousing pipeline, typically once these assets are acquired, because they're typically long-term holders of the stock, once the asset's gone, it'll be some time before you see it back in the market. So, part of the rationale for the joint venture was that we were able to, when the equity markets were closed, we were able to raise capital and sell a 50% interest in our own assets. And we have a right of first refusal that when they sold the Super will get a right of first refusal, so potential to buy those stores back in on Super's balance sheet directly in the future.

In terms of the exit horizon and the pricing for buying stores back in, yes, we'd typically expect the horizon to be probably five to seven years. We'd imagine the time we're looking to, our partner would be looking to exit. There's no predetermined pricing. There'll just be fair market value as determined at the point of sale. So yes, it'll be done at market rates as determined by independent valuers at the time.

There's another one. Like many people, the supermarkets come to me via home delivery now these days. Given warehouses are cheaper than stores, do you think a risk is grocers start delivering directly from warehouses? So, that is effectively the Ocado model. There's a very quick answer to this in that -- well, maybe not that quick. It was Asda and Sainsbury's both closed during COVID. They both closed these, what are known as dark stores, customer fulfillment centers, these warehouses that fulfill online. They closed them during the pandemic when online grocery was really booming. And that was to instead fulfill through stores because the biggest element of cost when it comes to grocery online is the delivery element. And the shorter you can make your delivery journey, the lower the cost it is to deliver. So, Omnichannel stores like the ones we own are absolutely the method of fulfillment. And you may have seen some headlines in the U.S. in the last week or so from Kroger, who've got a big partnership with Ocado, where they said they were reviewing some of those warehouses and instead looking to potentially fulfilling through stores. So, I think it's -- omnichannel has been the kind of clear winner. And you see that across the market, over 80% of online orders are fulfilled from stores. And I think that is actually all of the questions.

One more has just come in, Rob, on would we consider bidding for a publicly listed REIT? I think, I guess on that, we want to clearly, one of the benefits of internalization for us is that we are able to potentially look at some M&A activity. But we'd only execute on anything where there was a meaningful improvement to returns for our shareholders, be it through earnings or NAV growth. Fundamentally, I guess we would not want to dilute the story in terms of we are sort of grocery specialists. We, as probably most are in a sector, are looking at our options, but nothing imminent that we would be talking to. But clearly, and a potential avenue that we would keep under review.

Perfect. Well, that's great. Thanks very much for answering those questions from investors. Of course, the company can view all the questions that have been submitted today. We'll publish the responses out on the Investor Meet Company platform. But just before redirecting investors to provide you with their feedback, and it's particularly important to you both. Rob, could I just ask you for a few closing comments?

Thanks, Alessandro. Thank you, everyone, for listening in. It's for us, as we said, transformational year, incredibly busy, lots of significant milestones, but we are not done yet. We have plenty more to do. We've got capital to deploy. The priority now for us is getting that deployed into accretive opportunities that prove to the market a growing and covered dividend. And I think that will, that we're aiming for that to be the next catalyst for the re-rating of the shares, as I say. Thank you all for the support.

That's great. And Rob, Michael, thank you once again for updating investors today. Can I please ask investors not to close the session? As you know, we automatically redirected to provide your feedback and all the management team can better understand your views and expectations. Path for Management Team of Supermarket Income REIT plc, we'd like to thank you for attending today's presentation. And good afternoon to you all.